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1. Introduction  
This doctoral dissertation investigates immigrants’ political participation and 
representation in European democracies. It grounds on the observation that 
immigration to Europe has increased in the last years changing the ethnic and 
cultural landscape of the hosting democracies. These social phenomena raise 
several questions: How does immigration affect electoral democracies? Are 
immigrant and native voters alike? Or, does immigration emerge as a new social 
cleavage? Are parties concerned about immigration and open to include 
immigrant candidates? And, how are immigrants represented in national 
legislatures?  
  
This dissertation is an attempt to provide deep and systematized empirically 
founded insights on the transformations that national electorates, parties, and 
political institutions are experiencing in the so-called “age of migration” (Castles & 
Miller 2009). The studies examine and compare Western European democracies 
and shed light into some of the substantive changes and their underlying 
mechanisms. 
1.1 Why Immigrants’ Participation and Representation?  
Ideally all research projects should aim at satisfying two criteria: first, they should 
examine questions that are “important” in the real world and second, they should 
make a “contribution” to the existent scholarly literature by scientifically 
explaining some aspects of our world (King et al. 1994).  
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Although international migration is far from being a new phenomenon, in the last 
decades it has expanded to all regions of the world. International mobility has 
become easier as a result of political changes and the technological advancements 
in transport and communication, turning into the central dynamic of globalization 
(Castles & Miller 2009). A crucial characteristic of today’s international migration 
is the challenge that it poses to the sovereignty of states and the very notion of the 
nation, which are key features of modern polities. First, confronting the idea of a 
sovereign state constituting the authority which rules over a society, international 
migration defies the ability of states to regulate movements of people across 
borders and their integration (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000). Second, challenging 
the idea of a nation sharing a common ethnic and cultural heritage immigrants 
change the socio-demographic configuration of countries’ nation. This results in 
major challenges to the conception of national identities grounding on ethnic 
terms (Howard 2009). Furthermore, immigration contributes to the emergence of 
a structural conflict between the so-called “winners” and “losers” of globalization. 
While the winners of globalization benefit from globalization as the opening up of 
national boundaries enhances their life chances, for the losers of globalization the 
opening up of national boundaries represent a threat to their social status and 
security (Kriesi et al. 2008: 4-5). Thus, contemporary migration touches the 
vertebral bones of Western electoral democracies.  
 
A growing corpus of political literature has started investigating immigrants as 
voters, and immigrants’ interactions with political institutions and parties. 
Chronologically speaking this research first emanated from countries historically 
considered as immigration countries like the United States and Canada. Yet in 
recent years it has reached the old continent, where the field is under 
development. Recently, a team of researchers formed by Karen Bird and 
colleagues published one of the most comprehensive comparative studies about 
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immigrants’ political participation and representation in the context of European 
democracies (Bird et al. 2011). In this book the authors examine the electoral 
behavior of immigrants, immigrants’ candidacy and their representation in 
national legislatures, setting a fertile ground on which subsequent studies 
(including this one) build on.  
 
In the essay “An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems”, David Easton 
states “the study of politics is concerned with understanding how authoritative 
decisions are made and executed for a society” (1957: 383). Therefore, in the 
historical time that is ours, characterized by mass migration, this doctoral 
dissertation seeks to shed further light on the phenomenon of immigration and its 
effects on electoral democracies based on a series of comparative studies that 
encompass the process of immigrants’ political incorporation into the receiving 
counties, namely: (1) immigrants’ arrival to the host country; (2) their entry into 
the political arena and the recognition of their specific needs; (3) their political 
participation as voters, advocates and candidates and (4) the responsiveness of the 
political system to the needs and preferences of immigrant groups. 
 
Examining key aspects of the political life of immigrants emerged to me as a viable 
strategy to foster our understanding of the changes that European democracies are 
undergoing at the age of migration. As Easton observed “each part of the larger 
political canvas does not stand alone but is related to each other part” (1957: 383).  
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Figure 1.System of Political Actions 
 
 
 
In fact, a political system receives inputs of several kinds, which are converted into 
outputs, and have consequences for the system and the context in which the 
system exist (Easton 1957). As Figure 1 illustrates, in the context of multicultural 
democracies, political systems receive the input in the form of demands from 
immigrants, citizens of immigrant origin and national voters, which may have the 
support of specific political parties.  Much of what happens within political 
systems is related to the inputs and forces that shape the process of decision-
making. And following that process, authoritative decisions result, which shape the 
political system and its context (see Easton 1957).  
 
Following this framework of analysis I expect that by examining immigrant groups 
and their demands, immigrant voters’ mobilization, where do political parties 
stand on immigration and multiculturalism (inputs and support) and immigrants’ 
representation (outputs) I will make a contribution to our understanding of the 
politics of immigration, integration and citizenship in European democracies. 
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1.2 Research Design 
In order to provide with an overview of the research design of this investigation, in 
this section I explain the cross-national comparative strategy designed for this 
study, present a detailed account of the data that is used, and provide explanations 
for the multi-methodological approach implemented.  
1.2.1 Immigrants 
This dissertation focuses on the study of international migrants in Western 
European democracies. International migrants (or immigrants) are defined as 
individuals that enter a country with the aim of establishing residence1. The most 
usual criteria to identify immigrants are place of birth and citizenship (Bilsborrow 
1997). On the one hand, individuals’ place of birth is an important indicator 
because it sheds light on the dynamics of international mobility. On the other 
hand, nationality is one of the crucial identifying factors for international migrants 
because citizenship determines a person’s social, economic, and cultural rights in a 
country.  
 
Cross-national studies related to immigration embody several challenges. The 
definition of migrants has been a key source of inconsistency in national 
population statistics. Countries gather migration data in accordance to their own 
definitions and measurement traditions, which is not always consistent across 
countries. To reduce complexity and guarantee comparability in this dissertation I 
focus on first and second-generation migrants using place of birth as the main 
identifier. First-generation migrants are those individuals that are born in a 
different country than where they live, and to foreign parents. Second-generation 
migrants, in contrast, are those individuals born in the country where they live but 
                                                
1  Definition from the United Nations Population Division, International Migration Report 2002, 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/psetsublications/ittmig2002/2002ITTMIGTEXT22-11.pdf 
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to at least one foreign parent. These definitions are applied to all country, and 
district-level analyses.  
 
Following the main of objective of this thesis some of the empirical analyses focus 
on immigrant voters and representatives, using citizenship as the main identifying 
criteria. Therefore having identified international migrants by their country of 
origin, I then focus on the subset of national citizens of immigrant origin. This is 
particularly the case in Chapter 1 when I examine the immigrant electorate, 
Chapter 2 when I analyze the voting behavior of immigrant voters, in Chapter 5 
when I investigate immigrants’ descriptive representation and in Chapter 6 when I 
examine whether immigrant-origin deputies represent immigrants in national 
parliaments. 
 
The Venn diagram presented in Figure 2 illustrates the definitions above 
established. The circle of the left colored in dark grey represents the population of 
a country having the citizenship of that country. The circle of the right colored in 
light grey stands for the immigrant population living in that same country. At the 
intersection of both groups is the subset of individuals that have both, the 
citizenship of the country where they live, and a past of migration. Overall, the 
empirical analysis of this dissertation focuses mainly on immigrant voters and 
representatives, that is on the population located in the intersection of the 
diagram.  
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Figure 2.Venn Diagram of Citizens and Immigrants 
 
 
 
To conclude, the main subjects of interest of this dissertation are the immigrant 
populations residing in Western European countries. And, the main objective is to 
shed light on the effects that immigrants and immigration has in electoral 
democracies. As every empirical chapter deals with a different aspect of this 
phenomenon, depending on the focus I may refer either to the entire immigrant 
population of a country, or to the subset of immigrants holding the nationality of 
that given country. This is clearly indicated in every study.   
1.2.2 Case Selection 
In this dissertation I adopt a two-step approach to examine the transformations of 
Western European electoral democracies in relation to mass immigration (see 
Figure 3). First, I apply a cross-country comparative perspective to analyze the 
effects of mass immigration on the composition of the electorate, voting behavior 
and party policy positions in 15 Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. Second, following 
the case-study approach I go more in depth and examine immigrants’ political 
representation in three Western European countries: France, Germany, and the 
    Citizens Immigrants
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United Kingdom, which are in Europe among the countries with the largest 
immigrant populations.  
 
The combination of the comparative method with the right selection of cases can 
provide the means to test propositions that are deduced from given theory which 
derives in a very promising strategy (Mahoney 2003). At first, I examine some of 
the most important assumptions about immigrants’ political participation and 
representation across Western European countries. The comparative method used 
in this research can be traced back to the Millean canons. Comparative research is 
one of the basic scientific methods of establishing general empirical propositions 
(Lijphart 1971:682). It consists on the systematic search for the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the occurrence of political phenomena (Mill 1843 in Clark 
et al. 2009).  And, it is useful for testing propositions that have been validated in 
other contexts (Rokkan 1966: 19-20). In this way, the large N approach serves the 
purpose of revealing similarities and differences across cases, and to draw 
generalizations (King et al. 1994, Miller 2007).  
 
Second, the case-study approach follows the small N strategy and aims at 
providing a deep understanding of the factors that influence political 
representation and its causal mechanisms. In this sense, the small N strategy can 
help overcoming some of the weakness of large N comparisons, namely poor data 
quality, inadequate indicators, and reductionism (Geddes 2003, Brady & Collier 
2004).  
 9 
Figure 3.Scope of the Cross-country Comparison and the Case Studies Analysis 
Cross –country Comparison                Case Studies 
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Therefore, it is expected that by combining the large N and the small N strategies 
this dissertation can draw some generalizations and provide with a better 
understanding of the mechanisms of immigrants’ participation and representation.  
1.2.2.1 Cross-country Comparison  
In order to obtain scientific findings it is important to define clear criteria 
delimitating the scope of this inquire (Horowitz 1986). Accordingly, the selection 
of cases has followed the logic of a most-similar systems design (Przeworski and 
Teune 1970). Therefore to examine immigrants’ participation and representation 
the countries included in the analyses have been selected on the basis of their 
social, economic, demographic, and political similarities, which are discussed 
below.  
a) Socio-economic Development 
The “push-pull” economic theory of migration shows that difficult conditions in 
the country of origin, and attractive economic prospects in the receiving country 
are among the major forces behind migration (Castles and Miller 2009:22). 
Following this assumption the countries included in the comparative analyses 
outperform the majority of the countries in the region and in the world in terms of 
their socio-economic development. Prosperous economic and living conditions are 
strongly related to the topic studied here because they attract migrant workers 
from countries with less developed economies.  
 
The Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) is a composite 
statistics that combines life expectancy, education, and income indices accounting 
for inequality designed to rank countries in terms of their human development 
(United Nations Development Program). In short, the IHDI can be defined as 
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“the level of human development when inequality is accounted for”2, which is 
considered as the actual level of human development.  
 
As it is shown in Table 1 Western European countries, which are the cases, 
analyzed in this dissertation are considered to belong to the “very high human 
development” group, which means that they are located in the top quintile. 
Among the top 10 countries worldwide in terms of their Human Development we 
find four European countries including Ireland in the 5th position, Netherlands in 
the 7th position, Sweden in the 8th position, and Germany in the 10th position. In 
the second ten of the rank appear France in the 14th place, Finland in the 16th 
position, Belgium in the 18th place, and Denmark and Spain in the 19th and 20th 
places respectively. Down in the list appear Greece in the 22nd place, Italy in the 
23rd position, followed by Luxembourg, Austria and United Kingdom, which are 
in the 24th, 25th and 26th positions respectively. Finally, Portugal is located in the 
40th place worldwide.  
                                                
2 http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-report-en-1.pdf (page 157) 
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Table 1.Rank of Countries by Human Development in 
2010 
 
Rank Country  Adjusted HDI 
5 Ireland 0.89 
7 Netherlands 0.89 
9 Sweden 0.88 
10 Germany 0.88 
14 France 0.87 
16 Finland 0.87 
18 Belgium 0.86 
19 Denmark 0.86 
20 Spain 0.86 
22 Greece 0.85 
23 Italy 0.85 
24 Luxembourg 0.85 
25 Austria 0.85 
26 United Kingdom 0.84 
40 Portugal 0.79 
 
Source: IHDI, UNPD  
  
 
In other words, countries’ socio-economic conditions in terms of life quality, 
opportunities, and economic conditions are among the most important 
determinants of international migration. From this perspective the fact that 
European countries outperform other countries and regions in the world explains 
why they had become the recipient of mass immigration. And, mass immigration 
as I will show below is transforming the demographic landscape of these societies, 
making them the ideal cases to analyze to examine the effects of immigration on 
electoral democracies.  
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b) Immigration Countries 
In line to what I have argued above, socio-economic development comes almost 
always hand in hand with mass immigration. The pursuit of better economic 
opportunities is among the most important determinants of international 
migration. The relationship between socio-economic conditions and immigration 
is well established. As it is shown in Table 2 Western European countries are 
among the main destination of international migration. These countries have a 
considerable percentage of their population being born abroad.  
 
On the upper extreme is Luxemburg, which has one third of its population of 
immigrant origin. Ireland, Austria, Spain, and Sweden follow with more than 15 
percent of their population of immigrant origin. Then, Belgium, Germany, 
Greece, United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands have between 10 and 15 
percent of their population of immigrant origin. Finally, in Denmark, Portugal, 
and Italy around 10 percent of the population is non-national. And on the 
extreme lower side is Finland scoring the lowest percentages of immigrants among 
their population with 4.6 percent of their residents being of immigrant origin.   
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Table 2.Share of Immigrants per Country  
Country % Immigrants  
Luxembourg 36.3 
Ireland 17.6 
Austria 16.8 
Spain 16.6 
Sweden 15.1 
Belgium 14.8 
Germany 13.6 
Greece 12.3 
United Kingdom  11.9 
France 11.8 
Netherlands 11.6 
Denmark 9.8 
Portugal 8.7 
Italy 8.2 
Finland 4.6 
 
 Source: Eurostat  
 
Western European countries have followed a transformation phase in which they 
have step-by-step turned from emigration countries into immigration countries 
(Fassmann et al. 20143). Transformations in countries’ migration cycles are often 
times accompanied by periods of stagnation, which then stabilize when 
immigration becomes one of the central components of demographic growth. In 
this latest stadium of the migration cycle, policy evolutions related to migration 
regulations are re-examined and integration policies are put forward.  
 
Under those circumstances, Western European democracies are interesting cases 
to examine for two main reasons. On the one hand, the aim of this dissertation is 
to provide new insights on the interplay of immigration and democracy in “new” 
immigration countries. Much of what we know today about these phenomena 
originates from “old” immigrant countries, mainly the United States and Canada.  
For this reason, centering our focus on the European contexts allows for testing 
                                                
3 http://epc2014.princeton.edu/papers/140803 
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whether the same factors that explain immigrants’ political participation and 
representation in “old” immigration countries are useful to explain this in the 
“new” immigration countries.  On the other hand, due to the fact that the 
phenomenon of immigration is relatively new in Western Europe, many 
transformations are taking place at the present time in these democracies. 
Therefore, we are in a privileged position when examining this phenomenon in 
Europe because these evolutions are on the go, making the European democracies 
the ideal cases to investigate how immigration affects electoral democracies.  
c) Consolidated Democracies 
The democratic history of a polity is an important factor to take into account in 
comparative analyses. In the first place the length of the democratic trajectory of a 
given country is crucial factor explaining the characteristics of institutions, party 
systems and the electorate.  Established democratic systems guarantees that “the 
democracies studied are not ephemeral entities but reasonably stable and 
consolidated democratic systems” (Lijphart 1999: 53). In contrast, countries that 
have democratized more recently have a re-structuring party system and volatile 
electorates.  
 
From this perspective, drawing the line for the case selection along the iron 
curtain has been a vital decision in this dissertation. Western European countries 
have followed a differentiated political trajectory in comparison to the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe that were part of the Soviet Union. While the former, 
have more solid and stable democratic institutions, the latter are still experiencing 
considerable institutional, partisan, and demographic re-structuring. And this is 
quite consequential in defining the stadium of democracy. From this perspective, 
in stable democracies classic cleavages are more or less solved and new issues can 
emerge in the public agenda, among which immigration (Kriesi et al. 2008), 
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therefore older and stable democracies of the West of Europe are the ideal 
framework for examining the interplay of immigration and democracy. 
d) European Union Membership 
In addition to the above-mentioned characteristics that make Western European 
countries suitable for comparison in terms of their socio-economic conditions, 
migration dynamics and democratic history, another key point that is crucial in 
this study is countries’ early membership to the European Union. Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands constitute the “Inner 
Six”, the founding members who set the basis for the economic and political 
regional cooperation. In 1973 Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined 
the community. In 1981 Greece was included and later Portugal and Spain in 
1986, and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995.  
 
In 2004 the European Union made the steps towards the big enlargement, 
including Eastern European countries and symbolizing the unification of Eastern 
and Western Europe. Even so, including countries that have been EU members 
for a long time responds to a major concern. These countries play an important 
regional role as agenda-setters and policy-makers in the EU. It must be 
remembered that as part of the European Union, member states adhere to 
collaborative immigration policies applied on the borders of the Union to control 
for non-European immigration. As a result older members of the EU have been 
deciding on immigration matters, shaping EU immigration policies. And, a point 
often overlooked is that these countries have set the conditions for accession of the 
new EU members states, including the conditions related to intra-European and 
third-country migration. Given these points it is reasonable to center the empirical 
analyses of this dissertation on the older members of the European Union.  
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Finally, EU membership (which explains also the exclusion of non-EU members 
like Norway and Switzerland from this study) is an important determinant of 
immigration policies within the regional territory. First, it must be remarked that 
an increasing convergence on border control, citizenship and integration policies 
is observed across these countries (Koopmans 2005). Notably, since the Schengen 
Agreement signed in 1985 European citizens have the right to live and work 
everywhere within the EU. These institutional changes contributed immensely to 
intra-European migration. And, with the adoption of the Maastricht agreement in 
1992 the European citizenship was created which setting higher standards in 
terms of the integration of European migrants.  In particular, social and political 
rights have been granted to EU nationals living in other European countries.  
1.2.2.2 Case Studies 
The second part of the analysis focuses on immigrants’ political representation in 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and examines in particular their 
national parliaments. This design is conceived to reducing “the number of 
“disturbing” variables to be kept under control” (Della Porta & Keating 2008: 
214) and therefore we can better explain similarities and variations in terms of 
immigrants’ political representation.  
 
In the vast majority of the lower houses across bicameralist democracies, 
representatives are elected directly by citizens in which equal weight is given to 
each and single eligible voter (Tsebelis and Money 1997:46). Independently of the 
electoral system (single-member constituency, first-past-the post, two-round 
system, proportional representation) the lower house normally serves the purpose 
of legitimating because is elected by the citizens of the country where one citizen 
equals one vote (Tsebelis and Money 1997:46). The focus of the last empirical 
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analyses on the lower houses responds to the fact that these are elected directly in 
the aim of representing the citizens.  
 
The three countries selected for the analysis of political representation have key 
characteristics in common. They have adopted single-member constituency 
systems (albeit some differences), which have as a constitutive characteristic to 
emphasize the relationship between members of parliament and their territorial 
constituencies. From this perspective, single-member constituency systems are 
particularly interesting for the research topic I investigate in this dissertation 
because international migrants tend to concentrate geographically within the 
borders of legislative constituencies. This characteristic facilitates testing the 
explanatory power of different variables such as the effect of the size of the 
immigrant community in a given constituency on immigrants’ representation, 
against party or individual-based explanations. In addition, France has a two-
round system whereas the United Kingdom has a first-past-the-post system, and 
Germany combines single-member constituency system with open list 
proportional systems4. These institutional differences are taken into account by the 
researcher and linked to the empirical outcomes of the analyses to explain how 
and to what extent institutions shape immigrants’ representation.  
 
In summary, I have presented in this section the case selection procedures adopted 
in the selection of countries for the cross-country comparison, and the three cases 
for the in-depth analyses, that structure the two-step approach I follow in this 
dissertation. Next, I will show the time-span covered in the empirical analyses that 
conform this doctoral thesis.  
                                                
4 The implications of these differences for immigrants’ political representation are further discussed 
in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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1.2.3 Time Frame Overview 
The interest of this doctoral dissertation is to understand how the phenomenon of 
immigration affects our contemporary democracies. In order to do so, I examine 
some of the most important pillars of our democracies: the electorate, political 
parties, and political representation in national legislatures. The vast majority of 
the empirical research focuses in the present years. This is in particular the case to 
explain immigrants’ voting behavior, and immigrants’ political representation. In 
contrast, to explain the emergence and evolution of multicultural democracies, 
and parties’ policy position, I adopt a broader historical perspective that covers 
the period from the 1960s until 2010.    
 
Figure 4 summarizes the time covered in every empirical analysis. To start with, 
Chapter 2, which examines the emergence and evolution of European 
Multicultural Democracies, examines their evolution since the 1960s till today. 
Chapter 3, explains the participation and voting behavior of immigrant voters in 
contemporary democracies, and uses a survey conducted in several Western 
European democracies in 2010. Chapter 4 examines the evolution of the issue of 
Multiculturalism across party systems in the last five decades. Finally Chapters 5 
and 6 study descriptive and substantive representation in France (2007-2012), 
Germany (2005 – 2009) and the United Kingdom (2005 – 2010).  
 
Therefore for the most part, this research is centered in examining contemporary 
democracies. Nonetheless, when it is appropriate I take a retrospective approach 
that help us revealing the long-term development of contemporary European 
democracies in the context of immigration.   
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Figure 4.Empirical Chapters Time Frame Overview  
 
           
Chapter 2 Multicultural Democracies 
1960  2010 
           
           
Chapter 3 The Immigrant Voter 
          2010 
           
           
      Chapter 4 Parties and Multiculturalism 
1960  2010 
           
           
      Chapter 5 Descriptive Representation 
         2005-2012 
           
           
      Chapter 6 Substantive Representation 
         2005-2012 
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1.2.4 Data 
Given its empirical nature this dissertation makes use of a wide variety of primary 
and secondary data5. Table 3 presents a summary of the data by category, type, 
and source.  
Table 3.Summary of the Empirical Data  
Category  Type  Source  
Demographic  Population  Population registers 
 Migration  Population registers 
 Economic  GDP Growth  World Bank  
 Human Development  United Nations  
 Legal Migration  Several  
 Citizenship  Several  
 Political rights  Several  
 Preferences   Electoral behaviour  European Social Survey 
 Opinion  Several  
 Representation Policy position  Manifesto Project  
 MPs’ demographics Several 
 MPs’ questions  National parliaments  
 
 
The empirical analyses that conform this dissertation are based on five categories 
of data: (1) demographic, (2) economic, (3) legal, (4) preferences, and (5) 
representation data. These categories are sub-divided into different types, which 
have been extracted from different sources. Demographic data includes 
population and migration information, extracted from population registers. 
Economic data comprises economic growth and development data obtained from 
the databanks from the World Bank and the United Nations Statistics. Legal 
evidence includes migration, citizenship, and political rights, which have been 
extracted from legal documents and institutional databases. Preference data refer 
                                                
5 Data specifications are provided in the single chapters 
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to individuals’ vote choice and opinion, which are captured via opinion surveys. 
Finally, representation data comprises parties policy positions extracted from the 
Manifesto Project database an the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, MPs’ demographics 
obtained from representatives’ biographies in combination with secondary data, 
and MPs’ written parliamentary questions obtained from the websites of National 
Parliaments. All in all, the question of immigrants’ political participation and 
representation in European democracies is explained using different kinds of data.  
1.2.5 Measurements  
The aim of this dissertation is to measure immigrants’ political participation and 
representation in European democracies. In order to achieve such objectives, and 
following Easton’s system of political actions, I have identified crucial elements of 
our contemporary democracies and examined them in the light of the 
phenomenon of immigration. These include national electorates’ demographics, 
voting behavior, and descriptive and substantive representation. Table 4 presents 
a summary of the main variables examined in this doctoral dissertation6.  
 
  
                                                
6 Specifications related to the definition of these variables can be found on the empirical chapters. 
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Table 4.Summary of Measurements 
 
 
Chapter 
Number 
Latent 
Variable 
Systematized 
Concept Indicator 
 
Chapter 2 
 
 
Multiculturalization  
of Democracies 
 
 
 
Diversifying 
Electorate  
 
 
Electorates’ ethnic and 
cultural diversity  
Chapter 3 Electoral Behaviour  
of Immigrants  
 
 
Turnout Share of immigrant voters 
that participated  
 
Chapter 3 
 
 
 Vote  
Choice  
 
 
Immigrants’ party choice 
Chapter 4 Political  
Representation of 
Immigrants  
Substantive  
Representation  
Party position on 
multiculturalism 
 
 
Chapter 5  Descriptive 
Representation 
 
  
Proportion of immigrant 
MPs’ related to immigrant 
population 
 
 
Chapter 6  Substantive  
Representation  
MPs’ questions in parliament  
 
 
 
To start with, in Chapter 2 I analyze the characteristics of the diversifying 
electorate across Western European democracies. From this perspective I examine 
the evolution of national electorates in terms of their ethnic and cultural diversity. 
In Chapter 3 I study the electoral behavior of immigrant voters. Therefore, the 
main variables of interests are immigrants’ turnout and vote choice. Chapters 4 to 
6 focus on political representation, and in every chapter a different component of 
representation is tackled. Chapter 4 examines the evolution of the issue of 
multiculturalism across parties and party systems. In this chapter, political parties 
are the main units of interest, and I look in particular at their position on the issue 
of multiculturalism. Chapter 5 examines the representation of immigrants in 
national legislatures. It studies the nomination and election of immigrant deputies. 
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Finally, Chapter 6 investigates immigrants’ substantive representation in 
parliament by looking at the content of the questions they tabled by individual 
MPs.  
1.3 Structure of the Thesis  
Chapter 2 “Setting the Context: Multicultural Democracies” addresses 
the state-of-the-art on the impact of immigration on Western European electoral 
democracies. Relying on demographic and economic data it sets the reasons and 
contexts of immigration. It argues that these countries have now multicultural 
democracies, and discusses how immigration alters the composition of the 
electorate, voting behavior, and political representation. On the whole, the first 
chapter sets the ground for the empirical analyses that precede this dissertation.  
 
Chapter 3 “The Immigrant Voter” examines the voting behavior of citizens 
of immigrant origin in European democracies. So far, only few studies conduct 
comparative analyses of this type due to lack of survey data on voters’ 
backgrounds. This is why in this chapter a method is proposed that allows 
extracting this information from a combination of different items from the 
European social survey in a comparative manner. Through this novel approach, 
the thesis renders more visible the inherent specificities of the immigrant 
electorate. Furthermore, an additional contribution of this chapter to the literature 
resides on the way I have measured party preferences. The results show that 
immigrant voters participate less in elections and are more prone to support left 
parties than native voters. Thereby, this chapter provides cross-country evidence 
sustaining the findings reached in single case studies, showing that these patterns 
are observed across countries and immigrant groups.   
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Chapter 4 “Issue Evolution and Political Parties” complements the 
research immigrant voters by analyzing the evolution of the issue of 
multiculturalism and parties’ positions on this issue over the last five decades in ten 
democracies. All in all, it makes two main contributions. First, and contrary to 
what is generally assumed in the literature, the study shows that the issue of 
multiculturalism was present in the political arena before the emergence and 
success of anti-immigration parties. Second, it provides evidence which signal that 
all party families in the 1960s and 1970s (including nationalist parties) had positive 
views on multiculturalism. It is shown that by the end of the 1970s a radical shift 
in party systems occurred towards more conservative views. And, it is at this point 
that anti-immigration parties adopted more radical positions against 
multiculturalism. That process was accentuated in the 2000s parallel to the 
occurrence of major immigration-related events (terrorism, social unrest, and 
controversial statements by the media and political actors). In this way, Chapter 4 
sheds light on the evolution of the issue of multiculturalism across party families 
and party systems, and provides with some keys to unlock the underlying 
dynamics of these developments.  
 
Chapter 5 “Descriptive Representation” deals with how immigrants are 
represented in parliament. It is an attempt to move beyond the “counting-faces” 
approach focused on the number of minority representatives in office by 
incorporating additional elements in the study of descriptive representation. 
Coping with the challenges of the limited data available, the study makes two 
essential contributions. It proposes a framework of analysis by which descriptive 
representation is examined in relation to the characteristics of the immigrant 
electorate. Through this novel framework, this thesis sheds light on the role that 
immigrant voters play in the election of immigrant representatives, together with 
the strategies that parties follow in the nomination of candidates in the immigrant 
constituencies. Besides, it focuses on immigrant deputies socio-demographics in 
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order to explain how much these “mirror” immigrant voters. The results of the 
study reveal that this analytical framework is very useful to understand 
immigrants’ representation. Additionally, the study shows that institutional 
characteristics are among the most important determinants of immigrants’ 
descriptive representation. Furthermore, there is evidence confirming that party 
ideology is highly associated with immigrants’ nominations and that immigrant 
deputies are more likely to get elected in “immigrant constituencies”. Finally, 
biographical data sheds light on the fact that immigrant deputies resemble more 
national elites than the members of the immigrant community.  
 
Chapter 6 “Substantive Representation” examines how immigrant and 
native deputies deal with immigration issues, especially when they represent 
“immigrant constituencies”. The sixth chapter makes three substantial 
contributions to the existing literature on political representation. By examining a 
massive amount of parliamentary questions from an original dataset it sheds light 
on how members of parliament respond to their constituencies, whether 
differences between immigrant and native deputies exist, and the extent to which 
parties influence immigrants’ representation. The study shows that overall 
members of parliament respond to their immigrant constituents when these 
constitute a large group.  
 
Chapter 7 “Conclusion and Discussion” summarizes the findings of this 
dissertation, discusses the main limitations of the study and path the way for future 
research. 
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2. Setting the Context: Multicultural 
Democracies 
Mass migration refers to “large net streams crossing cultural and national borders 
resulting in significant population redistribution” (Fielding 1993:7). After a long 
history of emigration European countries have become the destination for many 
migrants. In contrast to other affluent democracies such as the United States, 
Canada or Australia, which have been since their very foundation immigration 
countries, modern European states are the result of a political history rooted on 
ideas of a nation based on shared ethnicity and cultural heritage. As a 
consequence, ethnic and cultural diversity resulting from mass migration 
challenges European societies and their political regimes in many ways.  
 
In the late 19th century and to the first half of the 20th century following the 
devastating effects of World Wars I and II most European countries experienced 
mass emigration. Considerable numbers of European citizens who were in their 
vast majority urban belonging to the poor working class and rural workers 
emigrated searching for better opportunities. Also, the armed and ideological 
conflicts that took place in European states forced partisans as well as members of 
the intelligentsia to flee their home country. The United States, Canada, Australia, 
Brazil, and Argentina ranked among the most popular destinations for European 
migrants. This period was also characterized by an important intra-European 
south-north migration, but that remained less important than the inter-continental 
flow. 
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Migration patterns reversed quite drastically after World War II. Western 
European countries7 (particularly those from the North-West) started to receive 
large number of migrants8. This change in the migration cycle resulted from two 
situations. On the one hand, migration to Europe is explained by the North-South 
variability of the economies. Notably, Germany, France, the Benelux, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, in comparison to other European states 
and other regions in the world enjoyed from economic prosperity, which attracted 
numerous foreign workers from less developed economies in the region. 
Macroeconomic theories explain that in periods of economic expansion, 
employers turn to foreign labor (Fielding 1993:8) and nation-states implement 
migration policies designed to cope with labor shortage. For instance, the Guest 
Workers programs implemented in Germany facilitated labor migration to the 
country.  
 
On the other hand, the independence of former colonies, which occurred mainly 
in the 1960s and 1970s, had also a great impact on mass migration, particularly to 
the former colonial masters. The cultural and linguistic ties that former colonial 
subjects had with France, the United Kingdom or the Netherlands, facilitated 
migration from the former colonial territories to these countries. Thus, economic 
development and the colonial history of many European countries increased 
migration to the old continent, contributing to the ethnic and cultural 
diversification of European societies. 
 
In this Chapter I examine some of the main traits of these demographic changes, 
and its consequences for the working of contemporary democracies. The Chapter 
                                                
7 In this research the terms Western Europe and EU 15) are used interchangeably. EU 15 was the 
number of member countries of the European Union prior to the accession of ten candidate 
countries on May 2004. The EU 15 comprises the following countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (source: OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms). 
8 The terms migrants, immigrants, ethnic minorities and foreigners refer to intra and extra-
European migrants and are used interchangeably.  
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is structured as follows. It first gives an introduction to the demographic dynamics 
in Europe that result from mass immigration, and it examines citizenship access 
and immigrants voting rights across European countries. In a second part it 
focuses on the specificities of immigration and the immigrant electorate in France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom.  
2.1 Immigration in Western Europe 
Since the end of World War II the impact of immigration on the European 
population didn’t cease to increase. As it is showed in Figure 1, net migration 
(shares of foreign-born9) to Western Europe (EU1510) augmented, particularly 
after 1985. At the same time, across European societies natural change (difference 
between births and deaths in country) decreased drastically. The combination of 
these two demographic trends had two major consequences. First, since the 1980s 
net migration surpassed natural change in terms of its contribution to the overall 
population growth. Therefore in European societies - characterized by an ageing 
population - generational replacement is to a great extent dependent on 
migration. Second, the relative size of the immigrant population has grown. As a 
result, the immigrant population started to be very visible in certain geographic 
areas and specific sectors of the economy.  
                                                
9 Net migration rates are calculated as the difference between immigrants and emigrants in a given 
country in a specific period of time.  
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Figure 5.Total Population Change, Natural Change and Net Migration in Europe (per 1000, 1960-2012)  
 
 
Source: Eurostat11 
                                                
11  Eurostat Migration Statistics (demo_pop) include the flows of immigrants and emigrants, and population stocks broken down by country of citizenship or 
birth, data that is supplied on an annual basis by national statistical institutes.  
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This evidence provides the empirical foundations for the premise that 
immigration is changing the ethnic and cultural composition of Western 
European democracies. And, it is expected that in the future diversity will 
continue to increase. Even the most conservative population predictions forecast 
that the percentages of foreign population (including first and second generation, 
excluding third generation) will continue to increase in the next decades. As it is 
showed in Figure 2 in the next decades it is expected that increasingly larger 
shares of the population will be of immigrant origin.  Overall, in the EU15 we 
expect that by the year 2021 twenty percent of the population will be first or 
second generation migrant, and that by 2051 almost one out of three European 
residents will be of foreign origin. 
 
Broken down by country, by 2051 great ethnic and cultural diversity12 is expected 
across most Western European democracies. The countries that are expected to 
have lower shares of immigrants are Finland and France scoring 12,9 and 15,5 
respectively. The majority of Western European countries are forecasted to have 
an immigrant population of around 30 percent. In the Netherlands were the 
foreign population is expected to reach 21 percent. Belgium, Germany, Denmark, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom will have approximately between 
26 and 34 percent of their population of immigrant origin. Finally, among the 
countries for which the population expectations forecast the largest shares of 
immigrants are Ireland, Spain and Luxemburg scoring 34 percent, 36 percent, 
and 62 percent respectively.   
                                                
12 In this dissertation ethnic and cultural diversity or heterogeneity are considered as similar 
concepts. Kymlicka (1995:11-12) distinguish two patterns of cultural diversity. The first one 
resulting from the incorporation of self-governing territorially concentrated cultures into a larger 
state, which are otherwise referred as “national minorities”. The second case refers to cultural 
diversity resulting from individual and familial migration. Such immigrants often times form 
“ethnic groups”. They typically seek integration into the larger society and to be accepted as full 
members of it. They seek recognition of their ethnic identity by demanding modifications of the 
institutions and laws of the majority group “to make them more accommodating of cultural 
differences”. 
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Figure 6.Scatter Plot Matrix of Expected Shares of 
Immigrants in Europe (average, 2011-2051) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat13. 
 
 
Institutional theorists have made the observation that once that international 
migration has started it tends to sustain itself. This is the byproduct of the growth 
of networks and the development of migrant-supporting institutions, which 
together make additional movement more likely over time. This process is called 
cumulative causation (Massey 1990) and sheds light on the fact that every 
migration act alters both the sending and receiving social contexts, increasing the 
likelihood of future migration. As can be seen, mass migration has transformed, is 
                                                
13 Lanzieri (2011): http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-RA-11-
019/EN/KS-RA-11-019-EN.PDF 
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transforming, and will continue to transform the ethnic and cultural landscape of 
European societies. Given these points, Western European democracies are 
becoming multicultural democracies. As Kymlicka (1995: 18-19) puts it, there is a 
sort of multiculturalism that arises from ethnic differences resulting from 
immigration. Different groups sharing distinct languages and history, which are 
important aspects of personal identities and political lives, co-exist in a given 
country arising several challenges related to the accommodation of these 
minorities and the performance of its democracy.  
2.2 Geographic Concentration 
“Migrants arriving in a particular country do not spread out randomly throughout 
all possible destinations” (White 1993:52). As a consequence, the largest European 
cities have experienced in the last years a dramatic change in their composition 
(White 1993b: 66-67). This results on the “labeling” of certain districts as 
immigrant neighborhoods, as La Goutte D’Or and Saint Denis in Paris, 
Kreuzberg and Neukölln in Berlin, and Brixton in London.  
 
The emergence of ethnic minority communities is basically the consequence of 
residence distribution, which results from residential segregation. In a word, 
housing reflects immigrants’ economic status, family composition and 
demography, cultural identity and the hegemonic forces of the host society. It 
evidences the emergence of housing submarkets within individual classes that are 
related to the existence of different minority groups. Generally speaking, socio-
economic status and class explain ethnic minority housing segregation. Immigrant 
groups are to a great extent in a weak financial position, and as a consequence 
unable to afford high rents or buy expensive properties. Many migrants also pool 
their resources, as through a systems of communal sharing of financial resources 
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practiced by the community they can afford access to properties, such is the case 
with the Chinese community in Paris (White 1993b: 71). 
 
Along with the effect that financial constraints have on immigrant groups’ 
geographic concentration, cultural factors or in-group orientation, also play a role. 
For instance many minority groups use very limited housing search methods. 
Among many migrants information is only gathered via personal contacts, which 
relates to a very limited sector of the housing market and that usually limited to 
specific geographic locations. Besides, in the competitive housing market in which 
housing competition is a possible factor nourishing ant-immigration sentiments, 
the concentration of minorities in certain areas could also be seen as a defense 
mechanism enabling a retention of cultural norms in the face of external threats 
(Phillips and Karn 1991). In short, housing and geographic segregation can be 
explained to a great extent by the behavior of immigrant communities themselves.  
 
Yet, the housing market also restricts immigrants’ dispersion and impedes greater 
contact between migrants and natives. In many cities, the so-called “housing 
managers” hold the power to restrict the access to housing from many groups. 
First, the control over social housing has played a crucial role. Segregation 
patterns have been observed across many cities, especially via the introduction of 
quotas and maximum percentages in social housing. In turn, the restrictive access 
of immigrants to social housing has perpetuated the segregation of immigrants 
from native groups of similar socio-economic status.  Second, private landlords are 
far more discriminatory although their identification is more difficult (White 
1993b: 71-72).  
 
To conclude, the geographic concentration of immigrants is an important element 
of their integration. It allows immigrant groups to maintain some cultural ties to 
their culture and socialization with groups of similar socio-cultural status while 
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residing in another country (Funkhouser 2000:489). Self-segregation is observed in 
two phenomena. First, international migration has also created communities of 
expats with high-status and very prosperous economic conditions. Examples of 
such types of immigrants are the employers of international organizations in 
Brussels and Geneva or the Japanese neighborhood in Düsseldorf.  Second, the 
self-segregation of immigrant groups, especially for those with more distinctive 
cultural demands, implies other advantages. Indeed, residential concentration 
favors to creation of religious facilities, educational provisions or specialist retailing 
(White 1993b: 72). 
2.3 From Immigrants to Citizens  
For many migrants there is no initial intention of permanent settlement. However, 
migration dynamics are intertwined with individual’s life cycles. Some migrants 
may want to prolong their stay because either they have succeeded in integrating 
into the host society, or because they have failed to meet their expectations and 
confront several difficulties to return. Also, having their descendants born and/or 
socialized in the host country may act as an additional incentive to settle in the 
host country because of the difficulties that it may represent for them to live in a 
different country. As a consequence when governments interfere to try to control 
immigration, most likely as a reaction of economic cycles, they confront different 
challenges than economic ones. Temporary migration has more likely 
transformed into permanent settlement or family reunion (Castles and Miller 
2009:33).  
 
Beyond economic integration, migrants are also confronted with their integration 
in the social and political communities of their host countries. Yet, as Bauböck 
argues “[a] democratic polity is never entirely identical with a society (…).[A] 
democratic procedure of decision-making creates its own kind of membership, 
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which indentifies individuals as potential voters and not just as participants in 
social interactions” (Bauböck 1993:174). In this way, liberal democracies usually 
constrain the access to the polity, via the selection of its members.  
 
The concept of citizenship refers to a particular type of legal bond between an 
individual and a state. T.H. Marshall (1950) argues that there are three types of 
rights that are granted to citizens: civic-legal, social and political. Civic rights 
include the right to fair trial, right of association and freedom of speech. Social 
rights refer to the social benefits provided to citizens including health protection, 
unemployment benefit and pension. Political rights include the right to cast a vote 
and to run for elections. In the postwar era with the expansion of human rights on 
the one hand, and the increasing inter-state mobility which has forced nation-
states to look after the conditions of immigrants, on the other, individual rights 
have been increasingly conceived as human rights, and recognized at the 
transnational level. These transformations have led to the emergence of a “post-
national citizenship” (Soysal 1994), which involves the extension of many rights 
that were previously granted exclusively to national citizens to non-citizen 
immigrants. These developments however, have mainly occurred on the 
recognition of rights of the first two spheres, namely civic-legal and social rights. 
In contrast, political rights have remained to a great extent rights that are 
exclusively granted to national citizens. Generally speaking immigrants can not 
hold public office, they don’t have the same rights in terms of their eligibility for 
representative bodies and can’t cast a voter. As Castles and Kosack put it “[t]he 
most serious form of discrimination against immigrant workers is their deprivation 
of political rights” (1972: 33).  
 
In general, the political inclusion of immigrants is dependent on two factors: (1) 
the recognition of political rights to foreign residents, and (2) the attribution of 
national citizenship. First, the attribution of political rights to foreigners is not 
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systematic nor it is applied in a similar way across all democracies and groups. 
Basically, it goes along with two distinctions made by national states: the type of 
election and immigrants’ country of origin (Table 5). On the one side, there is a 
distinction between local, regional, national and European elections. Whereas 
countries tend to be more liberal concerning political rights granted to immigrants 
on local, regional and even European elections, the right to participate in national 
elections remain almost an exclusive right of national citizens. This distinction 
results from the fact that national elections, and local or regional elections are 
perceived to have different hierarchies. National elections are first-order elections 
while local, regional and European elections are perceived to be second order 
elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980). First–order elections (parliamentary elections in 
parliamentary systems and presidential elections in presidential ones) have a great 
direct impact on national governments as in these elections voters decide who 
should govern the country. In contrast, second-order elections determine electoral 
outcomes to a lesser extent as these define fewer offices and have no direct impact 
on national government.  Although, second-order elections serve voters and 
political parties as an arena to influence first-order elections, these are less relevant 
(Reif and Schmitt 1980: 8-9).  
 
National elections are more influential in terms of defining a government, and 
because of that they are strongly linked to the core principle of modern electoral 
democracies of popular sovereignty. “Historically, the principle of nationalism has 
linked internal democracy with national self-determination, thus with territorially 
bounded and culturally integrated communities” (Soysal 2001: 164). In short, 
national elections are (more) related to the ideas of collective decisions making, 
representation of the interests of national citizens, and control of the rulers by the 
ruled (Balibar 2004:134).  
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Table 5.Voting Rights Granted to Immigrants and Citizens in Local, National and European Elections  
 Third Country EU Citizens Naturalized 
Election  Loc. Nat. EU Loc. Nat. EU Loc. Nat. EU 
Austria ●   ▄  ▄ ▄ ▄ ▄ 
Belgium ▄   ▄  ▄ ▄ ▄ ▄ 
Denmark ▄   ▄  ▄ ▄ ▄ ▄ 
Finland    ▄  ▄ ▄ ▄ ▄ 
France    ▄  ▄ ▄ ▄ ▄ 
Germany    ▄  ▄ ▄ ▄ ▄ 
Greece ▄   ▄  ▄ ▄ ▄ ▄ 
Ireland    ▄  ▄ ▄ ▄ ▄ 
Italy    ▄  ▄ ▄ ▄ ▄ 
Luxembourg    ▄  ▄ ▄ ▄ ▄ 
Netherlands ▄   ▄  ▄ ▄ ▄ ▄ 
Portugal Some   ▄  ▄ ▄ ▄ ▄ 
Spain LA*   ▄  ▄ ▄ ▄ ▄ 
Sweden ▄   ▄  ▄ ▄ ▄ ▄ 
United Kingdom C+I C+I C+I ▄  ▄ ▄ ▄ ▄ 
 
 
Source: Author’s own as of 2012. (▄) Political rights granted. (●) In 2002 the Social Democratic party in Vienna passed a law extending voting rights to all foreign residents that have lived in the country for 
more than five years. The regulation has never been applied in practice (Jenny 2011:51). C+I: in the United Kingdom Commonwealth and Irish citizens are granted political rights. LA* Voting rights are 
granted to some Latin-American migrants in Spain based on reciprocity. In Portugal these rights are granted to some migrants.  
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In this way, national citizenship that grants full access to political rights is an 
object enacting material and symbolic closure (Brubaker 1992:23), which like 
other institutions serve the purpose of delimiting the terms of associational and 
participatory life in modern nation-states (Soysal 2001:164). 
 
Moreover, there is a distinction related to immigrants’ country of birth, which 
subdivides immigrants into different groups. The differentiation of immigrants 
based on country of origin is basically the result of the colonial history, inter-state 
agreements and integration policies implemented by individual states. Basically 
there are three major groups of immigrants: third country migrants, EU citizens 
and naturalized migrants.  
 
Third country migrants are granted political rights only in few countries. Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom constitute some exceptions 
within the European Union. Third country migrants living in Belgium are allowed 
to vote in local elections since 2000 after 5 years of residence, yet they can’t stand 
as a candidate (Jakobs 2011:36). The Netherlands granted voting rights to 
immigrants in 1985, making it one of the first countries to recognized voting rights 
to immigrants in Europe. Third country nationals having resided in the country 
for more than 5 years automatically receive their voting card. Participation in 
local elections is not very difficult as it is not necessary to register to vote (Michon 
and Tillie 2011:33). Sweden remains one of the most liberal countries in Europe 
in terms of the recognition of political rights to immigrants. First, it granted voting 
rights to migrants in 1975, much earlier than many other countries. Second, 
foreign residents only need a residence period of three years to participate in 
municipal and county-elections. These features of Swedish democracy are related 
to the explicit goal of Swedish integration based on ideas of pluralism. These ideas 
also characterize other Nordic democracies like Norway (Bergh 2011:43) and 
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Denmark (Togeby 2011:45) and have been intended to foster the political 
incorporation of immigrants (Tahvilzadeh 2011:39).  
 
Also, following its colonial history most of third country migrants to the United 
Kingdom came from Commonwealth countries, primarily from the Indian 
subcontinent and the Caribbean. Their political incorporation has been expansive 
and inclusive. The British Nationality Act of 1948 purposes that Commonwealth, 
Irish, and British nationals are treated similarly. As a result Commonwealth and 
Irish nationals enjoy voting rights for local, national and regional elections. Which 
also makes them a very privileged group in comparison to other immigrant groups 
in the United Kingdom and abroad.  
 
Finally, in the context of the European Union integration, liberal democratic 
citizenship has been enriched with some transnational elements. A number of 
provisions introduced in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty including voting rights for 
EU residents in other European countries for local and European parliament 
elections (Article 8b) expanded some rights to EU citizens. Based on the 
reciprocity principle, EU citizens can vote and be candidates for local and 
European parliament elections.  Yet, EU migrants are excluded from participating 
in national elections. To conclude, migrants having acquired the citizenship of the 
country where they reside become nationals in all terms, which grant them the 
same political rights enjoyed by the autochthonous population. 
2.4  France, Germany and the United Kingdom  
In order to provide with more detailed explanations of the main characteristics of 
multicultural democracies, from this point on I will examine some crucial aspects 
focusing on the three case studies: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In 
Western Europe, these three countries have a net migration surplus and rank 
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among the first European countries in terms of the number of immigrants they 
have received in the last decade (Figure 7). France counts around 11 percent of 
foreigners among its population, while Germany and the United Kingdom have 
13 percent and 12 percent of their population of immigrant origin respectively. 
 
Looking in detail at the individual countries we observe that migration inflows to 
these countries followed different patterns. First, in France there was a peak of 
immigration in the 1960s and then in the 1970s. During that period many 
migrants from Southern Europe arrived to work in France in sectors such as the 
mines or the automotive industry. Also, following the wars of independence of 
West African and Maghreb colonies, and also Asia new waves of migration were 
registered. Ever since immigration flows were relative stable over the years and 
until the 2000s where they increased again. Finally, by the end of the 2000s 
following Euro-crisis immigration to France decreased. 
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Figure 7.Net Migration in the EU 15, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (per 1000,1960–2012) 
 
Source: Eurostat  
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Germany has experienced peaks of migration inflows in different decades. 
Following the adoption of Guest Workers programs designed by the German 
government in the 1960s and 1970s, different peaks of immigration have been 
observed. Following the Schengen Agreement signed in 1985 that gave the rights 
to citizens of the members of the European Union to live and work everywhere 
within the EU, and the dissolution of the Eastern block which attracted many 
migrant workers from the South and East of Europe arrived to the country. 
Germany experienced in the 1990s the most significant migration inflows in 
Western European countries. Then, the migration inflows that followed in the 
2000s had been relatively low, and even lower in comparison to France and the 
United Kingdom. Finally, the statistics show that given the fact that German 
economy has proven to be one of the most stable following the financial and Euro-
crisis, new immigration flows have been observed to occur after 2008.  
 
Immigration flows to the United Kingdom have constantly increased since the 
1980s, and since the mid-1990s is one the country that has received the largest 
shares of immigrants in the European Union. The number of migrants arrived in 
the last years to the British territory greatly exceeds the newcomers in France and 
Germany, which evidences the fact that the United Kingdom is one of the most 
attractive destinations for migrants. This phenomena, is partially explained by the 
relative openness of the British job market, the migration from many citizens from 
the British territorial powers and the fact that given that English is the official 
language many migrants find it easier to be able to work in the United Kingdom 
compared to France or Germany.  
 
In an increasingly globalizing world, neoclassic economics points out at the 
tendency of people to move from low-income areas towards high-income areas, 
establishing the linkage between migration and economic cycles. Transnational 
mobility is captured by the so-called “push-pull” approach, which adopts a 
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symmetric analysis on the economic factors that influence migration: difficult 
conditions in the country of origin, and attractive economic prospects in the 
receiving country. On the first end of migration flow there are the “push factors” 
which make people considering leaving their country of origin. Demographic 
growth, low living standards, small economic opportunities and political 
repression rank among the most important factors influencing people’s decisions 
to migrate. On the other end of migration flows there are the “pull factors” which 
act as incentives for people to move to a new country. Among these we count the 
demand for labor, better economic opportunities and political freedom (Castles 
and Miller 2009: 22). 
2.4.1 Socio-Demographics 
Neoclassic economics argues that cross-national economic disparities are one of 
the main forces behind transnational migration (Borjas 1989). These theories 
emphasize the individual calculations activated when confronted with the decision 
to emigrate, which are based on a comparison between the costs and benefits of 
remaining in the country of origin or going to a different destination. As Borjas 
puts it:  
 
“Neo-classical theory assumes that individuals maximize 
utility: individuals “search” for the country of residence 
that maximizes their well-being (…) The search is 
constrained by the individual’s financial resources, by the 
immigration regulations imposed by competing host 
countries and by the emigration regulations of the source 
country. In the immigration market the various pieces of 
information are exchanged and the various options are 
compared. In a sense, competing host countries make 
“migration offers” from which individual compare and 
choose. The information gathered in this marketplace 
leads many individuals to conclude that it is “profitable” to 
remain in their birthplace (…) Conversely, other 
individuals conclude that they are better off in some other 
country. The immigration market nonrandomly sorts 
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these individuals across host countries” (Borjas 1989: 460-
1, quotation marks in original).  
 
Given these points, migration is considered “human capital” (Castles and Miller 
2009:23). As much as people would carefully consider to invest in education 
because it raises their human capitals which can translate into future earnings, 
people decide to invest in migration if they expect that the potential returns of 
working in a different country are higher than those that would have had in the 
country of origin minus the costs of immigrating.  
 
From the perspective of neo-classic economics there is a relation between 
migration and the economy of the potential host countries. A study conducted 
across 22 OECD countries for the period 1987 to 2009 reveals that GDP per 
capita and net migration has a positive relationship while unemployment and net 
migration have a negative one. Empirical evidence suggests, “immigrants are 
mainly concerned by aggregate unemployment which represents a better indicator 
of host country employment opportunities” (Boubtane et al. 2012:19)14. The 
economic cycles experienced by European economies in the last decades provides 
some support for this argument. Figure 9 presents the relationship between 
unemployment rates and net migration rates. In France, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom one observes that the relationship between unemployment rate 
and net migration is negative, this means that when unemployment increases net 
migration tends to decrease. Unemployment and net migration have a negative 
relationship across the three economies, yet in France this relationship is weaker 
(R2= 0.268), than it is in Germany (R2= 0.447), and in the United Kingdom (R2= 
0.411).  
                                                
14 http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/67276/1/729304280.pdf 
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Figure 8.Line Plot Matrix of Unemployment and Migration Rates (1990–2012) 
France Germany United Kingdom 
 
 
  
 
Sources: OECD15  
                                                
15 Unemployment rates UNECE Statistical Database compiled from national and international data sources (Eurostat, OECD, CIS). Data on France doesn’t 
include overseas departments and territories. Net Migration: Eurostat - Migrants in Europe. 
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The above presented figures evidence that economic cycles and net migration are 
strongly related, implying that economic motivations are among the most 
important factors that influence migrants’ decisions to move to another country. 
The economic rationale of migration dynamics has great effects on the 
composition of immigrant groups. The migrant population is in its vast majority 
composed by Third country migrants, and is composed to a great extent by 
individuals in the working age.  As it is showed in Table 6, the group of legal 
foreign residents of a third country in France, Germany and the United Kingdom 
is larger than the population of EU migrants. In France, non-European migrants 
double the population of intra-European migrants (66 and 33 percent 
respectively). In Germany the number of third country migrants (62 percent of the 
population with foreign citizenship) is greater than the EU population. Finally, in 
the United Kingdom foreigners from third countries represent 57 percent of the 
immigrant population. The fact that third country migrants are more numerous 
than EU migrants is in line with the argument that inter-state economic 
inequalities foster migration. 
Table 6.Immigrants by Nationality and Age Group (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat16 
 
                                                
16 Eurostat (migr_pop1ctz): data on population by citizenship and by country of birth are based on 
administrative sources of national surveys. For some datasets statistical estimation methods are 
applied, mostly based on census, migration and vital statistics data. Certain differences in 
definitions and practices of producing statistics exist between countries.  
 
 France Germany United Kingdom 
EU citizens (%) 33 38 43 
Third county (%) 66 62 57 
Working-age Group (15-65 years old) 
National citizens (%) 64 65 65 
EU citizens (%) 69 82 76 
Third country (%) 72 79 82 
  48 
Second, although there is some evidence of the transformations of the migration 
population structure, the engine of migration is still the mobility of workers across 
countries. Following WWII, the European labor market became increasingly 
internationalized and labor migration was characterized mainly by male-
dominated groups of workers. In the following decades, migration developed into 
family migration. Across all migrant groups in Western European countries, the 
proportion of the total population made up of workers felt between the 1970s and 
the 1980s (King 1993:33). On the views of the author these transformations are 
evident when observing the increasing proportions of women among the 
population of foreigners: “[a] low proportion of females indicates a migrant 
population still in an early stage of settlement; as the ethnic presence matures with 
more family migration, so the female ratio will raise” (King 1993:33). Today this 
approach is contested by the argument of the feminization of the labor market. 
Female migration has increased in the past two decades. And at the same time it 
has gained in complexity. While many of the female migrants are confined to the 
household, many others enter the lesser-skilled sectors of the job market (like 
domestic labor). In spite of these trends though, increasingly more and more 
women enter skilled sectors of the labor market, especially in health (Kofman and 
Raghuram 2006). So as consequence of the increasing gender balance in the job 
market, today gender is not a distinctive feature of the immigrant population.  
 
Third, the immigrant population belongs in its vast majority to the working-age 
group, and proportionally more than the native population does.  Across countries 
the native population aged between 15 and 65 years old ranges between 64 and 
65 percent. However, when looking at the immigrant population, these 
proportions are larger.  Immigrants in the working-age group in France represent 
71 per cent, whereas in Germany and the United Kingdom these percentages are 
even greater scoring 80 percent and 79 percent of the total immigrant population 
respectively. Looking at the group differences it is observed that individuals in the 
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working age are more numerous among the third-country migrants than among 
EU migrants in France (72 percent and 69 percent) and in the United Kingdom 
(82 percent and 76 percent). In Germany in contrast third country migrants are in 
comparison to EU citizens to a lesser extent represented in the working-age group 
(79 percent and 82 percent). To conclude, the distribution of the immigrant 
population across age groups in comparison to the native population evidences the 
fact that among immigrants there is a greater proportion of young working adults 
than among natives. 
 
The data presented above showing that a majority of extra-communitarian 
migrants belong to the working-age group is further evidence of the relationship 
between economy cycles and mass migration. This raises questions related to the 
situation of immigrants in the receiving economies. Following the Malthusian 
assumptions that an increase of labor supply shifts the job equilibrium curve, some 
empirical research has pointed out that immigration lowers the average wages of 
native workers (see for example Borjas 2003). These arguments have been widely 
contested, mainly by the argument that natives and immigrants are not perfect 
substitutes in the job market (Card 2012). Immigrants experience discrimination 
in the job market in several ways: employment, recruitment, and occupation.  
 
First, there is a higher risk of unemployment among immigrant workers than 
among native workers. To a great extent this is explained by the fact that migrant 
workers suffer from unfavorable market allocations, and thus are confined to 
sectors of the economy that are particularly vulnerable to economic crisis and 
restructuring (Kogan 2004). But also, economic recession finds some political 
echoes that translate into tougher regulations that affect the employment of 
immigrant workers. As it happened with the Lindsey Oil Refinery dispute 
occurred in 2009 in the United Kingdom where local hiring clauses were adopted 
to respond to the popular demand of ‘British Jobs for British Workers’ that 
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resulted in an agreement to hire at least 100 British workers at the site (Barnard 
2009). Following the economic crisis of 2008 and till 2012 differences on the 
unemployment rates between native and migrant workers are observed across 
economies (Figure 5) suggesting that migrants in the job market retain their 
outsider status. During this period migrant workers were more likely to be 
unemployed than native workers in France were the average unemployment rate 
difference across groups was six percent (sd= 0.7), and in Germany five percent 
(sd=1). In the United Kingdom the group differences are lower and immigrants 
where only 1.4 percent (sd=0.2) more likely to be unemployed than British 
workers. The greater equality between migrant workers and native workers in the 
United Kingdom may respond to the highly skill nature of the non-EU Labor 
migration in Britain of foreign workers of the Insurance, Banking, Finance and 
Professional services in combination with the fact that in the United Kingdom 
work permits are issued selectively, generally to highly skilled workers from sectors 
for whom no British nor EU workers can be found (Salt and Ford 1993: 304-6).  
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Figure 9.Unemployment by Birthplace (2008-2012) 
France Germany 
 
United Kingdom 
   
 
Source: OECD  
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Second, institutional explanations for the employment differences between natives 
and migrants workers shed light on the fact the regulations over economic 
migration are not very effective.  Across OECD countries only a minority 
(approximately one fourth) of migrants have gone through selective migration 
mechanisms aimed at meeting the demands of the job market (Keeley 2009:49-
50). Thus it is argued that as a result of non-selective migration (and also irregular 
migration) the composition of the migrant workforce does not match necessarily 
the needs of national labor markets.  
 
Third, the reality of migrant employment results also from group discrimination. 
Theories of discrimination in labor markets suggest that in the context of hiring 
and placement decisions employers face the uncertainty of the productivity of 
some (ethnic) groups of workers (see for example Arrow 1972a, 1972b). 
Experimental research has shown that migratory background is a strong factor of 
discrimination among employers in the private sector. Much of this discrimination 
occurs when private employers are evaluating whether to invite job applicants for 
an interview.  
 
A study conducted in France including a variety of methodologies shows that 
second-generation Muslim households have lower incomes compared to Christian 
households (Adida et al. 2010). The study shows there is a religious effect in the 
French labor market.  Indeed, anti-Muslim attitudes translate into the 
discrimination of Muslim workers. Similarly, an experiment conducted by Kaas 
and Manger (2012) in Germany where applications using a Turkish-sounding and 
German-sounding name where sent to different employers shows that a German 
name raises the chance of a callback by 14 percent. Finally, in the United 
Kingdom in despite of the adoption of the Race Relations Act of 1968, and the 
implementation of additional policies to measure and punish ethnic 
discrimination, there is evidence of racial discrimination in the labor market (Firth 
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1981). More recent accounts show that Indian migrants “suffered particularly 
from the racial bias operating in entry into non-manual work” (Modood 1998:63). 
This evidence of unemployment discrimination sheds light of the existence of an 
ethnic disadvantage. Even when complains about racial or ethnic discrimination 
raise every year and when anti-discrimination laws are enforced.  
 
Employment and recruitment discrimination are highly related to occupational 
segregation, that is, the distribution of workers across and within occupations and 
jobs based on their demographic characteristics (like ethnicity). Basically, 
immigrant workers are highly represented in some economic sectors such as 
construction, accommodation and food, and household goods and services 
(Dancygier and Donnelly 2013). At the same time, ethnic minorities remain 
largely under-represented in most of the elite jobs, namely as managers and 
employers (Modood 1998:63). The occupational segregation thus provided 
empirical evidence of the argument that native workers and immigrant workers 
are imperfect substitutes (Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth 2012; Card 
2012) because there is a  “glass-ceiling” which affects these minorities (Modood 
1998:63).  
 
Finally, many migrants undergo deskilling while moving abroad (King 1993).  
Evidence suggests that with mobility, migrants experience a downward social 
mobility. And that people of professional origins often fail to secure professional 
posts (Modood 1998:63). The Immigrant survey conducted in France and 
Germany shows that only 28 percent (95% CI [24.2,31.8]) of the migrant workers 
in France, and 15 percent (95% CI [12.2, 17.7]) in Germany have a job that 
match their skills and training (Figure 10). Yet migrants accept this downgrade 
because they have a relatively weaker bargaining power in the job market (they 
maintain their outsider status) and these jobs still fulfill one main purpose, they 
offer them higher earnings that they would have in their country of origin.  
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Figure 10.Percentage of Immigrant Workers whose Jobs 
Matches their Skills and Training17 
 
 
Source: The Immigrant Citizens Survey18.  
 
All things considered, there is a strong relationship between mass migration and 
the economy. As it is argued by neo-classic economics much of immigration 
trends are explained by the combination of contextual economic conditions, and 
individual motivations; and more precisely the reaction of these individuals to 
contextual conditions. Besides, when considering immigration and employment 
regimes in parallel one observes that they are moving in opposite directions. 
“Migration is increasingly onerously regulated and overseen at the same time as 
employment is de-reregulated (…) Immigration is to be excessively regulated, but 
                                                
17 France (N=536, 95% CI [24.2,31.8]) and Germany (Berlin N= 635, 95% CI [12.2, 17.7]) 
 
18 The Immigrant Citizen Survey (ICS) (http://www.immigrantsurvey.org/) has been conducted 
in 7 European countries and 15 cities conducted between October 2011 to January 2012: Belgium 
(Antwerp, Brussels, Liège), France (Lyon and Paris), Germany (Berlin and Stuttgart), Hungary 
(Budapest), Italy (Milan and Naples), Portugal (Faro, Lisbon, and Setubal) and Spain (Barcelona 
and Madrid). The target populations were legal residents from third countries and naturalized 
citizens. The sample was preferably be based on country of birth, or, if this is not possible, on 
nationality. The sample was drawn from the best available national sources—censuses, local 
population registers, or other registers—in order to best capture the non-EU-born immigrant 
population. Interviews (around 40 minutes in length) were conducted face-to-face in all countries, 
except France (telephone interviews). 
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working conditions, not” (Anderson 2013:79). This leads to a situation in which 
migrant workers are subject to employment discrimination, occupational 
segregation and deskilling.  
2.4.2 Naturalization  
“A liberal state is nothing more than a collection of individuals who can 
participate in a dialogue in which all aspects of their power position may be 
justified in a certain way ” (Ackerman, 1980:72, emphasis in original). In such a 
context, the political incorporation of immigrants results from a process  ‘‘of 
becoming a part of mainstream political debates, practices and decision-making 
(…) [which are] achieved when patterns of immigrant participation are 
comparable to those among the native born’’ (Bloemraad 2006: 6). However, 
despite great advancements in terms of the rights granted to immigrants full 
political rights are only granted to national citizens, therefore naturalization plays 
a key role for the political integration of immigrants.  
 
Naturalization is indeed one of the most common ways to acquire a new 
citizenship and entails the formal act of granting citizenship to a foreigner upon 
application. Every national state has the competence to naturalize non-nationals 
that apply to become national citizens. Naturalization “is achieved in a single 
point in time by an administrative decision regulated by law” and the decision of 
the conditions under which citizenship is attributed is “[a] political one that can 
be object of internal deliberation and consent among members of a democratic 
polity” (Bauböck 1993:174). So, a crucial issue in the context of political 
incorporation is the criterion upon which citizenship is granted. Some states grant 
citizenship without requiring a common ethnicity or cultural assimilation. Others 
apply more exclusionary policies, which establish a linkage between ethnic and/or 
cultural belonging, and citizenship.  
  56 
Generally speaking, as Table 7 illustrates, citizenship regimes can be categorized 
along two dimensions: the basis upon which citizenship is granted (ethnicity or 
birth), and the cultural practices related to it (cultural monism or cultural 
pluralism). The first dimension refers to the population targeted in terms of who is 
eligible for citizenship. On the one side there is the ethnic definitions of the 
national community, based on the principle of ius sanguini, by which only those 
that have a shared ethnicity can be granted citizenship. Ius sanguini represents a 
strong barrier to immigrants’ integration as it excluded immigrants and their 
offspring. This conception has been characteristic of Germany’s citizenship 
practices, making Germany one of the most restrictive countries in Europe in 
terms of naturalization (Koopmans 2005). In spite of this, in the last decade the 
German citizenship was object to increasing liberalization. The 1999 Nationality 
Act contended that a person born in Germany to a foreign parent who has resided 
in the country for at least 8 years or has held unlimited residency permit for at 
least 3 years is automatically granted German citizenship. The law introduced for 
the first time in Germany a territorial component to the Germany citizenship and 
nationality (Anil 2005:454).  
 
The territorial definition of citizenship is defined on the basis of birthplace. 
Countries following the ius soli principle grant citizenship to those 
individuals/subjects born in the national territory. Ius soli characterizes the vast 
majority of the countries, including France and the United Kingdom, and favors 
the integration of second-generation migrants, as those born in the national 
territory enjoy the same rights than national citizens born to native parents.  
 
Finally, the basis under which citizenship is granted in a given country is not only 
relevant in terms of how inclusive these policies are, but have great implications 
for discrimination. Koopmans (2005) argue that the ethnic conception of 
citizenship imposes a great differentiation between national and foreigners, which 
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result on weakly developed sanctions to combat discrimination. In contrast, the 
second conception of citizenship (territorial) is more color-blind, as it embodies 
little discrimination in terms of first nationality and ethnicity, imposing greater 
sanctions to discrimination based on these attributes (Koopmans 2005:34). 
Table 7.Conditions for Citizenship 
 Ius Sanguini 
(Ethnicity)  
Ius Soli 
(Birth)  
Cultural Monism Germany France 
Cultural Pluralism  United Kingdom 
 
Source: based on Koopmans 2005: 73  
 
The second dimension of citizenship is the cultural one and refers to the cultural 
requirements for naturalization. It distinguishes between cultural monism and 
cultural pluralism. Cultural monism (or assimilation) is a conception of a unitary 
national political culture, which demands from immigrants to adapt to a set of 
values and behaviors that are considered to be at the core of the nation-state (Faist 
2000: 201-202). France and Germany are practitioners of cultural monism. The 
basic indicators of these practices are observed on the requirements for 
naturalization. In France, language proficiency plays and important role, however 
foreigners can be naturalized only if they are “well assimilated to the French 
society”.  In this way, prospective applicants are required to be “well assimilated 
to the French customs and manners”. Lack of assimilation is considered to exist 
when an individual lives at the margin of society or practices polygamy. Further 
evaluation of assimilation is conducted by the administrative personal and also 
takes into account the conduct of the applicant and her/his loyalty to the country. 
In Germany before the citizenship regimes modifications introduced in 1999 a 
strong identification with the German culture was required. Ever since, more 
demanding language criteria have been included and deep knowledge of the 
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German political system is required. Additionally, applicants must sign a loyalty 
statement to the constitution. 
 
Cultural pluralism in contrast, defends a more multicultural definition of 
citizenship in which the recognition of cultural differences is a distinctive element 
of the political culture. In this institutional framework, immigrants can maintain 
their cultural practices and identities in their new country of residence (Faist 2000: 
201-202).  In countries implementing cultural pluralism, like the United Kingdom, 
immigrant minorities have greater chances to maintain their cultural 
distinctiveness, which also contributes to the maintenance of ties to their countries 
of origin (Goulbourne 1991). In terms of naturalization practices, cultural 
pluralism translates into less demanding cultural requirements for naturalization. 
In the United Kingdom the cultural dimension and the cultural naturalization 
requirements are restricted to the knowledge of the English language (Koopmans 
2005:52-53). 
 
Nationality acquisition is measured considering the following indicators (see for 
example Koopmans 2005; Bauböck 1994): (1) number of years of residence 
requested, (2) welfare and social security requirements, 3) treatment of the second 
generation, (4) dual citizenship and (5) actual naturalization rates. Great disparities 
are found in terms of the number of years requested for naturalization. France 
and the United Kingdom require a minimum of 5 years of residence. Germany in 
contrast requires 8, and before the Nationality Law introduced in 1999 it was of 
10 years. Regarding the social and economic conditions of the applicant, in some 
countries like in Germany, dependence on the welfare system may be a barrier to 
naturalization. This was later revised, and in the 1999 Nationality Law introduced 
that dependence on the welfare state is not an impediment to naturalization if the 
individual is not personally responsible for the situation. In France and the United 
Kingdom such restrictions don’t apply.  
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Besides, in terms of the treatment of the second generation, in France the children 
of migrants are automatically granted French citizenship. In the United Kingdom, 
citizenship is granted on the basis of ius soli if at least one of the parents is a legal 
resident. In Germany after the 1999 Nationality Law, children born in Germany 
are granted the German citizenship if one of the parents has resided in the 
country for more than 8 years of has held a permanent residence permit for longer 
than 3 years. Dual citizenship can be an important factor influencing 
naturalization. As Koopmans (2005:366) argues the requirement to give up the 
first nationality can be an important material as well as psychological barrier, as 
immigrants can loose rights in their country of origin. Also, dual citizenship is 
allowed in France and in the United Kingdom, yet in Germany dual citizenship is 
only possible for certain migrants, depending on binational agreements.  
 
Finally, it is important to look the extent to which these factors affect the 
naturalization rates across countries. Figure 11 shows the naturalization rates in 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom and the EU 15 (average). Overall, the 
three countries individually present higher naturalization rates compared to other 
Western European countries.  The large number of naturalizations in these 
countries is to a great extent explained by the fact that France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom are the countries in Western Europe having the largest number 
of immigrants in their territories. Also, migration to these countries is not new, but 
has some decades thus many migrants are expected to meet the years of residency 
criteria that are needed for naturalization. 
 
In France the number of naturalizations per year ranges around 150,000 and is 
more or less stable on time.  In Germany we observe that after the liberalization of 
the German citizenship in the 2000s a peak of naturalization was registered. In 
that year, almost 200,000 immigrants acquired German citizenship. In the 
following decade naturalizations rates stabilized between 100,000 to 120,000 per 
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year.  Finally, the United Kingdom registered an increase of naturalization rates 
in the 2000s from around 75,000 in 2000 to more than 150,000 in 2007. And, 
following the worldwide financial crisis of 2008, naturalization rates in the country 
registered a considerable increase up 200,000 citizenships granted to foreigners a 
year.  
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Figure 11.Naturalization Rates per Country and in the EU15 (average, 2000–2011) 
 
 Source: Eurostat19 
                                                
19 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/EN/migr_acqn_esms.htm (migr_acq) 
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To summarize, in Europe there is an increasing convergence towards a common 
conception of citizenship. Although great variations are still observed across 
countries, since the 1980s France and Germany have moved into the direction of 
more civic-territorial conceptions of citizenship and from assimilationist cultural 
conceptions towards the recognition of rights and differences. The United 
Kingdom instead has moved little as in the country; the civic-territorial 
conceptions of citizenship and cultural pluralism have been implemented early on 
(Koopmans 2005: 72-73). These institutional changes, combined with the recent 
history of migration experienced by these countries are resulting in high 
naturalization rates, which translates in larger shares of the citizenry being of 
migrant origin.   
2.4.3 The Immigrant Electorate  
In this section I examine some of the key characteristics of the immigrant 
electorate. Students of migrations have observed that the longer the migrant 
groups stays abroad the less they are interested in their country of origin: 
“homeland identification is inversely related to the migrants’ length of stay” 
(Miller 1981:44). On the same talk, the more integrated immigrants communities 
are, the more they participate in politics in their country of settlement. Thus it is 
fair to assume, that immigrants, precisely naturalized immigrants whose 
citizenship statues indicates length of stay as well as a conscious choice to further 
integrate in the country of settlement, emerge as Miller (1981) argues as a new 
political force.  
 
In political science, cleavage theories claim that voters are divided into different 
blocs (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The underlying assumption is that certain 
cleavages separate voters on specific issues and that these cleavages determine the 
emergence of group’ shared policy concerns; shaping party systems, political 
choice, and political representation. “[M]igration is known to have an important 
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disruptive effect in different fields of social and economic life” (González-Ferrer 
2011: 66). “Immigrants enter another country in search of economic betterment 
and come there to constitute ethnic and racial minorities” (Banton 1988:126).  
 
The creation of group consciousness results then from the systematic classification 
of individuals between those that enjoy rights (national citizens) and those that 
have lesser rights (foreigners). This classification is practiced by states, and adds to 
experiences of group competition (for jobs, housing, social benefits) and individual 
experiences of discrimination (Banton 1988). In response to these discriminations 
migrants “organize and articulate their political interests along ethnic, racial, or 
religious lines” (Ireland 2000:235). Yet the emergence of the immigrant electorate 
depends to a great extent on their geographic concentration, the existence of 
social networks that help articulating political concerns and distinctive political 
preferences. 
2.4.3.1 The Geography of the Immigrant Electorate 
Electoral systems determine the incentives operating in the process of candidate 
nomination in a given democracy. Thus, the characteristics of electoral systems 
lead to different outcomes in terms of the representation of minorities. It has been 
demonstrated that proportional systems are more favorable than majoritarian 
systems for the access of women, Aboriginal people, and ethnic minorities to 
national parliaments  (Norris 1997, Reynols 2006, Kostadinova 2007, Forest 
2012). In proportional systems (PR) minorities have less the need to join other 
groups to form larger parties and access the parliament (Shugart 1994). Besides, 
PR is more favorable to the articulation of the interests of minorities. “What is 
important to realize regarding the electoral system is that only with proportional 
representation (…) can we see whether such a set of concerns is politically 
significant, PR, by not forcing minorities into larger political parties, allows 
minorities to express themselves through their own parties, if they so desire, 
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without being penalized in the process of seat allocation” (Shugart 1994:35). In 
majoritarian systems, party leaders and party members would usually choose to 
support candidates that they consider able to get the votes required to win the 
election (Rule 1994:18). Thus, minority candidates and the representation of 
minority interests tend to suffer from these calculations. As Weaver (1997) puts it, 
majoritarian systems penalize the access of minorities to office and the 
representation of the interests of the minorities.  
 
However, contrasting with the widespread assumption that electoral systems alone 
shape minority representation, recent research is shedding light on the limitations 
of the electoral rules framework (see for example Blooemraad 2013, Forest 2012, 
Ruedin 2009). These conclusions are based on evidence that shows that despite 
differences in the electoral architecture of industrialized democracies (PR or 
majoritarian systems) ethnic minorities (immigrants) are underrepresented in 
national parliaments (see Bloemraad 2013, Forest 2012). This evidence leads to 
the observation of the effects the demographic concentration has on the 
representation of minorities. The residential concentration of immigrant-origin 
communities in certain urban areas can translate into minority representation in 
single-member constituency systems (Bloemraad 2013, Feldblum and Lawson 
1994). And, the representation problem of majoritarian systems for minorities can 
turn to an advantage if there is a minority group that is spatially segregated at the 
appropriate scale (Forest 2012). For instance, in the United States, variations in 
the number of black representatives across regions and across levels of government 
are to a great extent explained as the interaction of the concentration of blacks 
(row number and percentage) and the size of the constituency unit (Grofman and 
Handley 1989). Based on this evidence we advance that the geography of the 
immigrant electorate one of the most important elements explaining their 
representation. The rationale behind the geographic concentration argument is 
that the distribution of immigrant voters across constituencies in multicultural 
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democracies can lead parties and candidates to compete for the immigrant vote if 
they have reasons to expect that this will lead to advantageous outcomes.  
 
Demographic data on the countries analyzed in this dissertation point in the 
direction of the unbalanced distribution of foreigners across regions20. Figure 12 
shows the distribution of the immigrant population (individuals holding a 
nationality other than French) in Metropolitan France. The statistics shed light on 
the fact that there is a great concentration of immigrants around the capital city, 
Paris, where the shares of immigrants reach up to 22 percent of the population. 
Besides, high concentrations of immigrants are observed in the south, southeast 
and west of the country.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
20 The evidence is based on the official data available for every single country, which explains the 
fact that demographic data is aggregated at different administrative levels. 
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Figure 12.Immigrant Population in France 
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Source: INSEE 201121 
 
 
Similarly, in Germany immigrants are concentrated in their vast majority in 
specific regions of the country (see Figure 13). The regions in the north including 
Hamburg, Berlin and Bremen have the largest immigrant populations with almost 
15 percent of their population being a foreigner. Then, in the West, Hessen and 
                                                
21http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=99andref_id=t_0405R 
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Baden-Württemberg have around 13 percent of their population being of 
immigrant origin. Other regions of the country present smaller immigrant 
populations, specially the regions in the East.  
Figure 13.Immigrant Population in Germany 
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Source: Statistiches Bundestamt 201022 
 
 
Finally, data on the distribution of the foreign population in the United Kingdom 
sheds light on the fact that there are areas that are dominated by the presence of 
immigrants. As it can be seen in Figure 14, there is a greater within-country 
                                                
22https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/Population/MigrationIntegration/Fore
ignPopulation/Tables/LaenderTimeSerie.html 
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population variation. Some areas like Greater London, Manchester, and Leicester 
are dominated by the presence of foreigners (around 50 percent). Whereas, in 
other areas, mainly the South-West, West Midlands, North of England, Wales and 
the South of Scotland have a less mixed population.  
Figure 14.Immigrant Population in the United Kingdom 
 
  
 
Source: Office of National Statistics 201123 
                                                
23 2011 Census: Country of birth, local authorities in England and Wales  
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As shown above, the inner dynamics fluxes of international migration related to 
regions’ economic conditions, housing segregation, and the power of ethnic 
networks result in the unequal distribution of the immigrant population. This 
phenomenon is quite important in the context of democracies operating with 
single-member constituency systems24 because migrants find themselves 
concentrated within the borders of specific electoral districts. Geographic 
concentration in this way can influence immigrant voters’ mobilization, party 
strategies, and makes the immigrant population more visible on the eyes of the 
legislators representing immigrant constituencies.  As a result, SMC systems in 
contexts of immigrants’ geographic concentration are expected to provide with a 
set of incentives for individual candidates and parties to represent the immigrant 
voters.  
2.4.3.2 Immigrants Prefer Immigrant Representatives  
The question of whether minority groups should be represented by individuals of 
the same group has been subject to extended political debates over decades. It is 
argued that descriptive representatives represent better the citizens that are like 
them in contexts of inter-group mistrust and when the interest of these groups are 
not addressed by existent political actors. In these contexts, having representatives 
that share attributes and experiences with some sub-groups of the electorate 
facilitates communication and helps bringing particular interests and concerns to 
the political agenda. Also, in democracies that have a history of political 
subordination or where there is low legitimacy having minority representatives 
favors political inclusion and decreases the feelings of political alienation of 
minorities (Mansbridge 1999, Banducci et al. 2004).  
 
                                                
24 Germany combines single-member constituencies with proportional representation.  
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The effects of having immigrant candidates and representatives on the attitudes 
and preferences of the immigrant electorate are manifold. First, it has been 
showed that in the US the presence of Latino candidates mobilizes the Latino 
electorate, increasing voter turnout and resulting in strong support for co-ethnic 
candidates (Barreto 2007). Also the presence of Latino representatives in the 
congress and senate are associated with lower levels of political alienation among 
Latino constituents. The presence of immigrant candidates and representatives 
plays an empowering role among immigrant voters (Pantoja and Segura 2003). So 
all in all, in contexts of increasing ethnic and cultural diversity party competition 
and the strategies followed by individual parties when they nominate immigrant 
candidates also contribute to the formation of an immigrant electorate (Pantoja et 
al. 2001, Pantoja and Segura 2003.) and ultimately to the quality of multicultural 
democracies.  
 
These dynamics are not only observed in the American context but they are 
increasingly more and more spreading across Western European democracies. In 
Germany, following the liberalization of the citizenship regime in 1999 a rapid 
enlargement of the immigrant electorate occurred. In this new political landscape 
the percentage of immigrant candidates (non-ethnic Germans) in the legislative 
elections rapidly increased (Claro da Fonseca 2011). In the general election of 
1998 previous to Law immigrant candidates of non-German origin scored only 
one fifth of the total number of naturalized candidates. In the 2002 election the 
percentage of immigrant candidates of non-German origin almost doubled and by 
2005 it represented almost half of all the naturalized immigrants. First and 
second-generation Turks constitute a majority of these immigrant candidates, 
which corresponds to a great extent to the occurring demographic changes in the 
immigrant electorate (Claro da Fonseca 2011: 120-121). These electoral dynamics 
in turn remain susceptible of affecting voting preferences among immigrant 
voters, yet the relationship between the nomination of immigrant candidates and 
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the voting behavior remain largely unexplored across Western European 
democracies.   
 
Empirical evidence suggests that immigrant voters want more immigrant 
representatives. The Immigrant Citizens Survey25 conducted among migrant 
respondents in France and Germany shows that the majority of immigrants 
consider that there should be more members of parliament with migratory 
background (Figure 9). In France 75,7 percent (95% CI [70.3, 81.10]) of the 
immigrants respondents would like to have more immigrant deputies in the 
National Assembly. Alike, in Germany, four out of five (95% CI [78,82.9]) 
immigrant voters would prefer having more representatives of immigrant origin in 
the Bundestag. 
                                                
25 http://www.immigrantsurvey.org/ 
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Figure 15.Opinions of Immigrant and Native Voters on 
whether there should be more Immigrant-origin 
Deputies26  
 
 
Sources: Immigrant voters’ opinions extracted from The Immigrant Citizen Survey27.  Native Voters:  2006 
Eurobarometer on Discrimination in the EU - The Eurobarometer Special 263 QA8.  
 
 
Captivatingly, in France native voters are favorable to having more immigrant 
MPs but not in Germany. A majority of French voters (66 percent) perceives that 
there should be more immigrant representatives in the parliament, yet they 
consider so to a lesser extent than immigrant voters do in France (ten percent less). 
In contrast, the majority of German voters oppose the idea of having more 
                                                
26 Sources: Immigrant voters’ opinions extracted from The Immigrant Citizen Survey26.  Native 
Voters:  2006 Eurobarometer on Discrimination in the EU - The Eurobarometer Special 263 
QA8.  
 
27 France (Immigrant Voters N=242, 95% CI [70.3, 81.10]/Native Voters N= 1009, 95% CI 
[63.8, 68.9]) and Germany (Immigrant Voters N=1000, 95% CI [78,82.9]/ Native Voters N= 
1570, 95% CI [32.6, 37]). 
 
  73 
parliamentarians of immigrant origin. In Germany only 35 percent of the native 
voters, that is less than the half of immigrant voters in Germany, would like to 
have representatives of the immigrant minority. This cross-national comparison 
sheds light on two facts: the similarities in terms of political preferences among 
immigrants across countries, and the differences on attitudes of the native 
population. Further empirical evidence supports the observation that immigrants 
have favorable attitudes towards immigrant candidates. An experimental survey 
conducted in France by Brouard and Tiberj (2011: 171) between immigrant and 
native French voters shows that both groups would vote for an immigrant 
candidate of their preferred party. Yet, the authors show that ethnic proximity has 
a mobilizing effect among immigrant voters as it influences their vote also beyond 
their partisan preferences (2011: 171).  
 
To the question of why would immigrant voters like to have more immigrant 
representatives survey data provides some answers28. Basically, the vast majority of 
immigrant voters in France think that having more immigrant parliamentarians is 
symbolically important, followed by close by the consideration that immigrant 
representatives would better represent their interests. In Germany, little more than 
a half of the immigrant voters consider that immigrant MPs would better 
represent them, and in second place that it is symbolically important to have more 
immigrant minorities in the Bundestag. 
2.4.3.3 Immigrants Support Left Parties 
The existence of an immigrant electorate in Western European democracies is 
evidenced by the simultaneous existence of two facts: an established linkage 
between being an immigrant voter (in contrast of being a native voter) and voting 
behavior and, group behavioral similarities. Political science research has shown 
                                                
28 http://www.immigrantsurvey.org/downloads/Political_v2.pdf 
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that vote choice is to a great extent determined by an individual’s socio-economic 
status (SES) (see for example Campbell 1960, Verba and Nie 1972). Education, 
income, occupation, age and marital status are among the most powerful 
explanations of electoral participation and vote choice. However in multicultural 
democracies, ethnicity, cultural distinctiveness and migration experience appear 
as powerful explanatory factors of the political behavior of immigrant voters and 
background (native/immigrant) emerges as a new cleavage. Second, the 
immigrant group is very heterogeneous in terms of its ethnic and cultural 
composition, the migration experience, the years since migration and the 
experiences migrants have in the receiving society. In despite of these within-
group variations, a great similarity is observed in terms of voting behavior of the 
immigrant electorate, providing further evidence that the migration experience 
contributes as well to the formation of political identities.  
 
Numerous national and cross-national analyses shed light on the fact that 
immigrant voters are great supporters of left parties, and are so to a greater extent 
than native voters with similar characteristics. 8 out of 10 French Maghrebi and 
African French voters in the 2007 presidential election gave a strong support to 
the socialist candidate Segolène Royale (Tiberj 2011:69). This overwhelming 
support of immigrant voters for the socialist candidate contrasts with the electoral 
support of the general electorate. Only 46 percent of the French electorate voted 
for Royale in the second round of the presidential election. Also, among 
naturalized immigrants in Germany socio-demographic characteristics, which 
remain the strongest predictors of party choice among the German electorate, 
have a weaker explanatory power. A vast majority of immigrant voters support the 
Social Democratic party (Wüst 2011: 91-92). In the United Kingdom the strong 
support of visible minorities for the Labour party has been observed along several 
elections (Saalfeld 2011, Messina 2007:203, Saggar 2000: 122).  
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The electoral support of immigrant voters to left parties suggests the existence of a 
migratory cleavage (Wüst 2004). In general, electoral research highlights that 
social class explains alignment with the left. The resulting expectation would be 
that because a vast majority of immigrants are workers they support working-class 
parties (Claro da Fonseca 2011:116). However, social class can not be the main 
explanation of the electoral behavior of immigrant voters basically because there is 
evidence that shows that even self-employed workers, which in the general 
electorate tend to support the right party, vote for left parties (Tiberj 2011:71). 
Consequently, one of the main explanations of the preferences of the immigrant 
electorate is the saliency of the immigration issue and the fact that left parties (the 
Socialist party in France, the Social Democrats in Germany, and the Labour party 
in the United Kingdom) have paid special attention to the integration of foreign 
workers and advocated for the fair treatment of refugees and asylum seekers. In 
contrast, conservative parties (UMP in France, CDU/CSU in Germany and the 
Conservatives in the United Kingdom) have been mostly reluctant to the 
integration of foreigners. Besides, the social and welfare policies promoted by left 
parties are of great help for immigrant minorities. Finally, left parties in Western 
European democracies are the ones that nominate more immigrant candidates, 
and that have more elected representatives of immigrant origin (Bird et al. 2011). 
All things considered, the left/right divide in terms of issue position, welfare state 
policies, and the nomination of immigrant candidates nourishes the political trust 
of immigrant voters on left parties29 affecting their voting preferences.  
                                                
29 In France 40 percent of immigrant voters think that left parties defends better their interests, 20 
percent that both left and right parties defend their interests, 30 percent that any party defend their 
interests and only 10 percent that the right defend better their interests (Source: Brouard and 
Tiberj 2005).  
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2.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
In this chapter I shed light on the development of immigration to Europe after 
World War II and how it has changed the ethnic and cultural landscape of 
Western European societies. Furthermore the decline on the natural population 
growth across European countries increases the relative importance of 
immigration, which has become the main factor of population growth. Even the 
most conservative population projections shed light on the fact that the immigrant 
population will continue to increase across European societies. And it is expected 
that within the next 40 years one out of three Europeans will be immigrant or 
immigrant descendant.  
 
Following partially a history of colonialism but mainly due to inter-country 
economic inequalities France, Germany and the United Kingdom are in Europe 
the countries receiving the larger numbers of immigrants. The relationship 
between migration flows and business cycles is clear and explains most of people’s 
mobility to these countries. At the same time immigration poses several new 
challenges: immigrants are subject to occupational, residential and political 
discrimination. Unemployment among migrants is higher that among the native 
population. Also, when applying for jobs employers are more likely to hire 
someone with a native-sounding name rather than immigrant, even when these 
have equal qualifications. Additionally, there is evidence of occupational 
segregation, which is evidenced by two indicators. On the one hand, entire sectors 
of the economy are dependent on migrant labor. On the other, migrants often 
report that they have a job for which they are overqualified. Furthermore, housing 
segregation has lead to the geographic concentration of immigrants in specific 
cities and areas changing drastically their ethnic and cultural composition, 
changing also the composition of legislative constituencies. Third, inequalities 
between immigrants and natives result in reality to a great extent from state-
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driven policies. Despite the fact that great advances have been made in terms of 
the individual rights recognized to immigrants, they have less social protection 
and limited political rights. Although in the last years the citizenship regimes have 
been liberalized in many countries in the aim of fostering immigrants’ integration 
and diminishing these inequalities, yet immigrants and natives remain in many 
regards to separated groups.  
 
Finally, related to these observations the question of immigrants’ voting 
preferences raises. Existing evidence suggests that migrant voters would prefer to 
have more immigrant representatives and that they are great supporters of left 
parties. Therefore in the aim of further developing our understanding of these 
assumptions, in Chapter 3 I examine immigrants’ voting behavior and in chapter 
5 their descriptive representation.  
  78 
  
  79 
3. Immigrant Voters  
In this Chapter I examine the electoral behavior of immigrant voters. From the 
1960s onwards - but increasingly more since the end of the 1980s - Western 
European countries have been the destination of large numbers of European and 
non-European migrants where immigration has largely surpassed emigration30. At 
the same time, nationality and citizenship regimes have converged towards more 
liberal policies making naturalization more accessible (Koopmans 2005). As a 
result of these population and policy evolutions the social and demographic basis 
of the national electorates have changed transforming these democracies into 
multicultural democracies.  
 
Studies related to the effects that ethnicity and cultural background has on 
elections are not new. Already some decades ago the sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois 
(1978) stated, “the problem of the twentieth century is (was) the problem of the 
color line”. The author explains that the “color line” is by no matters fixed but it 
changes through time, finding different expressions at different stages of history in 
varied contexts.  But most importantly the concept points out to the existence of 
privileges and burdens that are experienced by different social groups based on 
their ethnicity.  
 
In contemporary Western Europe a color line is drown along what Dancygier 
(2010) has called the “immigrant conflict” which relates to immigrant-native and 
immigrant-state conflict. The first type, the author argues, involve confrontations 
between immigrant and native groups in specific locations consisting on “violent 
                                                
30 Eurostat 
  80 
and nonviolent native opposition against immigrants, such as the local electoral 
success of xenophobic parties or physical attacks directed against migrant settlers”. 
In the last decades an appraisal of such conflicts has been observed across 
European countries, which has materialized in diverse forms, from spontaneous 
confrontations, to criminal acts and more organized manifestations expressed the 
formation and radicalization of anti-immigration forces. The second type of 
conflict refers to a confrontation between immigrant minorities and state actors, 
most often the police (Dancygier 2010: 4-5).  This conflict elucidates the 
challenges of integration that many immigrants face. In fact their mistrust vis-à-vis 
the forces of order emerges to a great extent from the increasing criminalization of 
immigration, in which the police is an important actor as the institution 
responsible for identity-checking, managing detentions and deportations and 
controlling all sorts of demonstrations and social movements.  
 
Yet what is importantly for this research to emphasize is that these confrontations 
emerge from the opportunities and barriers that native citizens and immigrants 
face in all spheres of society. Resulting from these symbolic and material 
differences  between groups having a privileged position in a society and those that 
remain at its margins, enduring inter-racial inequalities are observed (Saggar 
1998). These deeply rooted inequalities translate into different economic and 
educational opportunities and different experiences in the same society. And the 
question that emerges then is to what extent these different experiences translate 
into dissimilar political behaviors.   
 
Political research devoted at investigating immigrant voters’ political behavior in 
Western Europe remains to a great extent sparse and under-developed (Saggar 
2007). Basically, these developments can be traced back to the beliefs that 
immigrants have a small political leverage, and that native and immigrant voters 
are alike. In this chapter I argue the opposite. Namely, I put forward the 
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argument that the demographic evolution of the immigrant electorate makes them 
increasingly more relevant. Also the new strategies developed by key actors, such 
as political parties, increase their political relevance. And finally, that the 
immigration-specific social, cultural, and economic experiences they encounter 
make them susceptible of developing distinctive (political) behaviors.  
 
First, the size (absolute and also relative) of the immigrant electorate has increased 
across Western European democracies. As I showed in Chapter 2 mass 
immigration has increased while the nationality laws have followed a process of 
liberalization. The combination of these two factors has resulted in an increase of 
the number of immigrant voters (first and second generation). Also, the dynamics 
of the native populations across European countries is determining the relative 
relevance of the immigrant electorate. Natural population change has decreased 
as a consequence of shrinking birth rates and immigration has become the most 
important factor contributing to population growth31 and enlarging the relative 
size of the immigrant electorate. Finally, as migrants are not evenly distributed 
across national territories but tend to concentrate in specific areas as a result of 
chain migration, and the influence of networks in housing and job market 
segregation (Castles and Miller 2009). The geographic concentration of the 
immigrant electorate within the borders of specific constituencies increases their 
visibility and political leverage (Bloemraad 2013, Forest 2012, Bird 2005).  
 
Second, the new demographic realities of national electorates have had major 
consequences on the strategies followed by political parties (see also Chapter 4). 
For example in Germany one of the most prominent figures of the Grüne is Cem 
Özdemir, a politician of Turkish background and in France the Verts nominated 
in 2012 the Norwegian lawyer Eva Joly as their presidential candidate. And in the 
United Kingdom, as Norris and Lovenduski (1995) show, the Labour party has 
                                                
31 Eurostat  
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played an important role in the political incorporation of ethnic minority 
candidates.    
 
Third, although the conditions for immigrants in terms of their social and 
economic rights, and to a lesser extent their political rights, increasingly resembles 
the one of the native citizens, there is evidence that suggest the existence of the 
race ceiling (Saggar 1998). For example in the United Kingdom, immigrant 
minorities experience discrimination in the labor market (Wood et al. 2009) and 
have higher unemployment rates than the white population (Li and Heath 2010). 
Thus the fact that these minorities are subject to differential treatment from the 
side of institution and the population at large raises questions about how these 
differentiated experiences affect their political behavior.  
 
Based on the previously exposed observations, Saggar and Heath argue that most 
of previous studies have failed to account for “the potential of ethnic-based 
political outlook and voting” (1999: 103). Therefore, in the context of European 
Multicultural democracies I ask: Are immigrant and native voters alike?  Or, does 
immigrant background over-rides other political cleavages? And, are all 
immigrant groups comparable?  
 
In order to provide with some empirical evidence to answer these questions this 
chapter is structured as follows. First, I present the analytical framework to explain 
turnout and vote choice in the context of multicultural democracies. Second, I 
present the main working hypotheses. Then I summarize the research design 
where a detailed account of the case selection criteria, data, and measurement 
used in the study are presented. In a fourth section I present the main results. 
Finally, in the conclusion I summarize the main findings and discuss their 
theoretical and empirical implications. 
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3.1 Analytical Framework 
In the study of political behavior the main objective is to understand the behavior 
of the electorate and what drives these behaviors. Decisions concerning 
participation and party choice are influenced by individual as well as contextual 
factors. Thus, electoral research is concerned with the questions of who 
participates in elections as well as why they do so. In recent years there has been 
an increasing debate as to whether ethnicity constitutes an additional social 
cleavage and whether it over-rides other social cleavages (see for example Heath et 
al. 2011, Dawson 1994, Hajnal 2007).  
 
One of the most advanced models of electoral behavior emerged at the Columbia 
School and is widely known as the sociological model. It contends that individuals’ 
socio-economic status influence to a great extent political behavior (Rosenstone 
and Hanson 1993; Verba and Nie 1972).  
 
Recent studies in the field of electoral research however have pointed out the 
limits that the sociological model has in terms of explaining change in electoral 
politics. On the one hand, it is argued that the sociological model highlighted the 
stability of party systems because these were related to enduring social cleavages 
based on the stability of social groups in society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Yet, 
changes in the social structure of contemporary societies have highly influenced 
class composition, religious practices, educations, and gender among others. 
These changing social contexts have resulted in the decline on the impact of social 
structures on voting (Heath, Jowell and Curtice 2001). Precisely, comparative 
political research has shown that traditional social cleavages have declined in the 
way they can explain individuals’ choices (Franklin 1992:385). Furthermore, the 
sociological approach to voting behavior focuses on the effects of characteristics 
that are long term in nature, as race, religion, or education. Yet, long-term 
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characteristics are “too stable” to explain variations on national vote from election 
to election (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008: 12). The decline of party identification (Dalton 
and Wattenberg 2000) observed in partisan volatility or split ticket voting 
(Thomassen 2005) are evidence that long term predispositions as explanans have 
now shifted towards short-term factors as explanations of political behavior.  
 
The rational model in elections was first developed by Downs (1957) and then 
further extended by Riker and Ordershook (1968). According to this model a 
voter has before casting a vote to first estimate the expected benefits of voting and 
the party choice.  In order to perform this task, the voter has to first determine the 
differences of what she could potentially gain from voting and electing a given 
party. After calculating the expected benefits of her choice the voter calculates the 
opportunity costs. These include the costs of registering, voting, and processing 
the information about the party platforms or candidates in order to determine 
which candidate the individual prefers (Blais, 2000: 2).  
 
The question of whether voters in electoral democracies are “rational” has been 
for long debated. A major concern has been whether the “calculus of voting” 
(Riker and Ordeshook 1998) is empirically sound. In this framework voters are 
assumed to calculate the costs and benefits of voting and to opt for a party or 
candidate that brings them the highest utility. In this context, issue opinion and 
the image of candidates emerged as explanations of behavior in contemporary 
politics. The issue voting approach highlights that for voters some issues are more 
important than others (Franklin et al. 1992; Evans and Norris 1999). From this 
perspective, voters opt for the parties they consider are the most capable of 
dealing with specific issues. Second, empirical research has also shed light on the 
fact that political behavior is shifting towards candidate-centered vote choices 
(Aarts, Blais and Schmitt 2011). Growing evidence points in the direction of the 
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personalization of politics showing that the image of a candidate influences vote 
choice.  
 
In this framework, sincere and strategic voting can be distinguished. Sincere 
voting makes reference to the behavior in which voters simply cast votes for the 
parties they prefer, without having further considerations. In this context, the 
electoral prospect of a party in the election does not influence voters’ decision. In 
contrast, strategic voting refers to the fact that voters evaluate how their partisan 
preferences will affect electoral outcomes and cast votes strategically to obtain the 
most favorable outcome possible. This strategic reasoning depends on voters’ first 
and second choices and voters expectations on parties’ or candidates’ electoral 
performance and their ability to influence policy-making. In short, the rational 
choice approach is interested in voters’ decision-making and how they take into 
account preferences and expectations (Abramson et al. 1992: 65) This approach is 
based on the assumption that “voters use strategic scrutiny to refer to the 
assumption that voters consider how their vote choice influence policy outcomes 
and tactical voting to refer to instances in which voters does not cast a vote for his 
or her most preferred candidate”…“voters vote tactically when their strategic 
considerations lead them to abandon their most preferred candidate” (Abramson 
et al. 2009, p.65) 
 
In the context of multicultural democracies the question as to whether immigrant 
background constitutes a new social cleavage is very relevant. So far, Europe-
based single-country studies suggest that immigrant background is related to two 
traits of political behavior: low participation rates, and a demarcated support for 
left parties.  
 
Ethnic minority voters tend to have lower turnout rates than native voters. This 
fact has been observed in numerous countries including Britain (Heath et al. 
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2011), France (Brouard and Tjbery 2005) and Germany (Claro da Fonseca 2011). 
Explanations for immigrants’ low turnout have revolved around three main 
arguments. First, from the perspective of social cleavages it has been argued that 
migratory background overlaps to a great extent with social class. Migrants are in 
their majority workers (see Chapter 1) and working class voters tend to participate 
less in elections than voters from other social classes (Welch and Studlar 1985). 
 
A second set of arguments supports the perspective of rational choice theory. It 
states that immigrant voters have stronger feelings of disconnect (political 
alienation in the sense of Reef and Knoke 1999) with the democracies of their 
hosting countries as they feel that they have little or no influence over the electoral 
process. “[T] he feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an 
impact on the political process, i.e. that is it worthwhile to perform one’s civic 
duties” (Campbell, Gurin and Miller 1954:187), is a strong predictor of political 
participation (Pattie and Johnston 1998). Thus among immigrant voters strong 
feelings of disconnect translate into lower participation rates.  
 
Finally, the so-called “color line” coincides with the existence of a divide in the 
dynamics of vote choice: immigrant voters give their support to left and centre-left 
parties more than native voters do. For example, in Britain the Labor party enjoys 
from overwhelming support from minority voters (Heath et al. 2011, Saggar and 
Heath 1992). In France empirical research shows that immigrant voters are strong 
supporters of the Socialist party (Brouard and Tiberj 2005), and in Germany 
where immigrants are great supporters of the Social Democrat party (Claro da 
Fonseca 2011).  
 
Understanding vote choice in the context of multicultural democracies needs 
however to be further explored. From the perspective of the sociological model of 
political behavior belonging to specific social groups as one of the main 
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determinants of political predispositions that result in specific participation and 
voting behavior. Social cleavage theory define these social groups as:  
 
“ [a] set of values and beliefs which provides a sense of identity [which 
are related to a set of individual interactions, institutions, and 
organizations, such as political parties, which develop as part of the 
cleavage” (Bartolini and Mair 1990:215).  
 
Traditionally, social cleavage theory identifies four main social cleavages: 
geographic, socioeconomic, cultural, and religious (Lipset and Rokkan (1967). 
Nevertheless recent research has claimed the existence additional cleavages 
among which we count generational difference and education (Inglehart 1977), 
economic sector (Kriesi 1998), and gender (Inglehart and Norris 2000).  
 
In this context, the question of whether ethnicity or immigrant background 
constitutes a new social cleavage emerges. Saggar and Heath (1999) dispute that 
“ethnicity counts”; “social identity is linked to, and largely driven by, racial or 
ethnic categories of political community or political collective interest” (Saggar 
2007:504). From this perspective the fact that immigrants are subject to 
discrimination in the job market (Wood et al. 2009, Adida et al. 2010, Kaas and 
Manger 2012, Modood 1998, Arrow 1972), have higher levels of unemployment 
(Kogan 2004), suffer from economic downgrading (Modood 1998), and 
experience anti-immigration sentiments (Fietkau and Sanhueza 2014, Dancygier 
and Donnelly 2014, Helbling 2012) can result on groups having common interests 
in fighting discrimination or achieving greater integration. Therefore, as left 
parties are defenders of these excluded groups (Kittilson and Tate 2004) it seems 
plausible that immigrants would show vote for this parties, which supports the 
social cleavage postulation.  
 
On the other side, these patterns of behavior can be related to the policy positions 
of left and right parties. The strong preference of immigrant voters for parties in 
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the left of the political spectrum is explained by the fact that these parties are the 
ones that have traditionally devoted greater attention to the concerns of 
immigrant groups (Kittilson and Tate 2004). For instance, in Britain the Labour 
party concerned by the discrimination suffered by the minority groups and their 
high unemployment rates has been an important engine for the implementation of 
programs and initiatives to foster inter-group equality (Heath et al.  2011:257). Or, 
in France the Socialist party is strong defender of granting voting rights to 
immigrants.  On the contrary, conservative parties particularly on those polities 
that do not have anti-immigration parties defend immigration control and the 
reduction of the number of programs devoted to immigrants’ integration (Alonso 
and Claro da Fonseca 2012). Consequently, these parties appear to hold policy 
positions that are at odds with the preferences of immigrants becoming unpopular 
among these voters. From this perspective, immigrants may choose based on the 
political options that are presented to them.  
 
In order to examine this question I make two logical postulates: (1) if immigrant 
background is a new social cleavage, immigrant voters and native voters would 
have different patters of electoral behavior, and (2) if immigrant background is a 
new social cleavage there should be behavioral consistence across immigrant 
groups.  Based on these, I formulate the two hypotheses that I will examine in the 
analysis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Social Cleavage Hypothesis 
While controlling for other socio-economic factors, 
immigrant voters show a differentiated political behavior 
(participation and voting) compared to native voters.   
 
Hypothesis 2: Similarity Hypothesis  
While controlling for other socio-economic factors, 
immigrant voters show similar political behavior patterns 
independently of their region of origin. 
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In order to investigate these hypotheses I have elaborated a comparative study, 
which is explained in the next section.  
3.2 Research Design and Measurement 
Most of what we know about the relationship between immigration and political 
behavior draw on single-country studies, and in a vast quantity from studies 
conducted in the United States and Canada. Therefore, this research aims at 
providing with some first comparative insights focusing on Western European 
democracies. These objectives represent however some additional challenges, 
which are mainly related to data availability, and the design of the research. 
Therefore in this section I give a detailed account of the strategies I have followed 
in terms of the data, case selection, coding and measurement decisions that 
constitute this study.  
3.2.1 Case Selection 
The selection of cases is driven by the two objectives of this research, these are to 
move beyond single-case studies and to expand the studies of immigration and 
political to the European context. Accordingly, I examine the political behavior of 
immigrant voters across Western European democracies. The selection of cases 
has been determined by considerations of demographic, political and economic 
factors, which have been considered to maximize the quality of the cross-country 
comparison and data availability32. Therefore, this study focuses on a subset of ten 
Western European countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
                                                
32 In the present study the cases of Austria, Italy, Luxembourg, and Portugal have been excluded 
because there is not data available for these countries. Austria, Italy and Luxembourg were not 
available in European Social Survey database at the time when this dissertation was written. The 
Portuguese dataset did not include data on one of the crucial variables of analysis (income) 
therefore had to be dropped out.  
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Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. All these 
countries are characterized by comparable context conditions.  
 
First, I consider some economic characteristics, which concern the overall social 
and economic development. These countries outperform the majority of the 
countries in the world in terms of their development (as shown in Chapter 2). 
These economic and living conditions tend to attract migrant workers from other 
less developed European countries and other regions of the world. As the “push-
pull” economic theory of migration difficult conditions in the country of origin, 
and attractive economic prospects in the receiving country are among the major 
forces behind migration (Castles and Miller 2009:22).   
 
Second, these countries rank among the ones receiving larger immigration inflows 
and having the largest shares of immigrant populations in Europe (Table 8). In 
this context, immigration sets new circumstances for the potential emergence of a 
new social cleavage. On average one out of ten residents of Western European 
countries is a foreigner (and these figures are just small if one takes into account 
naturalized and second generation migrants). In Belgium and Denmark around 8 
percent of the population holds a different passport than the majority of the 
population. In France, Greece, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
foreigners represent around 10 percent of the total population. Germany, Spain 
and Sweden score even higher, where more than 13 percent of the residents in the 
national territory are non-nationals. Finally, in Ireland almost 20 percent of the 
population is a foreigner.   
3.2.2 Data 
The study is based on the European Social Survey (ESS) 2010. The ESS is a 
representative cross-national survey conducted every two years across Europe. 
This survey has been designed to measure attitudes, beliefs, and behavioral 
  91 
patterns across countries. The European Social Survey is a great dataset as it 
includes a similar battery of questions asked in numerous European countries 
including questions about the socio-economic status and political behavior of the 
respondents. Moreover, the ESS is particularly suitable for studies related to the 
immigrant population because (unlike many other comparative surveys) it includes 
questions regarding the background of the respondents, and their parents, which 
allows to identify first and second generation migrant respondents. I have opted 
for the wave 2010 because it is the most recent wave containing a larger number 
of Western European countries33. 
Table 8.Percentage of Foreign Born  
 
Foreign Population  
(%) 
Belgium 8.9 
Denmark 8.7 
France 10.3 
Germany 13.2 
Greece 10 
Ireland 19.7 
Netherlands 10.5 
Spain 13.7 
Sweden 13.9 
United Kingdom 10.3 
 
Sources: World Bank 
 
Additionally, this study makes use of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 2010 
(Bakker et al. 2012) to measure the general Left-Right position of national parties 
across Western European party systems. The CHES is based at the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill and estimates the party positioning on European 
                                                
33 When this study was conducted the data for France (2012 wave), which in this thesis is of great 
relevance. was not available. Therefore we have opted for using the survey of 2010.  
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integration, ideology and other policy areas for national parties in various 
European countries. Finally, contextual information on countries’ demographic 
composition, and immigration has been gathered from the website of Eurostat, the 
World Bank, and The United Nations Regions data.  
 
Finally, these countries have in common that they have stable and consolidated 
democratic systems and are members of the European Union. First, the 
democratic trajectory of national democracies is important because parties 
constitute a driving force for the transformation of national political spaces 
(Lijphart 1999:53). “It is important to consider the function of the cleavages 
exploited by the parties in their struggle for supremacy. Since the development of 
cleavages is a prime instrument of power, the party which is able to make its 
definition of the issue prevail is likely to take over the government” 
(Schattschneider 1960: 72f). In this way, a party “shapes the pattern of political 
contest and transforms the dimensions of the political space” (Kriesi 2008:24). Or 
as Sartori puts it, “it is not the “objective” class that creates the party, but the 
party that creates the “subjective” class” (1969:84). Furthermore, as old members 
of the European Union these countries are subject to many common economic 
and migration policies and have adopted the European citizenship, which grants 
voting rights for European foreign residents in municipal and European elections. 
3.2.3 Dependent Variables 
This study is interested in explaining two key variables: (1) electoral participation, 
and (2) vote choice. First, in every election “citizens must decide not only which 
party or candidate they wish to support but also, and perhaps more 
fundamentally, whether the wish to support anyone, that is, whether they will vote 
or not” (Blais 2007:621). So, voting is one of the most frequent and basic forms of 
political activity (Blais 2000). Participation in elections can be analyzed from two 
different perspectives: (1) at the aggregated level one can compare electoral 
participation across democracies, or over time; and (2) and at the individual level 
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one can examine the individual decisions to vote or not vote, and the crucial 
question of who votes and why. This study is interested in the voting behavior of 
ethnic minorities in comparison to native voters; therefore it adopts the second 
approach. Accordingly, I examine whether natives and immigrants have different 
levels of participation, and what can explain these differences. The ESS includes 
the following question: Did you vote in the last national election in [month/year]? Based on 
the response I create a dummy variable where respondents that voted =1,and 
respondents that didn’t vote = 0.  
 
Second, for understanding the candidates and parties that immigrants want to 
support and what affects their decision I focus party choice. The measurement of 
this second variable the analysis is restricted to those respondents that have chose 
to vote. Party choice is a nominal variable as voters choose to support either party 
A, B, C ... There is one ESS item measuring party choice, and asks respondents: 
Which party did you vote for in that election?  
 
One of the two main objectives of this chapter is to provide with some cross-
national evidence on the voting behavior of immigrant voters in Europe. A 
suitable to make the analysis of party choice comparable across democracies is by 
transforming nominal variable “party” into an ordinal variable. The use of the 
Left-Right scale is useful because it constitutes a “super-issue, which summarizes 
the programs of opposing groups” (Klingemann and Inglehart 1976:244). This 
measurement of ideological preference is a powerful tool to examine political 
behavior at the mass and elite levels in national and cross-national studies (Mair 
2007:219). The definitions of these two ideologies in this study follow Lipset et al. 
(1954: 1135), in which the left relates to advocacy for social change in the 
direction of equality (political, economic and social) and the right grounds on the 
support for traditional, more or less hierarchical social order, which opposes 
change of it.   
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For that reason, I have replaced the party name by the position of the party on the 
Left-Right scale in that period proceeding as follows:  I replaced the party name 
provided by the ESS respondents by the Left-Right position of the party as it is 
measured by Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 2010, which includes an item 
asking experts to tick the box that best describes each party's overall ideology on a 
scale ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). 
 
3.2.4 Independent Variables  
In order to examine the political behavior of immigrant voters I have identified all 
the ESS respondents that have immigrant background and their region of origin. I 
have followed two steps: (1) identifying immigrant voters, and (2) coding their 
region of origin.  
 
First, from the more than 11,800 of the respondents34 of the surveys conducted in 
the ten countries here analyzed I have identified all the respondents that have 
immigrant background. The variable includes first and second-generation 
migrants together.  
The variable immigrant background results from the combination of three ESS 
items:  
(1) Were you born in [country]? 
(2) Was your father born in [country]? 
(3) Was your mother born in [country]? 
Table 9 shows the coding scheme used. Immigrant voters are those respondents 
born abroad with at least one parent born abroad, or respondents who have one 
parent or the two parents born abroad. 
                                                
34 To see a detailed list of the countries, and number of respondents per background check the 
Table 10.  
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Table 9.Identification and Coding of Immigrant Voters  
 
Respondent 
born in country 
Father 
born in country 
Mother 
born in country 
Immigrant 
 
No No No Yes 
No Yes No Yes 
No No Yes Yes 
No Yes Yes No 
Yes Yes No Yes 
Yes No Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes No 
 
Source: ESS (2010), questions: C28, C33, C35. 
 
Second, since migrants from different world regions have had different 
socialization and subject to differential treatment (for instance EU migrants enjoy 
more rights than third country migrants across Western European countries) I 
have classified respondents according to their region of origin. The Statistics 
Division of the United Nations Secretariat has developed a Standard Area Codes 
for Statistical Use35.  
 
Using the ESS questions : “in which country was your mother/father born” I 
have grouped the counties within seven major areas: Africa Asia, Europe, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, North America, Oceania, and Sub-Saharan Africa.  
3.2.5 Control Variables    
In the analyses I include a battery of variables that explain political behavior36. (1) 
Age is a continuous variable and refers to the age of the respondent. (2) Gender is a 
dichotomous variable, where 0= Male, and 1= Female. (3) Education is a 
                                                
35 Sources:  
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49.htm  http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/CD- 
ROM_2009/WPP2009_DEFINITION_OF_MAJOR_AREAS_AND_REGIONS.pdf 
36 The original intention of this research was to include religiosity among these variables. However, 
as religiosity measured in terms of how religious respondents are is highly correlated with vote 
choice (non-religious respondents being aligned with the left, and religious-respondents being 
aligned with the right) this variable had to be excluded from the analyses because these did not 
converge.  
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continuous variable measuring the years of education completed. And (4) Income is 
an ordinal variable that locates respondents in their country’s in income deciles.  
3.2.6 Methods 
First, I use descriptive statistics to analyze the political participation and party 
choice of immigrant voters compared to national votes across countries. Second, I 
use Multiple Regression Models37 to test whether controlling for other variables, 
immigrant background and region of origin have an effect on party choice (using a 
10-point Left-Right voting scale as the independent variable). Negative coefficients 
indicate that voters are more supportive of left parties and positive coefficients 
show that they support more right-wing parties.  
3.3 Results 
In this section I present the main results of the impact of immigration background 
on political participation and voting across Western European democracies. The 
first part of this section focuses on turnout, whereas the second section deals with 
party choice.  
3.3.1 Turnout  
The political incorporation of immigrants is the result of the interaction between 
contextual and group characteristics mediated by the effects of political actors. In 
the first place, the demographic and institutional characteristic of a country has a 
great influence in hindering or encouraging immigrants political incorporation 
and participation (Bloemraad 2006). When examining turnout in national 
                                                
37 An alternative way to test the effects of the socio-demographic variables on voting behavior 
across countries is to use multi-level modeling. However, given that this study include a small 
number of cases in the second level (N=10 countries) such method can not be implemented as its 
use may lead to biased results:  “a small sample size at level two leads to biased estimates of the 
second-level standard errors” (Maas and Hox 2005: 86-92). 
  97 
elections one crucial aspect to take into account is the characteristics of the 
citizenship regimes, as in most countries and for most immigrant groups38, 
naturalization is condition sine qua non for voting in national elections 
(Waldrauch 2003).   
 
Furthermore, the group characteristics are important factors determining political 
predispositions. The size and origin of the immigrant groups, and their 
demographic concentration can inhibit (Jones-Correa 1998) or facilitate (Levitt 
2003) the political integration of immigrant voters. Many demographic traits 
associated with the political activity of native populations such as age, gender, 
education, race, religion and occupation are also strongly associated with 
immigrants’ political activity (Heath et al. 2011). Yet, some immigration-specific 
characteristics such as nationality, years since arrival, age of arrival and level of 
democratization of the home country influences to a great extent immigrants’ 
participation in national elections (Wong et al. 2005).  
Finally, political actors and their practices play a key role in the (de)mobilization 
of immigrant voters. Advocacy groups can facilitate the naturalization of 
immigrants to enable them to vote (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008, Wong 
2006). Political parties can be open or reluctant to bring in minority voters. 
Following electoral calculations some parties may be concerned about their 
current constituencies and therefore be reluctant to the idea of incorporating 
                                                
38  In the United Kingdom citizens of the Republic of Ireland and the Commonwealth countries 
are eligible to vote. The Commonwealth countries include:  Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, The 
Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Brunei, Darussalam, Cameroon, Canada, 
Cyprus, Dominica, The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, New 
Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua, New Guinea, Rwanda, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent 
& The Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, 
Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tonga, Trinidad & Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of 
Tanzania, Vanuatu and Zambia. Besides, citizens of the Fiji Islands and Zimbabwe retain their 
voting rights despite the fact that these countries have been suspended from the Commonwealth.  
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immigrant voters and candidates (Thompson 2005). While other parties may see 
an opportunity in mobilizing these new voters (Fraga 2009).  
 
In short, the political participation of immigrant voters is the result of the interplay 
of contextual, group and individual characteristics, and the reaction of the 
contexts to the newcomers as well as the effects that the context has on them.  
 
Table 10 shows the participation (expressed in percentages)39 of immigrant and 
native voters in the national elections closest to 2010 when the survey was 
conducted across Western European democracies. The empirical evidence shows 
that in general immigrant voters participate less than native voters40. Immigrant 
voters register the highest turnout in Sweden (89 percent), where also the native 
electorate has great levels of participation (96 percent). However, higher levels of 
participation among the local votes does not always relate to similar levels among 
immigrant voters. However in Denmark where native voters also register high 
levels of turnout (95 percent), immigrants have considerably lower levels of 
participation (72 percent). Overall, differences in the levels of participation of the 
native and immigrant groups are a little more than ten per cent. In Germany, 85 
percent of the Ethnic Germans casted a vote in the general elections and only 73 
percent of the immigrant voters did so. Similarly, in the Netherlands, 87 percent 
of Dutch voters participated against 72 percent of minority voters, turnout in 
Belgium among natives was of 82 percent and 74 percent among immigrants, 
while in Spain electoral participation reached 86 percent for native voters and 71 
percent for the new citizens. France and the United Kingdom register lower levels 
of participation among both native and immigrant electorates, yet keeping a 
similar distance between both groups. 74 percent of French voters and 77 percent 
                                                
39 An alternative way to compare the level of participation across groups would be using the 
ANOVA method. Yet this method could not be used in this study due to the characteristics of the 
data (sample sizes).  
40 The estimations for Greece, Ireland, and Spain need to be considered with caution due to the 
small sample size of the group of immigrant voters.  
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of British voters went to the polls, and only 65 percent of French immigrant voters 
and 67 percent of British minority voters casted a vote. Finally, in Ireland where 
the level of participation of Irish voters is similar to other European democracies 
(81 percent), immigrant voters register a very low level of participation with only 
28 per cent. 
 
As shown above, immigrant voters register lower participation rates than native 
voters do, and this is observed across all the European democracies analyzed in 
this study. However, cross-country differences are observed in terms of the 
intensity of these differences while in some countries the difference is rather small 
(Sweden) in others they are very high (Ireland).  
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Table 10.Electoral Participation of Native and Immigrant Voters  
 
 Native  Immigrant Total 
Country % N % N % N 
Belgium 92 993 74 165 89 1158 
Denmark 95 1056 72 95 93 1151 
France 74 827 65 154 72 981 
Germany 85 1550 73 211 83 1761 
Greece 86 1009 65 87 84 1096 
Ireland 81 1038 28 55 74 1093 
Netherlands 87 1058 72 121 85 1179 
Spain 86 985 71 29 86 1014 
Sweden 96 1029 89 191 95 1220 
United Kingdom 77 1072 67 157 76 1229 
 
 
            Source: ESS 2010 
 101 
3.3.2 Party Choice 
In the last years, several studies have investigated the voting behavior of 
immigrant minorities in national elections. Most of these studies demonstrate that 
these minorities tend to hovelling support center-left parties. Despite some of the 
attempts center-right parties to gain support from the immigrant minority 
electorate (for instance by nominating immigrant candidates) they have not made 
much progress in gaining immigrants electoral support.  
 
The comparative analysis of party preference shows that immigrant voters tend to 
prefer left parties to right wing parties, and they do so to a greater extent than 
national voters do. Figure 16 shows evidence of this relationship. In eight out of 
the ten cases analyzed here migrant voters prefer left parties compared to the 
native voters in their country of residence. The largest party preference differences 
between the immigrant and the native electorates are observed in Belgium and in 
the Netherlands. In the first country immigrant voters score an average of 4.6 
points in the Left-Right scale against 5.6 for the native voters, and in the second 
one migrants score 4.4 against the 5.4 averaged by native Dutch.  In the 
remaining countries the differences in voting behavior between immigrant and 
native voters is smaller, yet in a similar direction. In Denmark immigrants scored 
an average of 5 against the more conservative score of native voters (5.4 on 
average). Similarly in France, foreigners scored 0.5 lower than French voters with 
an average of 4.5 and 5 respectively. Also in Sweden, the migrant electorate 
preferred to support left parties scoring an average of 5 points, which is 0.6 lower 
of the average scored by Swede natives whose party preferences register a mean of 
5.6 points. Besides, in three countries the differences between immigrant and 
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native voters are very small41. In Germany, immigrant voters are more inclined to 
the left (4.7) but only having a very small difference compared to the average by 
native German voters (4.8).  Also in Greece this is the case. Both, foreign-origin 
voters (mean = 4.3) and Greek voters (4.5) reported to prefer left parties, yet this 
preference is more important for immigrant voters. Lastly, in Spain where 
immigrants score an average of 5 while Spaniard voters score 5.1, and in the 
United Kingdom where minority voters prefer left parties (5.1) more than British 
voters (5.3), migrants are more inclined to support left parries, yet these differences 
remains small. 
 
The expectation that immigrant voters’ support more left parties than national 
voters do is not confirmed in all the cases here analyzed.  Surprisingly, immigrant 
voters in Ireland appear to be more aligned with right wing parties than its 
respective national electorates. The difference between the two groups is smaller 
yet in a different direction than in all other democracies. Migrant voters score 5.7 
(the most right wing position of all electorates here analyzed) and native Irish 
score only 0.1 point less (5.6).  
 
 
 
 
                                                
41 The results here presented on the party choice differences between immigrant and native voters 
can be biased as a result of the small number of immigrant voters that registered some of the 
countries in the ESS survey.  
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Figure 16.Party Preference of Immigrants and Natives 
 
 
Source: ESS 
 
To conclude, the above-presented graphic representation of the party means 
scored by both immigrant and native electorates across Western European 
democracies shed light on two main facts. First, that in general migrant voters give 
more support to left parties than native voters do. In nine out of the ten countries 
here analyzed (Ireland excepted) immigrant voters show a stronger preference for 
left-leaning parties than national voters. Second, that the position of parties on the 
Left-Right scale seem to matter to immigrant voters. In eight out of the ten cases 
here studied, immigrants’ party preference was minor or equal to the threshold 
average 5 - the middle of the Left-Right scale, except for Ireland (mean 5.7) and 
the United Kingdom (mean = 5.1). Now the next step is to determine whether 
these findings result from some effect of immigrant background on political 
behavior or if it’s the result of the juxtaposition of immigrant background with 
other social characteristics (especially social class).  
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3.3.3 Migratory Background and Control Variables  
In this part of the analysis I present the results of multiple regression models used 
to predict voters party preferences (see Table 11). I regress a set of variables that 
have proven to affect party choice in previous studies (age, gender, education and 
income)42 and the main variable of interest (immigrant background) on party 
choice. The coefficients show that controlling for other socio-demographic 
variables, the variable immigrant background affects voting behavior only in some 
countries.  
 
The analysis elucidates that immigrant voters have some specific characteristics. 
First, in eight of ten cases here studied (excepting Ireland and Spain) and 
controlling for other factors the fact of having an immigrant background increases 
the likelihood to support a left party. In Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom voters that have an 
immigrant background show less conservative party preferences than native 
voters. Second, in four of the cases here analyzed the effect of background on 
party choice is significant. In Belgium, migratory background is the variable that 
has the strongest effect. Migrants prefer parties that are in the left of the political 
spectrum compared to national voters (coefficient -1.065) and this relationship is 
highly significant (p ≤ 0.001).  In France, the dummy migratory variable goes also 
in a similar direction with migrant voters preferring left parties more than native 
French voters (-0.479), this relationship is also significant (p ≤ 0.05) and is only 
seconding the effect of age on party choice (0.02, p≤ 0.01) meaning that younger 
voters are stronger supporters of left parties in comparison to older voters. In the 
Netherlands migratory background has an important and significant effect on 
electoral behavior together with socio-economic status (education and income). 
While immigrant voters have a stronger preference for parties aligned with more 
                                                
42 The variables religiosity and political interest have been excluded because they are highly 
collinear with the dependent variable. 
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left ideas (-0.85, p ≤ 0.001), also more educated (-0.095, p ≤ 0.001) and less 
wealthy voters (0.115, p ≤ 0.001) are strong supporters of these parties. Finally, in 
Sweden, migratory background strongly affects party choice (-0.539, p ≤ 0.001) 
where immigrant voters also prefer parties with more left positions than native 
Swedes. Yet, in this case all the other variables also influence party choice. Age 
and income have a highly significant relationship with party choice. Older and 
wealthier voters have a more conservative behavior (0.018, p ≤ 0.001 and 0.136, p 
≤ 0.001 respectively). Also, gender plays a role with women being less 
conservative than men (-0.248, p ≤ 0.01) and lastly education also affects party 
choice with more educated people being more conservative (0.051, p ≤ 0.05).  
 
Generally speaking, the empirical findings presented above show that different 
factors affect differently voting behavior across European democracies. Age, 
gender, education, and income have diverse impact on vote choice across 
democracies. In a similar fashion migratory background plays a role in party 
choice only four our of then democracies. Given these facts, a next step is to 
determine whether immigrant groups behave in a similar manner or not.  
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Table 11.Voters’ Personal Characteristics and Party Preferences (Multiple Regressions) 
 
 
 
 
 
                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           Standard errors in parentheses, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 
Country Constant  Age  Female  Education  Income  Immigrant  R2 
Belgium 6.055 *** -0.001  -0.198  -0.012  -0.014  -1.065 *** 0.03 
 (0.477)  (0.005)  (0.148)  (0.023)  (0.034)  (0.21)   
Denmark 4.4 *** 0.025 *** 0.521 *** 0.001  -0.068 ** -0.375  0.075 
 (0.3)  (0.004)  (0.122)  (0.012)  (0.022)  (0.194)   
France 4.158 *** 0.02 ** -0.134  -0.034  0.041  -0.479 * 0.03 
 (0.58)  (0.006)  (0.183)  (0.028)  (0.038)  (0.251)   
Germany 4.92 *** -0.001  0.059  -0.044 *  *** -0.104  0.014 
 (0.357)  (0.003)  (0.11)  (0.018)  (0.021)  (0.168)   
Greece 5.139 *** 0  -0.157  -0.056 ** 0.006  -0.246  0.016 
 (0.45)  (0.005)  (0.149)  (0.02)  (0.032)  (0.27)   
Ireland 3.618 *** 0.026 *** 0.019  0.02  0.09 *** 0.177  0.084 
 (0.315)  (0.003)  (0.098)  (0.017)  (0.023)  (0.231)   
Netherlands 6.362 *** -0.003  -0.343  -0.095 *** 0.115 *** -0.85 *** 0.054 
 (0.414)  (0.004)  (0.137)  (0.017)  (0.028)  (0.225)   
Spain 4.266 *** 0.012 * -0.144  0.021  0.006  0.013  0.008 
 (0.438)  (0.005)  (0.155)  (0.018)  (0.033)  (0.462)   
Sweden 3.254 *** 0.018 *** -0.248 ** 0.051 * 0.136 *** -0.539 *** 0.079 
 (0.354)  (0.004)  (0.119)  (0.018)  (0.021)  (0.162)   
United Kingdom 4.717 *** 0.008 *** 0.03  -0.017 ** 0.065 *** -0.113  0.038 
 (0.197)  (0.002)  (0.062)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.091)   
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3.3.4 Region of Origin 
In the next step of the analysis I include a variable accounting for the region of 
origin of immigrant voters (Region dummies) that I regress together with the 
socio-demographic variables included in the previous analysis (age, gender, 
education, and income). Table 12 shows only the coefficients for the world region 
dummies. First, looking at the table it can be observed that by including the region 
of origin of the immigrant voters we gain explanatory power in comparison with 
the multiple regressions presented above. The R2 differences between the multiple 
regressions including a dummy variable for migratory background, and the 
regressions including dummies indicting the region of origin of the voters are 
always positive, indicating that region of origin further explains electoral behavior. 
This means, that by specifying the geographic background of migrant voters we 
gain further understanding of how migratory background affects voting behavior.  
 
Second, the findings show that it is not the fact of being a migrant per se which 
influences party choice but rather the fact of belonging to specific migrant group 
in a given country.  The effect of immigrant background varies across groups and 
countries. There are countries like Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden where 
the migrant voter effect is observed across two or more immigrant groups. In 
France the migrant effect observed above is in reality explained by the political 
behavior of one specific group: North African voters. In Denmark, North 
American voters show specific group voting behavior, and in Germany this is the 
case for voters of European origin.  
 
In Belgium three migrant groups have distinctive voting behavior in comparison 
to the rest of the electorate. The fact of coming from the Northern Africa region 
significantly affects voters’ preferences.  North African voters prefer parties that 
are more in the left than native voters (coefficient: -2.034, p ≤ 0.001). Besides, two 
other regions of origin seem to have an effect on party preferences. On the one 
side, migrant voters coming from other European countries hold a stronger 
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preference for left parties in comparison to native Belgian voters, and these 
differences are significant (-0.608, p ≤ 0.05). On the other side, Asian background 
affects party choice yet for this immigrant group migratory background exercises a 
different effect on party choice. De facto, Asian voters show more conservative 
party preferences than Belgian voters (1.165, p ≤ 0.05).   
 
In the Netherland, like in Sweden, the voters’ region of origin affects voting 
behavior in the case of two specific migrant groups. In the Netherlands, Latin 
American – of Caribbean origin in their majority - and North African voters show 
greater affinity with liberal parties in comparison to average Dutch voters, and 
these differences are strongly significant (-1.466, p ≤ 0.01, and -1.913, p ≤ 0.01 
respectively). These coefficients also shed light on the fact that North African 
voters in the Netherlands held slightly more liberal views than Latin American 
voters. In Sweden the migrant effect that we perceived in the previous analysis is 
largely driven by the political behavior of Latin American and Asian immigrants 
in particular. Both groups are strong supporters of parties aligned with left 
positions in comparison with the native Swede voters (-1.965, p≤ 0.05, and -1.913, 
p≤ 0.05 respectively). Finally, the case of immigrant voting in France sheds light 
on the fact that the immigrant effect is related to the political preferences of one 
specific migrant group: migrants coming from North Africa, particularly the 
Maghreb region.  The migrant voters from this region have stronger preferences 
for left parties than native French voters, and this effect is significant (-0.804, p ≤ 
0.05). 
 
The inclusion of the regions of the regions of origin of immigrant voters in the 
analysis has relevant consequences in the analysis of the immigrant voting. 
Looking at the data, by including the immigrant background dummy along in 
Denmark this variable was close to significant (p =0.054), however when in the 
second analysis I include the regions of origin of the immigrant voters only one of 
the region variables becomes significant. As a consequence in Denmark the fact of 
being a migrant from North America has a significant effect on voting behavior. 
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Northern American migrants to Denmark are notably more favorable to support 
left parties than national Danes are (-1.837, p ≤ 0.05). Similar to the Danish case 
is the case of Germany. Including the regions of the world variables we observe 
that the fact of being an intra-European migrant has an effect on voting 
preferences. De facto, European voters are only slightly more in the left that 
German voters yet this effect is significant (-0.004, p ≤ 0.05). 
 
Finally, from a comparative perspective it is important to notice that similar 
immigrant groups show rather similar behavior across countries. European 
migrants in Belgium and Germany have more leftist party preferences than native 
voters. Latin American voters vote more for left parties in The Netherlands (here 
a vast majority of these voters are Caribbean) and in Sweden. And, North African 
voters held more liberal political preferences in Belgium, France, and the 
Netherlands. Besides, the fact of migrating from Oceania does not have major 
differentiated effects on voting preferences compared to native voters and 
migrants from other regions in any of the countries here analyzed. All in all, it 
appears that by including the region of origin we have managed to shed light on 
some of the intrinsic dynamics of the immigrant voting.  
 
Finally, the case of Asian voters contrasts with all the rest in the sense that this 
group is the only one showing specifically different party preferences. In Belgium 
Asian voters have more conservative preferences than native voters, yet in Sweden 
Asian voters are more liberal than the native populations.  So, taking all these 
observations into consideration we can conclude that we need to include more 
variable specifications (like sub-region, country, or religion) to explain these 
differences.  
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Table 12.Region of Origin and Socio-Demographic Variables (Multiple Regressions) 
 Multiple Regression 
(Region of Origin + Socio-Demographic Variables) 
 
EU 
North 
America 
Latin 
America 
Northern 
Africa 
SubSah. 
Africa Oceania Asia 
R2 
(Diff.) 
Belgium -0.608* 1.571 -1.256 -2.034*** -3.639  1.165* 0.042 
 
 
(-0.39) (-1.256) (1.284) (0.399) (2.224)  (0.497) (+0.012) 
Denmark -0.383 -1.837* 
 
1.639 
 
0.051 
 
 0.393 
 
0.025 
 
0.08 
 (0.224) 
 
(0.803) 
 
(1.389) 
 
(1.391) 
 
 (1.394) 
 
(0.516) 
 
(+ 0.005) 
France -0.171 -3.346 -0.804* 0.539 -2.007 0.038  
 (0.312) (1.787)  (0.415) (1.79)  (1.266) (+ 0.008) 
Germany -0.004* 
 
 -1.234 
 
-1.429 
 
  -0.471 
 
0.014 
 (0.183) 
 
 (2.098) 
 
(1.485) 
 
  (0.42) 
 
(+0.002) 
Greece -0.428 
 
 0.897 
 
 1.302 
 
-0.361 
 
0.019 
 (0.626) 
 
  (1.458) 
 
 (1.203) 
 
(0.31) 
 
(+0.003) 
Ireland 0.053 
 
0.384 
 
1.222 
 
0.55 
 
 0.126 
 
0.085 
 (0.274) 
 
(0.676) 
 
(1.5) 
 
(0.673) 
 
  (0.126) 
 
(+0.001) 
Netherlands -0.448 
 
-1.387 
 
-1.466** 
 
-1.913** 
 
-1.736 
 
 -0.623 
 
0.059 
 (0.354) 
 
(-1.387) 
 
(0.538) 
 
(0.659) 
 
(1.589) 
 
 (0.372) 
 
(+0.005) 
Spain 0.544 
 
-0.151 
 
-0.611 
 
 0.009 
 (0.749) 
 
 (0.712) 
 
(1.001) 
 
   (+0.001) 
Sweden  -0.336 
 
-0.961 
 
-1.965* 
 
-2.03 
 
2.603 
 
 -1.16* 
 
0.089 
 (0.179) 
 
(0.872) 
 
(0.698) 
 
(1.378) 
 
(1.946) 
 
 (0.421) 
 
(+ 0.01) 
United Kingdom  0.014 
 
0.556 
 
-0.337 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.304 
 
 
-0.334 
 
-0.236 
 
0.043 
 (0.139) 
 
(0.363) 
 
(0.286) 
 
(0.312) 
 
(0.593) (0.512) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(+0.005) 
)            *p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001; R2 (diff) shows the difference between R2 of model with region of origin and model without.  
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For the most part, including the regions of origin of immigrant voters allows us to 
better understand how immigrant background affects voting behavior. Immigrant 
background affects to a certain extent political behavior yet it is not the migratory 
experience per se which delineates a new electorate bur rather the fact of belonging 
to a specific immigrant group in a particular receiving country. These findings 
indicate that one should look into the specificities of immigrant groups, and in 
particular examine how immigrant background interacts with the contextual 
factors characterizing the country where immigrant voters reside.  
3.4 Conclusion and Discussion 
In this chapter I investigate if immigrant and native voters are alike, or whether 
immigration background emerges as a new social cleavage. The study focuses on 
ten European democracies that have experienced mass immigration in the last 
decades, moving beyond single-case studies and providing the basis for cross-
national comparisons. The study is based on the European Social Survey (ESS) 
2010, which is to my knowledge one of the only surveys including country of 
origin questions for the respondent and their parents allowing the identification of 
first and second-generation immigrant voters. Additionally, I use the Chapel Hill 
Expert Survey (CHES) 2010 to measure the position of the parties preferred by 
the voters at election time. 
 
The first part of the analyses uses descriptive statistics to examine the relationship 
between immigrant background and political behavior shedding light on two 
phenomena. First, the cross-country analyses show that immigrant voters register 
lower participation rates than national voters. Given that these differences are 
observed across all the cases analyzed there is empirical evidence to support the 
observation that immigration background influences the likelihood to vote. Low 
participation rates are explained by political alienation, which ground on feelings 
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of minimal connections with the exercise of power (Reef and Knoke 1999, Citrin 
et al. 1975), which result from the effects of characteristics of the citizenship 
regimes, the reluctance that main actors such as political parties show to 
incorporate newcomers and immigrants’ individual and group characteristics.   
 
Second, the descriptive analysis of the relationship between background and party 
choice shows that immigrant voters have less conservative party preferences than 
native voters, providing some empirical basis that support the social cleavage 
hypothesis. In the second part of the analysis the socio-demographic variables 
(age, gender, education and income) are included into the equation. By controlling 
for other factors, we observe that in general immigrants tend to support left parties 
more than native voters do. This pattern is observed across all countries except in 
Ireland and Spain. Moreover, the immigrant background effect is significant in 
four countries: Belgium, France, Netherlands and Sweden. Summing up, as the 
migratory background appears an influential factors in only few countries the 
evidence is not sufficient to support the social cleavage hypothesis (H1) as we may 
incur in a Type I error.  
  
In order to further understand the party preference of immigrants across countries 
in the second part I present single-country multiple regressions where the dummy 
variable immigration background is replaced by variables showing the region of 
origin of immigrant voters. The results suggest that by controlling for other socio-
demographic variables (age, gender, education, and income) the political 
preferences of immigrants is influenced by their region of origin. On the first 
place, the analysis shows significant results in six countries: Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, France, Netherlands and Sweden. Second, the effects are visible for 
specific regions including: Europe, North Africa and Asia for immigrant voters in 
Belgium; North America in Denmark; North Africa in France; Europe in 
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Germany; Latin America and North Africa in the Netherlands; and Latin 
America and Asia in Sweden.  
 
On the whole, the effects of region of origin on voting are as expected: immigrant 
voters have less conservative political preferences than native voters. There is 
however only one exception and that is Asian voters in Belgium who are more 
conservative than national Belgian voters. These findings do not support the 
similarity hypothesis (H2) that predicted similar patterns of political behavior 
across immigrant groups. For some immigrant groups, the immigration 
experience doesn’t have a major effect on their political preferences, for others it 
leads to more liberal preferences and for Asians in Belgium to more conservative 
ones.  
  
Concluding, this chapter shows that immigrants tend to be more supportive of left 
parties but cross-country and inter-group differences exists suggesting that further 
studies are need to understand the phenomenon of the immigrant voting. In 
Chapter 4 I examine the way in which political parties address the issue of 
multiculturalism and what factors influence their position on this issue.  
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4. Issue Evolution and Political Parties 
As immigration becomes one of the most important issues in European 
contemporary democracies and the socio-demographic basis of national 
electorates is changing, parties and party systems are reacting to these new social 
realities. The way in which political parties respond to these new societal 
challenges is influenced by historical trends on the way immigration is framed, 
and the solutions that are envisaged as well as by the dynamics that characterize 
electoral competition.  
 
Cultural diversity is not a new phenomenon and along history different countries 
have found different ways to coexist and respect diversity. However, since the 
1960s a new type of multiculturalism emerged across Western democracies. This 
latter stage of multiculturalism is very much related to the “human rights 
revolution” (quotation marks in original, Kymlicka 2010: 35) and results from a 
turning point on the way that cultural diversity and immigration are approached.  
 
Previous to World War II, illiberal and undemocratic relations dominated cultural 
diversity. These were based on ideas of hierarchy and justified by racialist 
ideologies promoting the superiority of some cultures and their right to rule over 
others (e.g. colonizer-colonized, settler and indigenous, normalized and deviant 
etc.).  In the aftermath of the war members of the United Nation Organization 
actively promoted a new ideology based on ideals of equality of races and people. 
They released the Universal Declaration of Human Rights including articles that 
specifically mention aspects of peoples’ equality and individual inalienable rights. 
For example article 1 and 18 of the declaration read as follows:  
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Article 1.  
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They 
are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood. 
 
Article 18.  
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and 
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship 
and observance. 
 
These two articles embody to a great extent the new ideas that where promoted 
then and which derived in new social movements, including multiculturalism and 
minority rights. In this way, the new wave of multiculturalism appeared as a mean 
helpful for overcoming the “legacies of earlier hierarchies, and to help build fairer 
and more inclusive democratic societies” based on new models of democratic 
citizenship aimed at overcoming the “deeply-entrenched inequalities that have 
persisted after the abolition of formal discrimination” (Kymlicka 2010: 37-39). 
Therefore a significant part of multicultural policies are today devoted to 
identifying and changing “rooted traditions, customs, and symbols that have 
historically excluded or stigmatized minorities” and which are present in 
institutions and in every day life (ibid).  
 
In the contexts of ethnic and cultural diversity resulting from international 
migration, the concept of multiculturalism narrows down to a “set of mutually 
reinforcing approaches or methodologies concerning the incorporation and 
participation of immigrants and ethnic minorities, and their modes of 
cultural/religious differences” (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010: 4). Basically, the 
new forms of multicultural citizenship in these contexts includes a combination 
policies aimed at promoting immigrants’ incorporation and participation, among 
which the following can be distinguished (see for example Kymlicka 2010) :  (1) 
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institutional recognition of multiculturalism at the national or regional levels, (2) 
adoption of multiculturalism in the school curriculum, (3) inclusion of ethnic 
representation in the media, (4) exemption from dress-codes, (5) allowing dual 
citizenship, (7) support of immigrant and ethnic organizations, (8) funding of 
bilingual education or instruction of minority language, and (9) affirmative action 
of disadvantaged immigrant groups. 
 
While, immigration democracies are increasingly in favor of the recognition of 
rights to national minorities, multicultural policies related to accommodation of 
international migrants remain very controversial and subject to political debate. 
As Kymlicka puts it “[t]here has been a backlash against multiculturalism policies 
relating to postwar migrants in several Western democracies” (2010). As shown 
above, multicultural polices include various types of welfare policies, which also 
tend to be defined along class lines. From this perspective, “ [i]ssues that involve 
“haves versus havenots” are more likely to gain quick access to the docket because 
large numbers of people are involved” (quotation marks in original, Elder and 
Cobb 1983: 95). Yet also, many of these are based on the arguments that point to 
“insurmountable” cultural conflicts. Fears that a clash of civilization - due mainly 
to the presence of Muslim - will “fracture Europe’s cities” (Dancygier 2010:14).  
Resulting in a highly politicized issue that agitates political parties. 
 
Besides, the dynamics of electoral competition also influence the positions that 
political parties adopt on immigration and integration, and as a consequence the 
whole landscape of political systems. In fact, much of the evolution of the issue of 
multiculturalism and the policies that are envisaged to cope with immigration and 
integration are linked to the way in which key actors of domestic politics react to 
it.  First of all, party ideology is a great predictor of the positions that parties adopt 
on immigration-related policies. As Alonso and Claro da Fonseca (2012) show, 
immigration-related policies are more salient today that in previous year. Yet, they 
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show that leftist parties, in particular the Greens are responsible for promoting a 
pro-immigrant agenda, while center-left and right parties have turned toward 
more anti-immigrant positions.  
 
Also, in a recent study Abou-Chadi (2014) showed that in democracies where 
radical right parties were successful mainstream parties would emphasize anti-
immigration positions. And, as Van Spanje (2010) shows the electoral success of 
these parties would not only affect the strategies followed by mainstream parties 
but also entire party systems. And vice-versa, Meguid (2005) also shows that the 
strategies followed by mainstream parties in relation to the emphasis the give to 
the immigration policy area and the positions they adopt on it explains to a great 
extent as well the electoral success of anti-immigration parties.  
 
Following these changes in the ways multiculturalism is dealt with, and taking into 
account the previously mentioned dynamics of electoral competition in this 
Chapter I set to examine how parties tackle the ethnic and cultural diversity in 
European democracies, namely what their positions on multiculturalism are, and 
what triggers these.  Parties are crucial actors of modern democracies and play an 
important role in government (Schattschneider 1942). Therefore crucial questions 
in the context of multicultural democracies are: How do parties address the issue 
of multiculturalism? Does their position on the issue remains stable, or does it 
changes over time? And, what factors affect these dynamics?  
 
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I present the analytical framework. 
Second I present the research strategy including the case selection, data, and 
measurements used in this study. Then I analyze parties’ positions on 
multiculturalism at different levels of aggregation (issue evolution, party families, 
party systems). Finally, I summarize and discuss the main results.  
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4.1 Analytical Framework 
The analysis of party policy positions and policy representation relies on political 
issues’ theories. An issue is “a conflict between two or more identifiable groups 
over procedural or substantive matters relating to the distribution of positions or 
resources” (Cobb and Elder 1983: 82). In this way issues are manufactured based 
on different views on how these resources should be distributed. And, most 
commonly they are used as a mean to advance specific causes contributing to the 
gains of a given political actor (idem, 82-83).  
 
The penetration of issues into the public agenda requires the existence of other 
factors. First, there should be awareness of the existence of the issue. Second, there 
should be a shared public concern that some type of action is required in relation 
to a given issue. And, third, there should be the consent that the matter is a 
concern of some government (Cobb and Elder 1983: 85-86).  
 
Issues can have different temporal relevance. They can either have circumstantial 
relevance or a more enduring, fundamental one. Carmines and Stimson 
conceptualize thus temporally relevant issues as  “issue evolutions”.  More 
precisely, they define issue evolutions as:  
 
“[T]hose issues capable of altering the political environment within 
which they originated and evolved. These issues have a long life cycle; 
they develop, evolve, and sometimes are resolved over a number of 
years. The crucial importance of this issue type stems from the fact 
that its members can lead to fundamental and permanent change in 
the party system”(Carmines and Stimson 1989:11). 
 
Furthermore, the importance of issue evolutions stands from their transformative 
power. Issue evolutions emerge in established political settings, yet “once emerged 
they introduce fundamental tensions into the party system, inconsistent with the 
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continued stability of old patterns” (Carmines and Stimson 1989:11). 
Realignments are enforced by the emergence of new issues that cut across (instead 
of reinforcing) existing line of cleavages between parties. “As the parties respond 
to the new issue dimension, they redefine the basis of the party cleavage with a 
new line of political conflict overlaying the old” (Carmines and Stimson 1986:  
901-902). And, when an issue moves to the stage of partisan politics, it is 
important to account for the elite actors who framed the issue in partisan terms in 
the first instance (ibid: 902).  
 
In some occasions, specifics become contentious, partisan, and long lasting that 
they play a major role in the definition of the party system in which they arise. 
And, this joint transformation of issues and party systems is a dynamic process, 
which result in the change of issue alignments (Carmines and Stimson 1986: 901).  
 
Some events are important because they symbolize a particular understanding of 
the problem, in this case of cultural intolerance. “Trigger events do occur, but 
they are probably rarer than one might think. More often, they are consolidating 
events – dramatic symbols of problems that are already rising rapidly to national 
attention. These events are certainly important, but more because of their timing 
in relation to other agenda events than because of their intrinsic value” 
(Baumgartner and Jones 2009:130). Cobb and Elder name it unanticipated 
human events and explain that such events refer to riots or protests, an imbalance 
on the distribution of resources, which leads to civil rights movement, and 
demographic change in specific regions (1983: 84-85).  
 
In some cases, events contribute extensively to the redefinition of the issue bases of 
political life. And, time order is then a crucial aspect in the redefinition of the link 
between the issues and parties. “As individual policy sub-systems are built up or 
destroyed in a given period of time, these events affect other areas of the political 
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system as well. The cumulative impact of many small changes can often be 
dramatic changes in the entire political system. So the political system as a whole, 
not only particular issue areas, may go through periods of stability and rapid 
change” (Baumgartner and Jones 2009:243). 
 
An important branch of political studies has investigated party policy position and 
party system change focusing on the issue of immigration. This scientific endeavor 
has traditionally taken two roads. First, some studies have investigated the 
positions adopted by parties on immigration measured as liberal or restrictive 
border control policy positions. For instance, Meguid (2005) investigates how the 
behavior of mainstream parties influences the electoral success of anti-immigration 
parties. By adopting “accommodative”,  “adversarial” or “dismissive” strategies 
single parties would influence the electoral fortune of anti-immigration parties. 
Van Spanje (2010) has also used a similar approach, focusing on parties’ position 
on immigration understood as border control. Yet, the author examined the 
opposing mechanism, namely, how the success of anti-immigration parties shaped 
the strategies adopted by other parties. In this study, the author concludes that the 
electoral success of anti-immigration parties result in a “contagion impact on other 
parties”, altering not only the position of individual parties but also of entire party 
systems.  
 
Contrasting with the above-presented measurement of the issue of immigration, a 
second branch of study focuses on the position of parties captured as their stance 
on multicultural and nationalistic policy positions. One of the most relevant works 
following this approach has been conducted by Alonso and Claro da Fonseca 
(2012). In this study the authors analyze how the increasing demographic 
heterogeneity of Western European societies is reflected in parties’ electoral 
competition. Using manifesto data the authors construct a variable by combining 
parties positive and negative mentions on multiculturalism, and on national ways 
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of living. They conclude that the issue of immigration has gained saliency in the 
agendas of left and right parties; and that left and right parties have in the last 
years been converging towards more anti-immigration positions. 
 
As these studies show, we have gained greater understanding of how the issue of 
immigration has penetrated the agenda of single parties, affects electoral dynamics 
and party systems. Yet, in the context of multicultural democracies we know still 
little about the political trajectory of this issue (“multiculturalism”), and what 
positions parties held on this policy domain. Therefore, following the precept that 
“what is not represented by parties is very unlikely to be represented at all” (Pitkin 
1967) I examine the emergence and evolution of multiculturalism across Western 
European party systems. The assumption here is that the ultimately, the position 
that parties held on the issue of multiculturalism tells about the partisan 
representation of immigrants.  
 
Framed by the theories of political issues, and their evolutions, presented earlier, 
and the empirical evidence shown in the mentioned studies, three main 
hypotheses guide this Chapter. Hypothesis 3 points at the early stages of the issue 
and is stated as follows.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Issue Evolution  
The issue of multiculturalism has made inroads into 
European democracies, and it has done so largely driven 
by parties’ opposition to ethnic diversity and multicultural 
policies.   
 
 
Of course, the evolution of the issue does not happen in isolation but follows the 
dynamics of partisan politics. In order to examine this aspect in more detail, 
Hypothesis 4 establishes a relationship between party families and their positions 
on the issue.  
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Hypothesis 4: Party Families  
There is a defined division on the positions held on 
multiculturalism by left and right wing parties.  
 
Finally, Hypothesis 5 is interested in understanding the extent to which the 
presence of anti-immigration parties has an effect on the positions that parties 
adopt on the issue of multiculturalism and tests for the “contagion effect” that 
these parties have over others.   
 
Hypothesis 5: Anti-immigration Parties  
In party systems where anti-immigration parties are 
present parties have more negative positions on 
multiculturalism than in party systems where they are 
absent.  
 
 
In the next section I summarize the main research design strategies that I have 
followed to test the above mentioned working hypothesis. 
4.2 Research Design and Measurement 
In recent years the literature dealing with the issue of immigration in European 
party systems has considerable increased. Yet, as these studies focus on “border 
control” aspect of immigration, or center their focus on catch-it-all 
conceptualization of immigration we know relatively little about parties’ stances 
on multiculturalism. Therefore the main objective of this chapter is to examine 
and understand the early stages and evolution of the issue of multiculturalism in 
Western Europe, parties’ stances and the influence of anti-immigration parties on 
this process.  
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4.2.1 Case Selection 
The selection of the cases that are examined in this chapter is driven by the main 
objectives of this research. In line with this, I examine here the position of parties 
on multiculturalism since 1960 across Western European democracies, 
determined to a great extent by the comparability of the cases (see Chapter 1) and 
the availability of the data.  
 
The study includes ten countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, and United Kingdom. These countries are, in comparison with for 
example the United States and Canada, newer immigration countries. This fact is 
very important because the “new” immigration phenomena in Europe is having 
great political repercussions, and influences to a great extent electoral politics. 
Second, in relation to what I have stated before, the time span covered by the 
study (1960- 2010) corresponds to the period in which the issue of 
multiculturalism gained saliency across European democracies (see Kymlicka 
2010), and for which data is available.  The time span covered in this analysis is 
very important because it covers the period in which immigration has been 
politicized in Europe, therefore the analyses will be able to show how the issue 
evolution related to several demographic and political processes.  
4.2.2 Data  
In order to achieve the above-mentioned objectives I rely on the data provided by 
the Comparative Manifesto Project (MARPOR)43 (Volkens et al. 2013). The 
                                                
43 There are several projects that measure the position of parties on immigration. For example the 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015) measures the position and saliency of immigration 
issues defined as follows:  for individual parties, determine whether it opposes / favors the 
integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (multiculturalism vs. assimilation). However, the 
CHES only includes four survey waves (in the last decade) therefore the MARPOR dataset is more 
suitable for this analysis.  
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project compiles and manually codes party programs released during electoral 
campaigns. The objective of the project is to “measure policy positions of all 
relevant parties competing in any democratic election in the post-World-War-II 
period” (MARPOR Codebook) including the coverage - among other regions – of 
European democracies.   
 
Following the definition provided by MARPOR, manifestos or party programs 
are “parties only authoritative policy statements and, therefore, as indicators of 
the parties policy preferences at a given point in time”44. The party manifestos are 
subject to quantitative content analysis, which aims at identifying the position of 
parties on diverse issue positions by quantifying the statements and messages 
communicated to their electorate. In order to guarantee comparability, a 
classification and coding scheme has been elaborated and applied to make issue 
statements comparables. Thus, the MARPOR is an appropriate dataset to 
measure party positions over time and across countries. Furthermore, for the 
study of party positions on multiculturalism the coding scheme used by the 
MARPOR project is particularly suitable as it codes parties’ positives and 
negatives mentions of this issue.  
 
Moreover, to understand how the evolution of the issue of multiculturalism is 
related to other phenomena, the study relies on statistical and historical-political 
data. First, the study includes population and immigration data extracted from the 
Statistics website of the OECD. Second, I use secondary contextual data extracted 
from secondary sources (mainly Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010) to contextualize 
the policy changes occurred in the last decade.  
                                                
44 https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/information/documents?name=handbook_v4 
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4.2.3 Dependent Variables 
In this chapter I explain two inter-related variables:  the (1) salience and (2) 
position of the issue of multiculturalism, as it is captured in the manifestos of 
political parties. The MARPOR project includes two items that capture 
multiculturalism45:  
 
Variable 607: Multiculturalism Positive refers to 
“favourable mentions of cultural diversity and cultural 
plurality within domestic societies. May include the 
preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages 
within the country including special educational 
provisions”. 
 
Variable 608: Multiculturalism Negative, defined as “The 
enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration, 
appeals for cultural homogeneity in society”. 
 
Using these items I create two variables that capture the overall attention that a 
party gives to the issue of multiculturalism, and the positions they defend.  
 
Saliency: the first variable, measures the overall attention given by an individual 
party to multiculturalism. Therefore, the main focus of this variable is the 
relevance of the topic in party manifestos, which is measured as follows:  
 
                                                
45 The measurement realized by the MARPOR Project is based on a broad definition of 
multiculturalism. The concept does not exclusively refer to cultural diversity and plurality related 
to immigration but more broad, it includes also national ethnic and religious minorities. Therefore, 
its measurement could lead to biased interpretations of the results. Yet, Alonso and Claro da 
Fonseca (2012) report a statement by the MARPOR project leader, Andrea Volkens, in which she 
states that the content in the manifestos captured in the multiculturalism variables (607 and 608) is 
in its majority related to immigrants and immigration. Also, the relationship between 
multiculturalism and immigration is shown in this Chapter (see Figure 18). 
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Equation 1 
 
 
where Mpos refers to positive mentions of multiculturalism, and Mneg to negative 
mentions of it. Accordingly, saliency is calculated as the sum of both, positive and 
negative mentions of multiculturalism. 
 
Position: the second variable captures the position of parties on the issue. The 
strategy adopted to measure party policy position follows the measurement 
proposed by Laver and Budge (1992) who measure party Left-Right positions. 
The measurement is designed to capture the difference between positive and 
negative mentions of the issue in party manifestos. The formula is as following: 
 Equation 2 
 
 
where Mpos refers to positive mentions of multiculturalism, and Mneg to negative 
mentions. 
4.2.4 Units of Analysis  
The objective of this study is to measure how parties deal with the issue of 
multiculturalism; with this purpose I examine the first stages and evolution of the 
issue in partisan politics different units of analyses. The program of a party in a 
given election is the unit of observation, from which we compile the measures of 
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issue saliency and position. Then, I analyze issue and saliency at different levels of 
aggregation (Europe, party families, countries). The aim of this strategy is to shed 
light on how multiculturalism is dealt with, on time and across contexts.  
 
(1) The Issue of Multiculturalism: in a first step I examine the trajectory of the 
issue of multiculturalism in Western Europe. I focus on the aggregated saliency 
and position of parties on the issue of multiculturalism in the last decades. The 
objective of this approach is to examine how the issue has evolved in Europe.  
 
(2) Party Families: in a second step I distinguish parties by their party family and I 
analyze their stances on the issue46. Party families, are a group of parties with a 
common origin in combination with similar ideological profiles (Mair and Mudde 
1998). In the analysis, I make use of the party family classification following the 
MARPOR’s coding scheme. The party families included are the following: 
Greens, Communists, Socialist, Liberals, Christian Democrats, Conservatives, 
Agrarians and Nationalists. The purpose of analyzing party families is how 
different parties holding different ideologies framed the issue of multiculturalism in 
Europe.  
 
(3) Countries: finally, I end the empirical analysis by focusing on the evolution of 
the issue across countries.  Here I am interested in cross-country similarities and 
differences on the attention and positions that parties and party systems give to 
multiculturalism.   
                                                
46 A similar aggregation strategy is used by Alonso and Claro da Fonseca (2012) in their analysis of 
parties’ positions on immigration. 
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4.2.5 Methods 
In this Chapter I use descriptive statistics to examine the early stages and 
evolution of the issue of multiculturalism in Europe, and across party families and 
party systems.  
4.3 Results  
4.3.1 The Issue of Multiculturalism (1960 – 2010) 
The issue of multiculturalism has gained in relevance in national elections across 
Western European democracies in the last decades. The line plot presented in 
Figure 17 sheds light on this fact. The black line represents the saliency of the 
issue. We observe that before 1975 only 0.6 percent of the sentences published in 
party manifestos were devoted to the issue of multiculturalism. During the 1970s 
the saliency of the issue briefly declined  (0.4 percent) to rise again during the 
1980s (especially at the end of that decade) where parties doubled the attention 
given to multiculturalism in comparison to the previous decade. In the 1990s the 
saliency of the issue raised considerably (tripling the scores of the previous years) 
reaching by the end of the decade an average of 1.2 percent of sentences in party 
manifestos dealing with the issue of multiculturalism. Finally in a matter of ten 
years and by the 2000s the average mentions of multiculturalism-related 
statements in party manifestoes went from 1.2 percent to 2.4 percent, representing 
the most significant change on attention devoted to the issue during electoral 
campaigns. In sum, despite a small regression in the 1970s overall the attention 
that parties give to the issue of multiculturalism raised in the last decades, and in 
particular in the last decade.  
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Figure 17. Share of Positive and Negative Sentences Related to 
Multiculturalism in Party Manifestos (5 year periods) 
 
 
 
The raising saliency of the issue of multiculturalism across European democracies 
is the result of important party dynamics. First, the dark grey line shown in Figure 
17 represents the evolution of positive mentions of multiculturalism. The data 
shows that multiculturalism enjoyed largely from a positive framing by political 
parties in the early stages of issue politicization. Prior to 1975,and till the mid-
1990s the mean share of positive sentences on multiculturalism surpassed the 
negative ones in party manifestos. By the 1970s this difference was of 0.1 percent 
in favor of positive statements and by the end of the decade the difference 
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increased even more, reaching up to 0.2 percent for sentences favorable to 
multiculturalism. The first and second part of the 1980s and the first part of the 
1990s continued to mark this tendency, with differences marking 0.2, 0.3, and 0.5 
percent respectively in favor of positive mentions of multiculturalism. Overall, 
what the Graph is showing is that at the early stages of multiculturalism, the 
saliency of the issue in the political arena was related to positive mentions of 
cultural diversity, and multicultural policies.  
 
Second, as showed by the light grey line in Figure 17 which represents the 
percentage of negative statements, by the mid-1990s a new trend emerges across 
Western European democracies. By the end of the 1990s, negative statements 
started dominating parties’ framing of multiculturalism. By the mid-1990s the 
difference between positive and negative statements diminished drastically 
compared to the previous decades. Positive statements only surpassed negative 
statements by 0.13 percent on average in party programs across Europe.  
 
The 2000s evidence a radical turning point in how multiculturalism is framed by 
parties during elections. At the beginning of the new millennium 0.7 percent of 
the manifestos were devoted to positive mentions of multiculturalism and almost 1 
percent of it was on average devoted to negative mentions. This marked a 
difference of 0.3 percent in favor of negative framings of it. And, by the end of the 
2000s this tendency was even more noticeable. Negative mentions of 
multiculturalism escalated to levels never observed before, scoring an average of 
1.3 percent of sentences making negative references to multiculturalism. Positives 
mentions on the other side also continued to raise reaching 0.9 percent. Yet the 
difference between the two framings increased, and negative sentences surpassed 
on multiculturalism surpassed positive mentions of it for more than 0.4 percent.  
The evolution of negative mentions of multiculturalism sheds evidence on the fact 
that in its last stages the issue has been dominated by remarkable skepticism.   
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In conclusion, by analyzing the early stages and evolution of the issue of 
multiculturalism in Europe we observe that its saliency has drastically changed, as 
the political views that are dominant in the political arena.  In previous decades 
and till the end of the 1990s, the issue has been in the agenda mainly because of 
positive mentions of it. Between the mid-1970s and the end of 1970s, 60 and 80 
percent of the mentions of multiculturalism in party programs were positive. In 
the mid-1980s, 82 percent of the sentences devoted to this policy area 
corresponded to positive references to it, and similar shares were registered by the 
end of the decade and beginning of the 1990s with 81 percent in both cases.  
 
By the end of the 1990s, positive and negative mentions of multiculturalism in 
party programs got much closer, positive sentences represented 55 percent of the 
total and negative sentences 45 percent. And, in contrast to previous years in the 
2000s the raising saliency of multiculturalism in party programs was mainly 
related to negative mentions of ethnic diversity and multicultural policies: 59 and 
60 percent of the sentences referring to immigration and integration were framed 
in a negative way by the mid-2000s and 2010.  
  
In other words, the graphic representation of the evolution of the issue of 
multiculturalism sheds light on the fact that its early development came along with 
a positive framing of ethnic diversity and multicultural policies. And that it is only 
in the last decade that it has been dominated by anti-immigration sentiments in 
party programs across European democracies. To explain the above-presented 
issue dynamics I examine below the relationship that exists between 
multiculturalism, and international migration and important events related to 
immigration.  
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4.3.2 The Rise of Multiculturalism  
One of the key explanations of the evolution of the issue of multiculturalism in 
immigration countries - and the most obvious one- is immigration. “The external 
world causes disruptions and shocks, raises challenges and opportunities (…) the 
external world is always a source of problems to be solved, opportunities to be 
exploited” (Carmines and Stimson 1989:7). Figure 18 shows a scatter plot 
revealing the relationship between net migration and issue saliency in Europe in 
the last decades. As it can be observed, there is a strong and positive relationship 
between immigration and issue saliency (r2= 0.74). This indicates, that when 
immigration increases (positive net migration), the attention that political parties 
devote to the issue of multiculturalism increases. Studies show that hostility 
towards immigration is correlated with the visibility of new migration inflows (as 
shown by Teitelbaum & Wiener 1995, Money 1999). And both, economic and 
cultural objections to immigration shape public opinion (Espenshade & 
Hempstead 1996), which in turns influence the strategies followed by parties when 
emphasizing and framing the issue (Adams et al. 2004). Economic factors include 
individuals’ evaluation of the state of the national economy and their 
employments status, which appear as strong predictors of attitudes towards 
immigration (Citrin et al. 1997). Besides, as mass migration represents ethnic and 
cultural diversification, there is also evidence showing that native citizens tend to 
have preferences for in-group members with whom they share cultural and ethnic 
characteristics. For example when analyzing the question of who deserves public 
assistance native-born respondents rank immigrants lower than natives (Van 
Oorschot 2006), and there is evidence that group comparison and discontent 
occurs in contexts of mass migration (Gurr 1970, Runciman 1966). All in all, as 
Quillian (1995) puts it, perceived intergroup threat is an important explanatory 
factor of racial prejudice, so when the perceived threat increases public opinion 
changes and parties shift their positions.  
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Figure 18. Scatter plot of Net Migration (per 1000) and the Average 
Saliency of Multiculturalism (1960-2010) in Western Europe  
 
 
 
R2: 0.74 
Sources: MARPOR, OECD  
 
 
In essence, we observe that the exploitation of the issue of multiculturalism by 
political parties is closely related to migratory inflows as these influence public 
opinion. This relation leads to two major considerations. On the first hand, it 
provides further evidence that the issue of multiculturalism in European 
democracies is overall a policy area highly related to the ethnic and cultural 
diversity resulting from international migration (in contrast to a multiculturalism 
that would refer to national minorities for example). On the other, it reveals that 
political parties react to the anxiety about of immigration and the assumption that 
immigrants may exploit the welfare state and social programs (Banting 2010: 807).  
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4.3.3 The Turn Against Multiculturalism  
The observation that political parties mainly framed multiculturalism in a positive 
way in previous decades raises questions about the factors that contributed to the 
radical change we observe in the 2000s. Certainly, net migration appears as a 
crucial factor determining the saliency of the topic, yet it is important to 
understand what other factors have contributed to the raise of the radical turn 
against multiculturalism that Europe has experienced in the last decade. Agenda 
setting and issue evolution theories provide with a framework that is useful to 
understand this turn. They put forward the role that major events play in the rise 
and framing of particular issues (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 2009; 
Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg 1995; Soroka 2002; Carmines and Stimson 1989). 
Major events such as crises, wars, depression and terrorism penetrate the political 
system, affecting party strategies and electoral dynamics overall.  
 
The advent of the 21st century has been characterized by a series of major events, 
which have affected our perceptions and the political relevance of immigration, 
and with it of multiculturalism. Therefore from this perspective, examining the 
some events that contributed to a negative image of immigrants and immigration 
seems crucial for understanding the turn against multiculturalism that dominates 
the political arena.  
 
 
 
  136 
Figure 19.Timeline of Major Events related to Multiculturalism (2000-2010)47  
 
    Sources: Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010: 4-6), Own Sources.  
                                                
47 Non-exhaustive list of major events that have dominated the public and political discourses in the 2000s. 
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Numerous events revolved around immigrants or immigration in the 2000s. And, 
marked a new momentum for multiculturalism in European Democracies. As 
Figure 19 shows some of these major events, classified by type and ordered by 
date. In the upper side of the timeline two types of events are shown. The grey 
dotted line shows events that involved the civil society, including the Oldham 
Riots in the United Kingdom in May 2001, the Riots in France in October and 
November 2005, and the demonstrations that took place in Britain in 2008 
following the economic and financial crisis asking to prioritize British over 
immigrant workers. The grey line shows terrorist actions. The 9/11 terrorists 
attacks in the United States, the train bombing in Madrid in March 2004, the 
assassination of the film director Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands in November 
2004, and the train bombing in London in July 2005. 
 
In the lower part of the timeline, signaled by the dotted black line controversial 
expressions of opinions that have gained international relevance are enlisted. 
These include the publication of articles in the printed press such as “The 
Multicultural Drama” in the Netherlands in 2000, the article entitled “Too 
Diverse” in the United Kingdom in 2004, and the Muhammad Cartoons in 
Denmark in 2005. Finally, political parties, politicians and national governments 
have also actively contributed to the debates on multiculturalism in the 2000s 
(black line). The electoral success and popularity of anti-immigration parties has 
played an important role in the evolution of the issue. In the Netherlands in 2001 
and 2002, the anti-immigration party Pym Fortuyn gained a lot of popularity and 
the National Front of Le Pen in France made it in 2002 to the second tour of the 
presidential elections. In France controversial laws were adopted, including the 
secularity law in 2004, and the burqa ban in 2010.  
 
Finally, conservative representatives have played a pivotal role in setting the tone 
for framing multiculturalism in Europe. For instance, in 2008 the British Prime 
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Minister David Cameron gave speech over the “Cultural Apartheid” that 
emerged as a result of mass immigration. And in 2010, the German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel declared, “Multiculturalism is Dead”. 
 
The combination of these events, which gained international attention, opened a 
window of opportunity for the re-politicization and re-framing of multiculturalism 
(and more broadly, immigration) in Europe. Their repercussions are shown below.   
4.3.3.1 Events Involving the Civil Society 
A series of events engaging the civil society occurred. Dancygier (2010) defines 
these as confrontations between immigrant groups, natives and immigrant groups, 
and immigrant groups and the forces of order. From this perspective three major 
events related to immigrant groups raised public and political concerns about 
multiculturalism.  
 
First, in May 2001 in the United Kingdom riots emerged in which British 
Bangladeshi and Pakistani youths opposed White youths. The riots are known as 
the 2001 Oldham riots because they occurred in that town in Greater 
Manchester. These had been considered as one of the works ethnically motivated 
riots in the United Kingdom, and later spread to Southall, Leicester and 
Birmingham. Second, in October and November 2005 in France riots in urban 
suburbs occurred including Arab, North African and black French second-
generation immigrants. These confrontations consisted mainly in burning cars and 
public buildings, and confrontations with the police. Third, in 2008 following the 
effects of the financial and economic crisis protesters of the Lindsey Oil Refinery 
in the United Kingdom voiced what seemed to be the concerns of many British 
workers: ‘British Jobs for British Workers’.  
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What these events have in common is that they emerge as violent expressions of 
existing tensions between ethnic groups that challenge the social order, polarizing 
public opinion, and requiring the action of the representatives in office. The 
diagnosis and solutions adopted in every individual case are also sources of new 
controversies around multiculturalism. For example, the Ritchie Report that 
investigated the Oldham riots shed light on how separated the lives of different 
ethnic groups were, and how this was the source of ethnic conflict. They stated: 
“[The] lives [of the different ethnic groups] often do not seem to touch at any 
point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges”48, proposing 
to bring these communities close together. Years later, in the United Kingdom 
following the mentioned demonstrations occurred in the context of the 2008 
financial and economic crisis asking to prioritize British over immigrant workers 
the affair turned into the enactment of a local clause that agreed to hire at least 
100 British workers at the site (Barnard 2009).  
4.3.3.2 Terrorism  
Terrorism refers to the unofficial use of violence and intimidation for the pursuit 
of political aims. Several terrorist attacks occurred in immigration countries 
leading to numerous debates over immigration, multiculturalism, and security. 
First, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001 in the United States increased the 
concern about the possible threat of Islamic terrorism in the West. The series of 
four terrorist attacks by the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda took place in New 
York and Washington. Having more than 3,000 victims it has been one of the 
most visible attacks in the West in the last decades. As a reaction, many countries 
(including Germany) passed laws to combat terrorism, which resulted for example 
in tougher controls over asylum policies.  
                                                
48 The Ritchie Report, page 9:  
http://resources.cohesioninstitute.org.uk/Publications/Documents/Document/DownloadDocum
entsFile.aspx?recordId=97&file=PDFversion 
  140 
 
Second, in March 2004 in Madrid the train bombings killed 191 people. The 
perpetrators of the attacks have been characterized as an Al-Qaeda inspired group 
yet not relationship to Al-Qaeda has been established. Big controversies over the 
handling and representation of the attack by the government were at the centre of 
the debate, confronting the two main political parties: the Spanish Socialist 
Worker’s Party (Left) and the People’s Party (Conservative), and has been 
interpreted as one of the main reasons why the incumbent party (People’s Party) 
lost the general election which was held only few days after. 
 
Third, in November of 2004 in the Netherlands a Muslim extremist assassinated 
the film director Theo Van Gogh.  The director had produced a short film named 
“Submission” (2004) in which he criticized the treatment of women in Islam. In 
the aftermath of his death, several attacks to mosques and Islamic schools and 
violent incidents against Muslims took place. Also, it resulted in the attacks to 
Christian churches. The murder polarized the debates in the Netherlands about 
the situation of the Muslim residents in the Netherlands. Among the greatest 
repercussions related to immigration are the statements made by Geert Wilders, 
an Independent member of the Dutch parliament, who advocated a five-year halt 
to immigration from non-Western societies. He declared: “The Netherlands has 
been too tolerant to intolerant people for too long. We should not import a 
retarded political Islamic society into our country"49.  
 
Finally, the 2005 London bombings occurred in the month of July. Four British 
Islamists detonated bombs. These attacks targeted civilians using public transport 
system, the attacks resulted in 52 victims. Some days later, it was reported that the 
British National Party (BNP) printed leaflets showing images of the attacks with 
                                                
49 http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2002096425_dutch20.html 
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the slogan “Maybe now it's time to start listening to the BNP”, which was alleged 
by other parties as an exploitation of the tragic events to spread their beliefs.  
  
As shown above, the repercussions of these events in the political arena are related 
to first to the fact that immigration has been associated with criminality (Mclaren 
and Johnson 2007). And, second the terrorist attacks have marked the starting 
point of a new relationship between citizens of European countries, and 
immigrants from Muslim countries (Helbling 2012:12). It has been argued, that 
these terrorist attacks has had a major impact on attitudes towards immigrants, in 
particular, the political agenda emerging after 9/11 has contributed to a “culture 
of suspicion against Muslims” (Fekete 2004:14). In brief, these terrorist attacks 
have contributed enormously to establishing a relationship between 
multiculturalism and security issues, which emerged together with more restrictive 
views vis-à-vis ethnic and cultural diversity in Europe. 
4.3.3.3 Expressions of Opinions and Public Discourse 
This type of events concerns expression of opinions in the press, which have been 
subject to public attention, and disputes over freedom of speech. Three major 
events related to expressions of opinions have had great influence on the debates 
about multiculturalism in the last decade. The first two events openly criticize 
multiculturalism. The third one is related to a certain characterization of Islam, 
which lead to major discussions. And, an interesting fact is that these publications 
did not emerge exclusively from conservative media groups, but media aligned 
with the left and liberal ideologies also contributed to the debates.  
 
The first case took place in the Netherlands at the beginning of the 2000s. The 
Dutch journalist, and member of the Labor Party, Paul Scheffer published the 
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article “The Multicultural Disaster”50. As the title indicates it consists of an open 
critic addressed to multiculturalism. In the article using statistical data, Scheffer 
expresses what his thoughts are about the failures of multiculturalism: “the 
formation of an ethnic underclass”, “integration is the exception rather than the 
rule”, “the multicultural drama that unfolds is also the biggest threat to social 
peace”. The political importance of it didn’t come only from the fact that it was an 
open criticism of multiculturalism, but it stands from the fact that it is one of the 
first open criticisms to multiculturalism coming from the left.  
 
Similar criticisms emerged in 2004 in the United Kingdom, where the editor of a 
left-leaning magazine, Prospect Magazine51, David Goodhart published the article 
“Too Diverse?”52. In this article he asks whether Britain is becoming too diverse to 
sustain the obligations that are necessary to maintain a good society and a good 
working welfare state. As the author puts it: “as Britain becomes more diverse 
[the] common culture is being eroded. And therein lies one of the central 
dilemmas of political life in developed societies: sharing and solidarity can conflict 
with diversity”(Goodhart 2004).  
 
Finally, by the end of the summer 2005 the independent liberal (centre-right) 
Danish newspaper “The Jutland Post” published 12 cartoons depicting Islam and 
Muhammad, from which one showed Muhammad with a bomb in his turban. 
The publication of these cartoons resulted in protests of the Muslim community 
living in Denmark, protests all over the Muslim world, and several attempts of 
terrorist attacks against the newspaper and the cartoonists.  
 
                                                
50 Het multiculturele drama:  
http://retro.nrc.nl/W2/Lab/Multicultureel/scheffer.html 
51 The Prospect Magazine is a British general interest monthly magazine devoted to politics, 
economics and current affairs. It has been catalogued as a left-leaning magazine. 
52http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/too-diverse-david-goodhart-multiculturalism-
britain-immigration-globalisation/ 
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Interestingly, among the cases here presented two show critical views on the 
effects of multiculturalism in the local societies emerging from actors that defend 
left ideas. And the third one, from a centre-right newspaper, is related to the 
perceptions of Islam. This latter, is perceived as embodying a multicultural 
backlash related to freedom and freedom of speech. 
4.3.3.4 Politics  
The fourth category of events engages key political actors; these include political 
parties and governments. From the side of the parties, the electoral success of anti-
immigration parties in the last decade has been crucial to the developments of the 
issue of multiculturalism in Europe. Two facts appear as highly relevant here. 
First, between 2001 and 2002 in the Netherlands the raise of popularity and death 
of the far-right politician Pim Fortuyn had major consequences in Dutch politics. 
The Pim Fortuyn List was created in 2002 held conservative views on 
multiculturalism, immigration and Islam. And, Pim Fortuyn criticized Islam for 
being a "backward culture". These declarations raised major discussions in the 
Netherlands opening the debates over immigration in that country.  
 
At the same time in France, the French presidential elections of 2002 resulted in a 
great surprise for the French electorate. In the first round of the elections the 
conservative party leaded by Jacques Chirac and the far-right party, Front 
National, of Jean-Marie Le Pen obtained the majority of the votes going and 
making it to the second round. Reacting to these results, all candidates from 
opposing parties called the French voters to boycott the far-right candidate and 
numerous demonstrations took place in the following days in France’s largest 
cities. Also as a sign of protest, the conservative and incumbent candidate Jacques 
Chirac refused to participate in the political debates next to Le Pen.  
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France was also the country where controversial laws adopted by conservative 
governments raised major discussions over immigration and multiculturalism in 
particular. In February 2004 a law banning the use of signs and clothes that show 
the religion of students in public schools was adopted53, and in September 2010 a 
law banning the use of veils covering the face in public spaces was passed54.  While 
the arguments related to the secularity law revolved around France’s identification 
with secularity and its status as secular state, the burqa law mobilized arguments 
related peoples’ identification, security and ultimately integration. The burqa law 
and the arguments around it were subject to cross-national diffusion resulting in 
similar debates to take place in Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Austria, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom.  
 
Finally, statements by conservative prime ministers in the United Kingdom and 
Germany also raised concerns about the issue of multiculturalism. In February 
2008 the first minister of the United Kingdom, David Cameron, attacked 
multiculturalism alleging that it has created a “cultural apartheid” because it 
allows ethnic communities to lead separate lives. “For too long we've given in to 
the loudest voices from each community, without listening to what the majority 
want”55. A few years later, in October 2010, the Chancellor of Germany declared 
that multiculturalism has “utterly failed” 56. “Of course the tendency had been to 
say, 'let's adopt the multicultural concept and live happily side by side, and be 
happy to be living with each other'. But this concept has failed, and failed 
utterly”57. These declarations put Merkel next to the most conservative wing of 
                                                
53Article L141-5-1:   
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071191&idArt
icle=LEGIARTI000006524456&dateTexte=20140708 
54 LOI n° 2010-1192:  
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022911670 
55 http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/feb/27/immigration.humanrights 
56http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism-
failed 
57http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-germany-multiculturalism-
failures 
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the German Christian Democrat Party. All in all, successful anti-immigration 
parties in the Netherlands and France, the adoption of laws limiting the rights and 
actions of specific immigrant groups in France, and declarations of Conservative 
Governments’ Heads in Britain and Germany have also influenced the strategies 
followed by parties during elections.  
 
To conclude, at the beginning of this chapter and grounding on some on some of 
the assumptions put forward in political research, I advanced the premise 
(Hypothesis 3) that the early stages and evolution of the issue of multiculturalism 
in Europe has been driven by the mobilization of views opposing ethnic diversity 
and multicultural policies. In the temporal analysis of parties’ positions on 
multiculturalism in Europe we could clearly observe that a positive framing of 
ethnic diversity and multicultural policies dominated the early stages of the issue 
of multiculturalism. And, that a radical turn against multiculturalism has only 
conquered the political arena in more recent years.  
 
In the next section I explore the relationship between party families and the issue 
of multiculturalism in the aim of understanding the role played by these parties in 
the evolution of the issue.  
4.3.4 Party Families 
In the previous section of this Chapter I have examined the early stages and 
evolution of the issue of multiculturalism in Europe. Two phenomena are 
remarkable. First, the saliency of the issue has increased in the last decades in the 
programs of political parties. Second, since the late 1990s statements apposing 
ethnic diversity and multicultural policies have dominated the political discourses 
over multiculturalism. The question that emerges in this context is whether all 
parties contribute equally to such evolution of the issue. In order to understand 
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this I examine how salient the issues is across party families, and what positions 
they held.  
 
Table 13 shows the existence of great variations in terms of the mean saliency of 
the multiculturalism across party families. Communist and Socialist parties have 
the lowest scores. The mean saliency of the issue in the party manifestos for these 
party families is 0.5 (1.2 standard deviation) for the Communists. Similarly, the 
issue is not very salient in the party programs of socialist parties (mean 0.6, 
standard deviation 1.1). On the side of the left, the parties that seem to give more 
attention to the issue are the Greens, for whom the saliency of the issue is 1 
(standard deviation 1.2). Following this, the liberal parties give much attention to 
the issue, scoring second after the Nationalist Parties. Liberal parties score a mean 
of 1.4 percent of sentences on this issue in their party programs (standard 
deviation 2.9).  
 
Christian Democrats, Conservatives, and Agrarian parties find themselves in the 
middle between left parties on the one hand, and green, nationalist and liberal 
parties on the other. While they give more attention to the issue than left parties, 
they do it to a relative less extent than the second group. Christian Democrats 
devote 0.9 percent of their manifestos to sentences on multiculturalism (standard 
deviation 1.7), Conservative Parties 0.7 percent (standard deviations 1.6) and 
Agrarian parties 0.8 (standard deviation 1.5). Finally, Nationalist Parties are the 
ones giving greater attention to the issue scoring 3.2 percent of their sentences on 
this issue in their manifestos (standard deviation 5.2). Generally speaking, the data 
shows that in terms of the saliency right wing and conservative parties devote 
more attention to the issue of multiculturalism than left parties do.  
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Table 13.Mean Saliency and Position by Party Family (1960–2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard deviations in brackets, Pearson’s r: - 0.89 
 
Besides, looking at the positions of parties on the issue of multiculturalism, the 
manifesto data reveals two main features. First, the data shows that all the party 
families - with the only exception of the Nationalist parties - held on average 
positive positions on multiculturalism. In other words, all the party families 
located in the left of the political spectrum are favorable to multiculturalism. The 
Greens lead with most of the positive statements on the issue 0.4 (standard 
deviation 0.5), followed by the Communist and the Socialists which both score 0.3 
(standard deviation 0.5). Also the Christian Democrats show similar scores than 
these parties, with 0.3 (standard deviation 0.5). Then, the Conservatives have also 
a slightly more positive position on the issue scoring 0.2 (standard deviation 0.6). 
Followed by Liberals and Agrarians, which score 0.1 (standard deviation 0.6) and 
0.1 (standard deviation. 0.5) respectively.  
 
Second, it reveals that in Europe Greens parties are the ones promoting of 
multiculturalism, and Nationalist Parties are the ones leading the anti-
multiculturalism agenda. Based on this evidence, we notice the important role that 
new “niche” party families (Meguid 2005), namely Greens and Anti-immigration 
party families, play in the political arena in relation to immigrants and 
immigration.  
Party Family Saliency Position 
Greens 1 (1.2) 0.4 (0.5) 
Communists 0.5 (1.2) 0.3 (0.5) 
Socialists 0.6 (1.1) 0.3 (0.5) 
Liberals 1.4 (2.9) 0.1 (0.6) 
Christian Democrats 0.9 (1.7) 0.3 (0.5) 
Conservatives 0.7 (1.6) 0.2 (0.6) 
Nationalist Parties 3.2 (5.2) - 0.3 (0.7) 
Agrarian Parties 0.8 (1.5) 0.1 (0.5) 
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Finally, the data reveals that there is a correlation between these saliency and 
position. The Pearson’s correlation is -0.89, indicating that when the saliency of 
the issue increases; the position tends to be more negative. Equally, when the 
saliency decreases it is related to more positive positions.  This last observation 
grounds on the fact that the policy dimension of immigration is not always salient 
to all parties. In fact, the nationalist party family (as classified by the Manifesto 
project) includes several anti-immigration parties, which are parties that aim at 
restricting immigration and highlight the emergency of taking such measures (Van 
Spanje 2011). In sum, the very ideological nature of parties sets parties apart 
regarding the saliency of immigration and positions expressed in their manifestos.  
4.3.4.1 Party Families over Time  
The importance that a party attaches to such issue varies over time and place. 
Much of the saliency and positions on the issue of multiculturalism observed 
across party families, are the result from the attention and positions these parties 
have sustained on time. In order to better grasp these evolutions I broke down the 
trajectory of position per party family since 1960s and until 2010. Figure 20 shows 
the evolution of the positions held by different party families in the last five 
decades. The line plot reveals that most of the party families held positive views on 
the issue. Since their emergence in the 1970s, Green parties have held positive 
views on multiculturalism. Their position has been consistently positive and 
therefore the Greens count as the parties being the most positive on the issue in 
Western Europe. Communist and Social Democrats are also the other two party 
families that defend multiculturalism in their party manifestos. Yet, Communists 
held more positive positions than the Social Democrats and even in the 1980s they 
surpassed the Greens in their positive approach to the issue, turn than then 
declined and become the second defenders of multiculturalism after the Greens.  
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Figure 20.Line plot of Position on Multiculturalism across Party Families (1960-2010) 
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On the Right of the political spectrum Conservative and Christian Democrats 
have held rather positive positions on the issue, which only for the former declined 
in the last decade. The Agrarians and the Liberals on their side have held a wide 
array of positions in the last years. While the Agrarians started in the decade of the 
1970s holding positive views on multicultural policies, the positive statements 
declined in the following decades, reaching negative views in the decade of the 
90s. Their position on the issue adopted again a new trend with the upcoming of 
the new century, and in the 2000s these parties raised again positive views on 
multiculturalism.  
 
The Liberals on their side, held in the last decades moderate positions on 
multicultural policies. Their stances were moderately positive. Their position 
turned to be less positive during the decade of the 1980s but their positive views 
recovered in the following years. Interestingly, in the first decade of the 20th 
century Liberal parties gave a turn towards a more conservative views on 
multicultural policies turning to more mentions of negative statements than 
positive ones on ethnic diversity and multicultural policies.  
 
Finally, the trajectory of the issue in relation to the positions held by Nationalist 
parties in the last five decades is characterized by a constant radicalization on the 
opinions expressed in manifestos on the issue of multiculturalism. To our surprise, 
prior to the 1970s these parties presented positive views on the issue of 
multiculturalism, yet during the 1970s we observe that they turned radically 
towards anti-multicultural positions. Negative statements on multicultural policies 
increased among Nationalist in the following decades, and stabilizing in the 1990s 
and 2000s around -0.6. 
 
In other words, the time analysis of individual party families sheds light on some 
interesting facts. First, among all parties, the Greens parties the ones presenting 
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more positive views on multiculturalism in party manifestos. This fact is partially 
explained by the fact that the Greens being new parties in party systems embraced 
the so-called “post-materialist values” including ethnic diversity (Inglehart 1977).  
 
Second, on average positive mentions of multiculturalism dominate over negative 
ones across all party families but the Nationalists. Communists, Social Democrats, 
Liberals, Conservatives, Christian Democrats and Agrarians score positive on 
average in the last five decades. Only Agrarian parties in the 1990s and Liberals in 
the 2000s turned towards more negative mentions of the issue, but these data 
points are outliers in their overall position trajectory. Surprisingly the issue 
position of Nationalist parties was not always in the negative part of the scale but 
in the 1960s these parties had positive mentions of multiculturalism in their party 
programs, which in the later years radicalized towards clear anti-multicultural 
statements.  
 
Third, examining the positions of party families from the perspective of the 
saliency of the issue we can conclude that the issue is much more present in the 
agendas of those parties that oppose multiculturalism (or those that defend 
moderate positions), than of those that promote it (with the only exception of the 
Green parties).  
 
Taking all these points into consideration, we can conclude that the “freezing 
hypothesis” advanced by Lipset and Rokkan (1967 in Mair 1997:3) is contested in 
the context of multicultural democracies. In reality the issue of multiculturalism is 
gaining in relevance in these democracies. Its politicization is largely driven first 
by the anti-immigration ideas mobilized by Nationalist parties. And second, by the 
promotion of multiculturalism undertake by Green parties. Therefore, from this 
perspective “niche parties” (Meguid 2005) are playing a pivotal role in changing 
the landscape of electoral politics. The empirical evidence shows the growing 
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influence of anti-immigration parties (Mudde 2013) which influences the policy 
strategies adopted by other parties (Meguid 2005) having a “contagion effect” on 
entire party systems (Van Spanje 2010). All in all, the evidence supports the idea 
that Europe is experience a “right turn” (Minkensberg 2001:1, Zaslove 2004:99).  
 
To conclude, I started this second analysis hypothesizing a considerable difference 
in the positions on multiculturalism defended by left and right parties. The data 
presented above shed light on differences in terms of the positions held, and the 
saliency of the issue in the manifestos of left and right party families. The 
radicalization of Nationalist parties in the last decades is imminent. However, to 
our surprise in the last years, Conservative parties held in average more positive 
views than Socialist parties. This fact suggests that we need to closely examine the 
dynamics of parties and party systems across countries.  
 
4.3.5 Multiculturalism across Countries  
In this section I examine the saliency and position of the issue of multiculturalism 
across European democracies. Broken down per country, we observe that the 
saliency of the issue varies greatly across democracies. As it is shown in Figure 21, 
the political relevance of the issue in electoral manifestos has increased in the last 
decades (Saliency is represented by the black line). First, by the 1980s the issue of 
multiculturalism was already highly politicized in some democracies, namely 
Belgium, Finland, France, Portugal, and Spain.  By the mid 1990s the issue gained 
in relevance in Denmark, Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, 
Italy and the United Kingdom. Whereas in some democracies the attention than 
parties devoted to it, decreased, like in Belgium, Finland, and Sweden.  
 
Finally, the last years witnessed an increase in the saliency of the issue in the 
majority of European democracies. The saliency of the issue escalated in 
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Denmark, where the issue is the most salient in Europe. This explained to a great 
extent of the effects of the foundation in 1995 of the Danish People’s Party, 
combining many elements of the French party Front National and supported by a 
far-right circle of intellectuals, which highly mediated its influence (Rydgren 
2004).  
 
Other countries where the issue is highly salient at present are Austria, Belgium, 
Finland and the Netherlands. The importance of the issue also increased in 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Germany, Greece and Sweden. In some other 
democracies, it remained stable in comparison to the previous decades like in 
France, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Finally, Italy and Spain are the only 
two countries where the average saliency of the issue decreased.  
 
In terms of the average position of parties on multiculturalism (represented by the 
grey line), we observe than on average at the party system level parties showed 
rather positive positions on multiculturalism, or close to cero, which means that 
parties showed on equal basis positive and negative arguments in relation to 
multiculturalism in party manifestos. On average, the country that has negative 
arguments dominating the positions of parties is Denmark in the mid 1990s. And, 
on its opposite, Ireland is the country where the saliency of the issue appears to be 
dominated by positive statements over multiculturalism.  
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Figure 21. Line plots of Average Saliency (black) and Position (grey) per Country
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4.3.5.1 The Effects of Anti-Immigration Parties  
Previous research has shown the influence that anti-immigration parties have in 
influencing the strategies followed by other parties (Meguid 2005), affecting entire 
party systems (Van Spanje 2010).  Figure 22 shows the pure position of parties on 
multiculturalism in the last elections held in every country (by 2010). As the 
illustration shows, in the presence of anti-immigration parties, party systems tend 
to show a greater polarization on the issue. In most of the countries, conservative 
parties tend to also adopt negative stances on multiculturalism. This is precisely 
the case in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands and Sweden. In some cases 
however, competitor parties either avoid the issue or adopt a rather neutral (close 
to cero) position. This is particularly the case in France, Italy, and the United 
Kingdom.  
 
Besides, in countries without anti-immigration parties (or having some of very 
small relevance), the overall framing of multiculturalism is more positive, and less 
polarized.  In some cases most parties either show neutral or only positive 
positions on the issue like in the cases of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
Finally, in some countries like Finland, Germany and Luxembourg, there is one 
party opposing multiculturalism but all other parties are either neutral or positive 
on this matter.  
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Figure 22. Parties’ Position on Multiculturalism in Last Election  
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4.4 Conclusion and Discussion  
In Chapter 4 I investigate the evolution of the issue of multiculturalism across 
party systems and parties, and what factors influence the issue saliency and 
orientation. Using the MARPOR project data I have examined the evolution of 
the issue in the last five decades in ten Western European democracies.  
 
The study sheds light on interesting facts about the evolution of the issue of 
multiculturalism in European democracies. First of all, against the expectations 
(H3) in previous decades multiculturalism was present in parties’ political agendas. 
It was highly dominated by positive views on ethnic diversity and multicultural 
policies. It is only around the year 2000 that the politicization of the issue starts to 
be driven by parties’ opposition to multiculturalism. This radical turn is the result 
of terrorist attacks, social unrest and the mediatization of views that highlight the 
problems associated with international migration. Besides, the empirical analyses 
also give evidence that in general all party families tended to have positive (even 
when very moderated) positions on multicultural policies. Broken down by party 
family, we observe that only the Agrarian parties in the 2000s and the nationalist 
parties starting in the 1980s opposed multiculturalism. These findings challenge 
the expectations formulated in the hypothesis 4 that established a relationship 
between support and opposition to multiculturalism and the left and right (as 
shown by Alonso and Claro da Fonseca 2012). Indeed the evidence shows that 
opposition to multiculturalism has been rather an issue of anti-immigration parties 
(in line with the findings of Green-Pedersen 2007). Finally, the cross-country 
examination shows that the presence of anti-immigration parties is an important 
factor determining the positions adopted by other parties in a democracy, 
supporting hypothesis 5. When anti-immigration parties are present, parties hold 
more negative positions on multiculturalism than when they are absent.  
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Summing up, in this Chapter I show the way in which political parties respond to 
ethnic diversity and multicultural policies in immigration countries. Grounding on 
this empirical body a next question is what role do parties play in the selection and 
nomination of immigrant candidates. Therefore in Chapter 5 I investigate the 
extent to which political parties, among other factors, affect immigrants’ 
descriptive representation.  
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5. Descriptive Representation 
Descriptive representation refers to the "ability of groups to elect representatives 
with similar traits" (Welch and Hibbing 1988). From this perspective, descriptive 
representatives are individuals who in their own background and experiences 
mirror specific groups (Mansbridge, 1999:628). This approach also called 
“statistical” or “mirror” representation focuses on the demographic and social 
characteristics of elected officials. And, it aims at assessing how well are societies’ 
groups politically represented. In the context of multicultural democracies three 
major questions emerge: (1) Is there a correspondence between the composition of 
national assemblies and their ethnically diverse societies? (2) How do electoral 
systems and parties influence the representation of immigrants in Europe? And, (3) 
what factors related to immigrant candidates and immigrant groups contribute to 
immigrants’ inroads into politics?  
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine immigrants’ representation in national 
assemblies. In order to attain this objective I follow a more comprehensive 
approach to understand how institutional and group-level characteristics affect 
their representation. This chapter is organized as follows. First, I place the 
political representation of immigrants in the context of European multicultural 
democracies, and examine the main factors that can contribute or hamper it. 
Second I present the research design that has been developed for this study. 
Third, I analyze the relationship between immigrants’ representation and 
electoral systems, parties, constituencies and immigrant candidates. Finally I 
summarize and discuss the findings.  
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5.1 Analytical Framework 
Descriptive representation refers to make something absent present by 
resemblance. Therefore, what is to be represented is a specific group. The 
rationale is that the legislature should resemble the nation and mirror the people, 
the public opinion, or the movement of social and economic forces of the nation 
(Pitkin, 1967:64).  From this perspective the members of the legislature “supply” 
information about the groups that are in society: women, the working class, 
national minorities, et cetera. This leads to the fact that descriptive representation 
gives great emphasis to the composition of the legislature in terms of the 
characteristics of individual representatives.  
 
The presence of minority representatives in legislative bodies is important in many 
ways. It can contribute to their representation in contexts of inter-group mistrust 
or when immigrants’ interests are not crystallized by dominant political actors 
(Mansbridge, 1999). Also, some of the inequalities existent across groups can be 
traced down to the existent indifference that elites show vis-à-vis the interests of 
minority and under-represented groups. Therefore from this perspective, 
descriptive representation can contribute to readjusting the unequal distribution of 
political values in society: power, participation and decision-making (Shapiro, 
1981:712). Also, group representation increases political knowledge, increases 
contact with representatives and increases electoral participation (Banducci et al. 
2004). Furthermore, descriptive representation has a potential symbolic value. 
Descriptive representation can contribute to inter-group trust building, and 
reinforce the feelings of inclusion (Mansbridge 1999). It is associated with more 
positive political attitudes (Banducci et al. 2004), and can play a role model with 
other members of that group (Bloemraad 2006:228-9). 
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In the context of multicultural democracies, explanations of the factors that foster 
and hamper immigrants’ representation can be divided into two types. On the one 
hand, there are the factors that conform the political landscape of the democracies 
in which immigrants live. In terms of the contextual and institutional features, two 
main factors are identified in the literature as playing an important role in 
immigrants’ representation: (1) the characteristics of electoral systems that set the 
rules of the elections, and (2) the characteristics of political parties, which are the 
main gatekeepers in the selection and nomination of candidates. On the other 
hand, supply side analyses argue that (3) the characteristics of the immigrant 
electorate, and (2) of immigrant candidates and representatives do matter for 
explaining immigrants’ descriptive representation.  
  
Based on these arguments, below I present some empirical evidence that sheds 
light on the role that electoral systems, political parties, immigrant constituencies, 
and immigrant-origin political leaders play for descriptive representation. Based 
on this I derive the main hypotheses that are examined in this Chapter.  
 
5.1.1 Electoral Systems 
Electoral systems matter for representation, as these are “links in the chain 
connecting the preferences of citizens to the policy choices made by governments” 
(Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005:3). In representative democracies citizens delegate 
policy-making to a small number of representatives. And the way these 
representatives are elected is of crucial importance for representation. The 
concept of electoral system refers in general to “the set of rules that structure how 
votes are cast in elections for a representative assembly and how these votes are 
then converted into seats in that assembly”  (idem: p.3). Therefore, the 
characteristics of electoral systems are of vital relevance for political representation 
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as these influence representatives’ election, the number of parties, and voters’ 
turnout.  
 
The electoral formulas have major implications for representation as these 
determine how votes are counted and how seats are allocated. Different 
characteristics of different electoral systems lead to different results in the 
representation of immigrant minorities. Here we have a look at two types of 
systems. Majoritarian systems have been designed to create a majority in order to 
produce an effective working majority for the government. Given that 
majoritarian systems prioritize effective governance, the consequence is that 
minor parties are highly penalized and have a difficult path to government. On 
the other side, proportional systems have been designed to foster the inclusion of 
minority parties, in the aim of mirroring the composition of society in the 
parliament.  
 
Studies on the relationship between electoral systems and the representation of 
minorities suggest that these institutional features matter for immigrants’ 
representation. In general, it is argued that majority systems have negative 
consequences for the representation of minority groups (Norris 1997:304). A study 
conducted across 15 European democracies showed that ethnic minorities are 
worst off in terms of their representation in majority systems compared to 
proportional systems (Kostadinova 2007). The difference between majoritarian 
and proportional systems in these contexts resides specifically on the inner 
dynamics of both systems. In majority systems candidates’ selection is often 
decentralized, therefore at the local level there are smaller incentive to select a 
candidate that will produce a more representative legislature at the national level. 
In contrast, in proportional systems candidates have greater visibility, therefore in 
such a system, there is greater incentive to present a list that “looks like the voters” 
(Bird 2003: 13). 
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The characteristics of electoral systems seem to determine to a great extent the 
descriptive representation of immigrants in national legislatures Based on this 
evidence, the first hypothesis that is examined in this Chapter states as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 6: Electoral Systems  
Immigrants are better represented in democracies having 
proportional electoral systems than in democracies having 
majoritarian systems.  
  
5.1.2 Political Parties 
Parties adopt different strategies to maximize their electoral gains (Downs 1957). 
In this framework the strategies they follow when recruiting candidates to be 
included in the party lists (as the position they adopt, see Chapter 4) are perceived 
as means to these ends. In other words, candidates’ nomination is one of the 
means that parties have at hand to address the general electorate or certain parts 
of the electorate in the aims of winning a given election (Scarrow 2004).  
 
By choosing the electoral candidates, parties are defining the pool of individuals 
that are eligible for government, and most importantly by this act they are 
determining the overall composition of national parliaments (Norris and 
Lovenduski 1995:2). In this way, parties play the role of the main gatekeepers in 
the recruitment process (Caul 1999, Norris and Lovenduski 1995, Norris 1997, 
Costa and Kerrouche 2007, Strøm 2003). As a result, the question of which 
candidates are included in the party lists is of central concern. Political research 
has shown the existence of significant differences over candidates’ nomination 
across parties. Party-specific political opportunity structures influence the 
recruitment process resulting on representation bias of diverse nature.  
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In the context of multicultural democracies parties are increasingly recruiting 
ethnic minority candidates. Indeed, via the nomination of candidates of 
immigrant origin, parties “try to attract new immigrant voters with the promise to 
enhance their representation in parliament” (Claro da Fonseca 2011:112). Party- 
related characteristics influence to a great the proportions of minority candidates 
that participate in legislative elections (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, Kittilson and 
Tate 2004, Caul 1999). Cross-country empirical evidence pint points at one 
crucial determinant of minority recruitment, and that is party ideology (Kittilson 
and Tate 2004, Norris and Lovenduski 1995). Left wing parties embrace ideals of 
equality and have traditionally offered more support to under-represented groups, 
therefore more immigrant candidates and representatives are found among these 
(Kittilson and Tate 2004). On the other hand, right-wing parties held more 
conservative stands vis-à-vis immigration and their integration. Likewise they 
appear less keen on recruiting minority candidates remaining rather unpopular 
within the immigrant electorate.   
 
On the other hand, while the relationship between ideology and immigrants’ 
recruitment in election time seems straightforward, this assumption has been also 
challenged. The main argument here revolves around the party identification of 
immigrant voters, and its effects on the strategies followed by individual parties. As 
Bird (2003) puts it, durable party identification of minority groups can affect 
political recruitment and parties’ strategies on descriptive recruitment. As I have 
shown in Chapter 3, immigrant voters tend to support left and center left parties. 
Therefore based on this evidence if a left party counts already with the support 
from immigrant voters, the perceived gains of promoting the candidacy of 
immigrant-origin candidates are little. In contrast, parties that are weaker in the 
support they have from these voters (such as right wing parties) might adopt 
recruitment strategies aimed at attracting the immigrant voting (Bird 2003:19). 
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Summarizing, “by promoting minorities for office, parties may “advertise” to 
potential voters their support for minority issues” (Kittilson and Tate 2004:10). 
 
Based on this evidence the relationship between party ideology and immigrant 
candidates’ recruitment calls for further examination. Consequently, in this 
Chapter I examine whether the so-claimed relationship between ideology and 
immigrants’ descriptive representation is still valid: 
 
Hypothesis 7: Party Ideology  
Left wing parties tend to recruit more immigrant 
candidates for safe seats than right wing parties58.  
   
5.1.3 Immigrant Constituencies 
Next to the role that the political context and institutions play (as shown above) 
some key characteristics of immigrant groups are decisive for immigrants’ 
descriptive representation. First, the geographic distribution of immigrants across 
the constituencies influences the representation of immigrants in parliament. 
Geographic concentration within the borders of a constituency makes the 
immigrant community more visible (Bird 2003). And therefore it can influence the 
strategies followed by parties to mobilize these immigrant voters as a bloc (Bird 
2005). US-based empirical evidence shows that immigrants’ concentration in 
some specific electoral districts develops new political scenarios in which parties 
and candidates must address the immigrant voters in order to win (DeSipio and de 
la Garza 2005:398).  
 
                                                
58 With the available data I have been able to examine only the candidates of 
immigrant origin that have been elected. A future study should include as well all 
the nominated candidates as to observe how immigrant candidates are distributed 
across safe, contested and lost seats.  
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Second, in terms of immigrant voters’ mobilization, geographic concentration can 
increase immigrants’ political participation, especially when immigrant candidates 
run for office. Empirical evidence has shown that immigrant voters register lower 
electoral turnout in comparison with native voters (see Chapter 3). Generally 
speaking socio-economic disparities translate into disparities in political resources 
and participation (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995, 
Bartels 2009). As a result, poor citizens participate less in politics than wealthy 
citizens do (Bartels 2009), and as immigrants are in their majority workers (see 
Chapter 2) they also tend to participate less in elections. In addition, immigrant 
voters have reduced language skills and political knowledge, and usually have 
been excluded from political participation for some time before they naturalized 
generating some apathy among them, which also explains their lower turnout. 
Nevertheless, the effects of socio-economic status and group-specific characteristics 
on turnout seem to decrease when immigrant candidates run for office. Empirical 
evidence demonstrates that in the US urban Latino voters registering high levels 
of unemployment and living in constituencies with large shares of immigrant show 
high level of electoral participation (De la Garza and DeSipio 2005).  
 
The evidence exposed above suggests that immigrants’ geographic concentration 
within the borders of electoral districts favors immigrants’ descriptive 
representation (Kostadinova 2007, Bird 2003, Togeby 2008). In constituencies 
where immigrant voters are visible, parties may be more likely to nominate 
candidates of immigrant origin. When immigrant candidates are nominated 
immigrant voters are more likely to turnout to vote and support the candidate 
(Barreto et al. 2004). From this perspective, who the leader is can be relevant for 
voters’ choice because candidates’ personal characteristics can provide necessary 
information on how they would behave with respect to unforeseen problems 
(Aarts et al. 2011:3). Also voters can make the assumption that immigrant 
representatives have a better understanding of the main concerns in these 
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constituencies (Mansbridge 1999), especially regarding immigration and 
integration.  
 
All in all the arguments expressed above point to the assumption that group 
representation improves when groups are both, large and concentrated. Based on 
this the next hypothesis that will be examined in this Chapter is formulated as 
follows:  
 
Hypothesis 8: Geographic Concentration  
Large shares of immigrants in a constituency are related to 
immigrants’ descriptive representation in national 
parliaments.  
 
 
To finalize, I have presented the three working hypothesis that give the structure 
of the study presented in this Chapter. Below I will summarize the main steps that 
have been made in the design of the study, and explain how I measure descriptive 
representation.  
5.2 Research Design and Measurement 
5.2.1 Case Selection 
The objective of this chapter is to contribute to our understanding of immigrants’ 
descriptive representation in European democracies. As explained earlier, given 
that the analysis of political representation required great efforts in terms of data 
collection and coding only three cases are being examined with great depth here. 
Precisely, this study focuses on three cases: France (2007- 2012), Germany (2005 -
2009), and the United Kingdom (2005- 2010). The comparative method is used 
here to be able to establish more general empirical implications of the findings 
(Mill 1843, Lijphart 1971). The small N strategy adopted here has been designed 
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to provide with a deep understanding of the factors that influence immigrants’ 
descriptive representation.  
 
The selection of the three cases examined here has been inspired some baseline 
characteristics that these countries share in common (Przeworski and Teune 
1970). The three countries rank among the most developed countries in Europe 
and in the world. These favorable economic conditions influence international 
migration cycles. As a result, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are in 
the continent among the countries counting more immigrants among their 
national populations. Even when peaks of mass immigration have been observed 
in other countries (like Ireland) the arrival and settlement of immigrants in these 
three countries have been relatively stable in the last decades resulting in the fact 
that these three count among the countries with the largest first and second 
generation immigrant populations.  
 
Second, I focus on countries having similar political traits. France, Germany, and 
the United Kingdom have had stable democracies in the last half a century. This 
guarantees certain stability in their party systems and election cycles. Democratic 
stability is related to the resolution of classic social cleavages in the sense of Stein 
and Rokkan (1967) giving room to the emergence of new issues such as 
immigration and the environment (Kreisi et al. 2008). Besides, early membership 
to the European Union makes these countries important agenda-setters in the 
region, and therefore they play an important role setting the agenda on 
immigration. Finally, the three cases have implemented some sort of single-
member constituency system. France has a two-round system, Germany combines 
it with proportional representation, and the United Kingdom uses the first-past-
the-post system. Single-member constituency systems are relevant because they 
incentive parties to nominate immigrant candidates in immigrants with large 
shares of immigrants. 
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5.2.2 Data 
For this study, I have created an original dataset including demographic and 
biographical data about the members of national parliaments. Data on the 
background of national deputies has been gathered by the project Migrants as 
Political Actors59, and extracted from parliamentary and personal websites. 
Education, gender, and political career data has been gathered using MPs’ official 
and personal websites, as well as other secondary online sources. Furthermore, 
immigrant population data was gathered from the websites of the national 
statistics organizations of the respective countries.  Finally, for measuring parties’ 
ideology I use the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2010 (CHES) (Hooghe et al. 2010). 
 
Examining the composition of national assemblies raises questions about social 
categories, in particular when these are related to peoples’ race and ethnicity. As 
Fearon (2003) states it, the notion of ethnic group is complex as it is drawing the 
lines of an ethnic group. Yet, generally speaking, ethnic groups have the following 
characteristics: (1) membership in the group is reckoned by descendant, by both, 
members and non-members, (2) members are conscious of group membership, (3) 
members share some common cultural features such as language, religion and 
customs, (4) the group has a homeland, (5) the group has a shared history as a 
group and (6) it stands on its own as a group (Fearon 2003: 201).  
 
In this chapter I follow one of the most used strategies in social research dealing 
with immigration. I categorize elected representatives by their birthplace or by the 
birthplace of their parents. One of the main advantages of this approach is that 
this strategy allows doing cross-country and longitudinal analyses (see Bloemraad 
2013). Following this strategy, I have identified first and second-generation 
                                                
59 Coordinated by Andreas Wüst: http://www.migrantactors.net/  
  170 
immigrants elected members of parliament based on their place of birth and 
nationality at birth60.  
 
As Table 14 shows, the number of immigrant deputies is very small in the three 
countries. In France, out of 577 national deputies only 18 have been of immigrant 
origin in the 2007 Legislature. Of the three countries here examined, Germany 
has the smaller number of representatives with migratory background. In the 2005 
general election only 12 of the 614 deputies elected were of a different ethnicity 
than German. Finally, the United Kingdom registers the higher number of 
immigrant deputies of the three countries. 21 of the 646 elected deputies in the 
British general election were of first and second-generation migrants.  
Table 14.Number of Deputies and Immigrant Deputies  
 
Country  Total Deputies Immigrant Deputies 
France 577 18  
Germany 614 12 
United Kingdom  646 21 
 
 
As it can be seen, the number of immigrant representatives remains relatively low 
across democracies. In the next sections of this Chapter I will discuss some aspects 
related to the measurement of descriptive representation, and then examine what 
factors affect immigrants’ representation.  
 
                                                
60 I have made use of all accessible methods to identify immigrant members of national 
parliaments. Yet, given the nature of the data that is required in this inquires it is possible that 
some immigrant representatives remain unidentified.  
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5.2.3 Dependent Variable 
Traditionally, research on descriptive representation has focused on counting the 
numbers of members of representatives that have specific characteristics 
(homosexuals, women, ethnic minorities, et cetera). Many recent studies however 
have highlighted the limits of this strategy (see for example Forrest 2012, 
Bloemraad 2013). In reality it takes more than absolute numbers to understand 
descriptive representation. They should be linked back to their context, that 
means to the electoral constituencies and the composition of the electorate of a 
given group (idem).  
 
Therefore, in the aim of expanding the study of immigrants’ descriptive 
representation in this Chapter, I use the Representation Index developed by 
Bloemraad (2013)61. I measure immigrants’ representation in national assemblies 
relative to their group size in society. Representation is measured as follows: 
Equation 3 
 
 
 
where representation is equal to the share of immigrant MPs in national 
parliaments that result from the division of the number of immigrant MPs 
(ImmMps) by the total number of MPs (MPs) divided by the share of immigrants 
in the population, which is represented by the number of immigrants (Imm) 
divided by the population (Pop). Measurements close to 1 indicate that 
                                                
61 Forest (2012) following a similar approach developed a similar measurement (Proportionality 
Index)  
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immigrants are well represented in national assemblies while measurements 
approaching 0 indicate that they are underrepresented.  
 
The comparative study of immigrants’ descriptive representation raises theoretical 
and empirical questions of what the subjects of the analysis are dealt with. 
Furthermore, immigration research is often confronted with limitations on data 
availability. In this study a person is defined to be an immigrant if she was born 
abroad. In this study also the second-generation migrants, who are those 
individuals that had at least one parent born abroad, are included. The rationale 
behind is that individuals with a migratory background have experienced the 
administrative, linguistic, economic, social and cultural challenges of migration. 
5.2.4 Independent Variables 
In order to explain immigrants’ descriptive representation in national parliaments 
in this Chapter, I examine how this is affected by three main variables: (1) 
electoral systems, (2) political parties’ ideologies, and (3) constituency composition. 
 
First, the variable electoral systems’ characteristics distinguish electoral systems 
between majoritarian and proportional systems. In order to examine the effects of 
electoral systems on immigrants’ representation I include in the analysis three 
more countries: Denmark, Netherlands, and Norway for which data on 
immigrants’ descriptive representation was available at the aggregate level62.  
 
In a second step, the variable parties’ ideology captures the position of parties in 
the Left-Right scale. The Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2010 asks experts to place 
parties’ overall ideology on a 0-10 scale where 0= extreme left, and 10 = extreme 
right (Hooghe et al. 2010).  
 
                                                
62 Bloemraad 2013 
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Finally, the third main independent variable is constituency composition, which 
captures the demographic composition of a given electoral constituency in terms 
of the percentages of immigrants that live there. This data has been gathered from 
the websites of each country’s national statistics institutions63.   
 
5.2.5 Methods 
The analysis here presented is conducted in three steps. In a first step I use 
descriptive statistics to examine immigrants’ descriptive representation. I study 
how electoral system characteristics, parties’ ideology, and constituency 
composition affect immigrants’ representation. In a second step I run a logistic 
regression to determine the relationship between the predictors party ideology and 
constituency composition, and the dichotomous variable immigrant deputy 
elected (1=yes / 0= no). This method allows testing how these two variables 
explain immigrants’ representation in the different countries.  The logistic model 
for these predictors is: 
Equation 4 
 
Logit [P(y=1)] = α + β1* ideology + β2 * constituency 
 
Where β1 represents the effects of parties’ ideology and β2 represents the effects of 
the share of immigrants in the constituencies.  
 
Finally, in a third step qualitative analyses are used to shed light on the 
characteristics and political trajectory of immigrant deputies.  
                                                
63 France: INSEE, Germany: Destatis, United Kingdom: ONS. As a consequence of data 
limitations overseas French territories, Scotland and Northern Ireland have been excluded from 
the analysis.  
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Altogether, in this empirical chapter I make use of a variety of data sources, 
measurements, and methods to thoroughly examine immigrants’ descriptive 
representation.  
 
5.3 Results   
5.3.1 Electoral Systems 
Based on previous empirical research I have hypothesized that the characteristics 
of electoral systems play a crucial role in immigrants’ representation. Above all, 
proportional systems are argued to favor the representation of minority groups 
while majority systems are expected to penalize it. In order to examine the validity 
of this proposition in the context of multicultural democracies I further examine 
this relationship in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. With the purpose 
of observing how these assumptions travel across contexts, I have included 3 other 
cases (Denmark, Netherlands, and Norway) that help us understand their validity.  
 
Table 15 summarizes the main statistics and values for the mains variables related 
to immigrants’ representation in national legislatures. The first aspect we observe 
is that overall the share of immigrant deputies is very low in all national 
legislatures (second column). In Norway, only 0.6 percent of the elected legislators 
in 2009 are of immigrant origin. Germany follows, with 1.9 percent of the 
national deputies not being of German origin in the 2005 legislature, and in 
Denmark 2.2 percent of legislators are non-Danish in the 2007 parliament. In 
France in 2007 and in the United Kingdom in 2005, have 3.1 and 3.7 percent of 
their legislatures of immigrant origin. Finally in the Netherlands in 2006, 
immigrants represent 11.3 of the national parliament. All in all, immigrants’ 
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representation remains very low across countries, yet in the Netherlands 
immigrants are better represented than in other European democracies. 
 
The Representation Index developed by Bloemraad (2013) (fourth column) sheds 
a brighter light of immigrants’ representation in Europe. By taking the immigrant 
population into account - that is the percentage of the population they represent 
in these democracies (second column) - we observe that in relative terms, 
immigrants are better represented that we would have thought by only looking at 
the raw percentages of immigrants that seat in national parliaments. The 
Representation Index shows that only in Germany and in Norway immigrants are 
extremely under-represented. In Germany, where immigrants represent 12.9 
percent of the population, only 1.9 percent of the national parliament having a 
very low Representation Index score of only 0.07. In Norway, a similar 
phenomenon is observed. Immigrants who represent 5.6 percent of the population 
are represented by only 0.6 percent in the parliament. Therefore in Norway, 
immigrants’ index is of 0.11.  
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Table 15.Summary Statistics of Descriptive Representation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Sources: Multiple64  
                                                
64 Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway (Bloemraad 2013). In Denmark, Netherlands and Norway the immigrants in office are those considered as non-
Westerns based on the data that is available. Women’s Representation: World Bank. Electoral Systems: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. 
Country 
Immigrants 
in Office 
(%) 
Immigrant in 
Population 
(%) 
Immigrants’ 
Representation 
Index 
Electoral 
System 
Women’s 
Representation 
Index 
France 2007 3.1 11.6 0.25 Majority 0.36 
Germany 2005 1.9 12.9 0.07 Mixed 0.63 
United Kingdom 2005  3.7 11.3 0.26 Majority  0.39 
Denmark 2007 2.2 6.4 0.35 Proportional 0.76 
Netherlands 2006 11.3 10.5 1.08 Proportional 0.63 
Norway 2009 0.6 5.6 0.11 Proportional 0.72 
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Besides, the Representation Index proves that immigrants have a greater 
representation in Norway (0.35), France (0.25), and United Kingdom (0.26) 
compared to the first measurement here presented, which only considered the 
percentage of immigrants in national legislatures, without considering how these 
scored in relation to the immigrant populations in these countries. Therefore, 
following the evidence provided by the Representation Index we observe that in 
Norway immigrants’ descriptive representation corresponds to one third of the 
immigrant population, while in France and the United Kingdom it corresponds to 
one fourth of it. This means that in these three democracies, immigrants are 
under-represented in national parliaments but have made great inroads in 
national politics.  
 
Finally, the Netherlands reaches a very high score in the representation index 
(1.08) demonstrating that in this country immigrants are very well represented in 
the national parliament.  In the first part of this Chapter I have hypothesized that 
there is a relationship between immigrants’ representation and the characteristics 
of electoral systems. To be exact empirical evidence suggests that proportional 
systems help immigrants’ representation, while majoritarian systems hamper it. 
Immigrants’ outstanding representation scores in the Netherlands can be 
explained to a great extent by the characteristics of its electoral system. The Dutch 
territory is treated as a single constituency and as a result, the Netherlands has one 
of the most proportional systems in the world (Leenknegt and Van Der Schyff, 
2007). Therefore the “perfect” representation that immigrants have in the 
Netherlands results from a system that facilitates the candidacy and election of 
immigrant representatives.  
 
In Denmark, the electoral system is also proportional but of a different nature. 
Electors can cast either a “personal” vote for one candidate or vote for one of the 
party lists in a system with ten-multi member constituencies. The combination of 
  178 
the proportional representation system with preferential vote has created the 
possibility for the collective mobilization of immigrant minority groups, facilitating 
immigrants`representation (Togeby 2008). In this way, proportional 
representation enhances immigrants’ representation.  
 
The cases of the Netherlands and Denmark support the assumption that 
proportional systems facilitate the representation of immigrants. Yet, the empirical 
evidence for Germany and Norway show some dissonance. Indeed, in Germany 
and Norway, which also have proportional systems, immigrants are less 
represented than they are in France and the United Kingdom, which have 
majoritarian systems.  
 
The evidence on the relationship between immigrants’ representation and the 
characteristics of electoral systems is unclear. However, as Table 15 (column 6) 
shows the theorized relationship between electoral system characteristics and 
under-represented groups works for women (as argued for example by Mateo 
Díaz 2005). Women are better represented in countries that have proportional 
systems (Denmark 0.76, Norway 0.72, Germany 0.63 and the Netherlands 0.63) 
and less represented in countries with majority systems (United Kingdom 0.39 and 
France 0.36). The fact that proportional systems favors women’s representation, 
but not necessarily immigrants’ suggests that in the context of multicultural 
democracies other factors shape immigrants’ political representation.  For 
example, Elgie (2005) who investigated representation in France shows that 
majority systems are quite consequential for the representation of under-
represented groups because they encourage political parties to select candidates 
that are “white, middle-class [and] male” (Elgie 2005:131). On the other side 
however, the same systems can encourage a “contagion effect” by which if one 
party selects a minority candidate in a given constituency, other parties can feel 
pressure to name minority candidates as well (Bird 2003:13). 
  179 
 
To conclude, the relationship between electoral systems and immigrants’ political 
representation is mediated by other factors. Bird et al. (2011) have suggested that 
there is a political opportunity structure, which result from the openness of the 
party system and political parties, and the capacity of collective mobilization of a 
minority group (p.13). Correspondingly, in the next sections we explore what role 
these factors play.   
5.3.2 Political Parties  
Traditionally, left parties have been the defenders of excluded groups ethnic and 
minorities (Tate and Kittilson 2004), while right wing parties have to a great 
extent opposed immigration (Alonso and Claro da Fonseca 2012). Existent 
evidence suggests that political ideology affects the openness of political parties to 
nominate candidates of immigrant origin for safe seats. In this way, ideology 
appears as a dividing line the representation of immigrants in national 
parliaments.  
 
Table 16 shows the number of immigrant deputies in national legislatures in 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom and their distribution by party 
family. Overall the United Kingdom has the largest number of immigrant 
representatives (N=21), followed by France (N=18), and then Germany (N= 12). 
Broken down by party family, we observe that parties belonging to the Socialist 
family are the ones that have a greater number of elected representatives of 
immigrant origin across countries. In France, ten deputies of immigrant origin are 
from the Socialist party, in Germany four belong to the Social Democrat Party, 
and in the United Kingdom 16 members of parliament have been candidates 
representing the Labour party.  
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Other parties in the left play also a role in the representation of immigrant 
minorities. In France, the communist party has one elected deputy of immigrant 
origin. As well, in Germany three deputies are from the Left party, and 4 from the 
Green party. Finally, in the United Kingdom, the centrist Liberal party has one 
deputy of immigrant origin elected.  
 
Finally, right wing parties have made some advancement towards increasing 
immigrants’ representation. In France, seven legislators of immigrant-origin are 
members of the UMP. In the United Kingdom four conservative deputies have a 
migratory background. And, in Germany, one immigrant deputy is a member of 
the Christian Democratic party.  
Table 16.Immigrant Deputies by Party Family  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concluding, the above presented evidence support the claims that there is a 
dividing line between left and right wing parties in immigrants’ representation. Of 
the three parliaments here analyzed, most of the immigrant deputies have been 
elected as candidates of left parties, a smaller proportion represents right wing 
parties, and only one deputy in the United Kingdom is from the center. 
 
Party Family France Germany 
United 
Kingdom 
Greens - 4 - 
Communists 1 3 - 
Socialists 10 4 16 
Liberals - - 1 
Christian Democrats - 1 - 
Conservatives 7 - 4 
Nationalist Parties - - - 
Agrarian Parties - - - 
Total 18 12 21 
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On the whole, the family of the socialists is the one that appears more open to 
recruit immigrant candidates. This is partially due to the fact that the Socialist 
Party in France, the Social Democrats in Germany, and the Labor in the United 
Kingdom are between the two major parties in the respective democracies. 
Furthermore, smaller left parties are also of crucial importance for immigrants’ 
representation in particular in Germany where seven out of the twelve immigrant 
deputies are members of smaller left parties, four of the Green party and 3 of the 
Left.  Finally, right wing parties show different levels of openness vis-à-vis the 
immigrant community across countries. In France the UMP counts only 3 
immigrant deputies less than the Socialist party (7 and 10 respectively). In the 
United Kingdom the Conservative Party has only one fourth the number of 
immigrant deputies the Labour party has (4 and 16 respectively). In Germany, the 
Christian Democrats have only one deputy of immigrant origin.  Therefore it is in 
Germany where the extreme Left-Right division exists in terms of immigrants’ 
descriptive representation.  
 
All in all, the analysis here presented reveals that left parties are more inclusive 
than right-wing parties vis-à-vis the immigrant community. Center-left parties 
play the dominant role in immigrants’ representation, while smaller Left parties 
show also to inclusive. At last, variations are observed across the parties located in 
the center and right of the political spectrum.  
 
Following these results the next question is whether there is any relationship 
between immigrants’ descriptive representation and immigrant constituencies.    
5.3.3 Immigrant Constituencies 
Immigrants tend to concentrate in specific geographical areas. This results from 
the housing segregation that ethnic minorities experience, which leads to the 
formation of urban areas where ethnic minorities become the majority of the 
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population. This process is reinforced by the existence of ethnic networks because 
migrants help new migrants from the same group to settle. At last, occupational 
segregation is also a major factor contributing to immigrants’ geographic 
concentration. In some industries immigrant workforce dominates and as a result 
important immigrant settlements are observed in the proximities of these 
industries.  
 
These demographic dynamics are very relevant in multicultural democracies. The 
degree of geographic concentration of the immigrant populations is related to the 
concentration of immigrant voters in specific electoral constituencies. When 
immigrants are concentrated, they become more visible and therefore more likely 
to be considered by key political actors in their electoral calculations, including the 
nomination of immigrant candidates. Also, empirical evidence suggests that 
immigrant voters prefer candidates of immigrant origin (see Chapter 1). 
Therefore, the demand for immigrant candidates increases in immigrant 
constituencies. The question that emerges then in the context of multicultural 
democracies is if immigrants’ demographic distribution is related to their political 
representation.  
 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have relatively similar shares of the 
population with an immigrant background (11.6, 12.9 and 11.3 percent 
respectively). As pointed out before the immigrant populations are not evenly 
distributed across the countries but tend to concentrate in specific areas. Figure 22 
shows the frequency distribution for the share of immigrants across the electoral 
democracies per country. The x-axis presents the percentage of immigrants, and 
the y-axis the absolute number of constituencies.  
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As one can see, the three histograms are not symmetric and are skewed to the 
right. In France for the 555 constituencies analyzed 65 there is a mean share of 
immigrants of 5.4 percent, with a standard deviation of 4.5 percent, and a range 
of 27.5. This means that in the hexagon, many constituencies have very small 
immigrant populations. Some have medium size immigrant communities, and a 
smaller number has a high concentration of immigrants. France, similarly to the 
United Kingdom, has many constituencies in which the share of immigrants is 
very low. However, similarly to Germany, most of the constituencies have 
between 5 and 15 percent of immigrants, and only few have more than 15 percent 
of immigrants. 
 
In Germany across the 299 legislative constituencies, the average of immigrants is 
of 5.5 percent, with a standard deviation of 5.4 and a range of 26.6. Immigrants in 
Germany are more evenly distributed across a number of electoral constituencies, 
and their concentration in specific geographic areas is moderate. Constituencies 
with between 5 and 10 percent immigrant population are quite frequent. Also 
there are a relatively large number of constituencies with small immigrant 
populations. And in Germany constituencies with large immigrant population are 
quite unusual. 
 
Lastly, in the United Kingdom, the district-level demographic data was available 
for 563 constituencies 66. The data shows that on average the immigrant 
population represents 8.3 percent of the population in the electoral districts, with a 
standard deviation of 11.9 percent and a range of 65.79 percent. The varying 
degrees of concentration of immigrants across the constituencies indicate that 
while in some constituencies there is almost exclusively white voters, in some other 
constituencies’ immigrants represent big shares of the population, and in a smaller 
                                                
65 Data was not available for overseas departments and territories.  
66 Scottish constituencies are excluded from the graph.  
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number of constituencies immigrants constitute the majority of the residents. The 
United Kingdom has both a large number of constituencies, which are highly 
British and a large number with big immigrant communities (10 percent or more). 
Also, unlike Germany and France, it has constituencies where a vast majority of 
the population (50 percent or more) is of immigrant origin.  
 
The ethnic and cultural composition of the electoral constituencies in the three 
countries results from the combination of the demographic dynamics of 
immigration which is characterized by immigrant groups that tend to live in 
specific cities and areas (see Chapter 2) and the main features of countries’’ 
electoral systems. In France the law establishes that every of the 96 departments 
has to have a minimum of two constituencies. Yet the number of constituencies 
per departments varies according to its population, and the size of the electorate 
in every constituency should not vary more than 20 percent in relation to the 
average size of the population in all constituencies in the department (Elgie 
2005:121). As a result, France has numerous constituencies covering middle-size 
territories. This leads to the formation of constituencies where immigrants 
represent a significant part of the population. 
 
The case of Germany is very different in this regard due to its mixed-member 
system of proportional representation. The Federal Electoral Act establishes the 
existence of 229 constituencies. Overall the population of the constituency should 
not deviate more than 15 percent from the population of all constituencies. This 
formula aimed at respecting the proportionality vis-à-vis the overall population of 
the country results in a very uneven number of constituencies per region yet with 
a more proportional distribution of the population, including the immigrant 
groups.  
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Figure 22.Immigrants’ Distribution across Electoral Constituencies  
 
France Germany United Kingdom 
   
 
Source: INSEE, Statistiches Bundesamt, Office of National Statistics (data of year closer to election)  
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In the United Kingdom there is a larger number of electoral districts in 
comparison to France and Germany, in the 2005 general election it counted 646 
constituencies. The British legislation states that four independent Boundary 
Commissions operating in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland define 
the constituency boundaries. Each constituency must be within the 5 percent 
electoral quota of the country, and should not exceed a certain geographic area. 
Resulting from these features of the British electoral system there is a larger 
number of constituencies, which are geographically more concentrated. 
Increasing the likelihood of forming immigrant minority majority districts.    
 
The question of whether there is a relationship between the ethnic compositions of 
the constituencies and immigrants substantive representation is explored below. 
Table 17 presents the list of elected immigrant deputies and the share of 
immigrants in their constituencies (quartiles). The evidence sheds light on the fact 
that the size of the immigrant electorate is related to the number of immigrant 
deputies elected, in particular in constituencies with the biggest immigrant 
communities. To be more precise, in France two immigrant deputies have been 
elected in constituencies belonging to the first quartile, that is the smallest shares 
of immigrants among their populations, five in the second quartile, four in the 
third quartile and seven in the upper quartile. In Germany the number of 
immigrant deputies is very low, as most of them have been elected in party lists. 
However of the four immigrant MPs in the Bundestag, one was elected in a 
constituency with mid-low immigrant shares, one in a constituency with middle-
high immigrant populations and two in constituencies with high shares of 
immigrants. Finally in the United Kingdom equal numbers of immigrant deputies 
have been elected in constituencies with small, medium and medium-large 
immigrant populations (three in each quartile) and a large number (12) of these 
MPs have been nominated and elected in constituencies with very large 
immigrant electorates.  
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Table 17.Immigrant Deputies Elected and Shares of Immigrants in the Constituencies 
              % of Immigrants 
 Low Mid-Low Mid- High High 
France Karamanli 
Kucheida 
 
Bapt 
Ferry 
Idiart 
Imbert 
Touraine 
 
Diefenbacher 
Fenech 
Luca 
Pinte 
  
Asensi  
Baert 
Devedjian 
Jung 
Marland-Mitiello 
Moscovici 
Valls  
 
Germany  Edathy Noll Akgün 
Schulz 
 
United Kingdom Kumar 
E.Miliband 
Öpik 
 
Howard 
Kawczynski 
Vara 
Afriyie 
Dhanda 
D. Miliband 
 
Abbott 
Butler 
Hendrick 
Khabra 
Khan 
Lammy 
Mahmood 
Malik 
Singh 
Stuart 
Vaz 
Vis 
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The above-presented evidence suggests that there is a relationship between the 
nomination and subsequent election of immigrant candidates and the ethnic 
composition of the electoral constituencies. Although we can’t draw conclusions 
on the underlying mechanisms of this phenomena, we can conclude that parties 
may be more inclined to nominate immigrant deputies in constituencies where 
they may gain the support of the immigrant voters (Norris and Lovenduski 1995).  
5.3.4 Parties or Immigrant Constituencies? 
The statistics presented earlier show that party ideology and immigrant 
constituencies play an important role in shaping immigrants’ descriptive 
representation. However, we don’t know which factor is the most influential one. 
Therefore in Table 18 I show the results of a logistic regression which estimates 
the likelihood that an immigrant deputy gets elected given the ideology of her 
party and the share of immigrant that live in her constituency. Party ideology in 
this case is measured using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey which gives the position 
of parties in a Left-Right scale where 0=left and 10= right. As before, composition 
represents the share of immigrants living in a given constituency. The 
dichotomous response variable represents the background of the elected deputy 
(1=immigrant-origin, 0= native).  
 
The results presented suggest a positive relationship between parties’ left ideology 
and the odds of an immigrant MP of getting elected across the three national 
parliaments here studied. However it is only in France that the relationship is 
significant (coeff. 0.86, p < .01). Regarding the relationship between constituency 
composition and representation in the three parliaments the coefficients are 
positive which suggest that the size of the immigrant community affects 
immigrants’ descriptive representation. The relationship between the variable 
composition and representation nonetheless is only significant for the British 
parliament (coeff. 0.05, p < .001).  
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Table 18.Logistic Regressions with Deputies’ Background 
as Dependent Variable 
 
France 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Constant -4,052 ,464 76,178 1 ,000 ,017 
Left ,866 ,493 3,087 1 ,079 2,378 
% Immigrants ,037 ,044 ,708 1 ,400 1,038 
 
Germany 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Constant -5,527 1,256 19,366 1 ,000 ,004 
Left 1,043 1,169 ,797 1 ,372 2,839 
% Immigrants ,059 ,079 ,566 1 ,452 1,061 
 
United Kingdom 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Constant -4,135 ,510 65,688 1 ,000 ,016 
Left ,175 ,615 ,081 1 ,776 1,191 
% Immigrants ,055 ,012 19,538 1 ,000 1,057 
 
 
To summarize, there is a relationship between parties’ ideologies on the one hand, 
and constituency composition on the other, and immigrants’ representation in the 
three countries here analyzed, yet their effect varies across contexts. In France 
parties appear as the main factor shaping immigrants’ representation in national 
parliaments. To be more precise, left parties play a crucial role in recruiting 
immigrant candidates for safe seats. In contrast in the United Kingdom, 
immigrants’ representation appears to be more dependent on immigrant voters 
being concentrated and visible in specific constituencies. Thus, in contexts where 
immigrants are highly concentrated parties are more likely to nominate deputies 
of immigrant origin. From this we can conclude that party ideology and 
immigrant constituencies play different roles in the contexts of multicultural 
democracies. Yet, given the small N on which these analyses draw we can’t at the 
moment derive the implications of these findings.  
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5.4 Who are the Immigrant Deputies?  
A crucial question that underlies this chapter is whether and to what extent 
immigrant deputies resemble the immigrant electorate. In this section I further 
examine who the immigrant deputies are to understand the linkage between 
immigrant representatives and immigrant voters. The analysis is structured 
around three aspects: (1) socio-demographic characteristics, (2) political trajectory, 
and (3) their relationship to immigrant communities and networks. These are 
examined by looking at the socio-demographic characteristics of immigrant 
deputies, and how they are related to the immigrant communities.  
5.4.1 Region of Origin 
In the context of European democracies a first distinction that has to be made in 
terms of the country of origin of immigrants is between European and Non-
European migrants. The introduction of the European citizenship granted some 
political rights (voting and candidacy rights for local and European parliament 
elections) for European migrants. Besides, the political rights granted to third-
country migrants depend on national laws, thus cross-country differences are 
observed. While France and Germany do not grant political rights to third-
country migrants, the United Kingdom grant full political rights to 
Commonwealth migrants.  
 
Table 19 presents the total number of immigrant deputies per region of origin. In 
France 15 of the elected immigrant members of parliament are of European 
origin, and only three of non-European background. In Germany like in the 
United Kingdom the majority of the immigrant deputies are non-European. In 
the Bundestag the majority of immigrant deputies are from a third country 
(n=12), while European deputies are only two. And in the United Kingdom third-
country deputies are 14 while European deputies are only 7.  
  191 
Table 19.Region of Origin of Immigrant Deputies 
 
 
European Union  
(n) 
Third Country 
(n) 
France 15 3 
Germany  2 10 
 United Kingdom 7 14 
  
 
Source: Own Source 
 
The findings presented shed light on several phenomena. First, in France where 
the shares of non-European migrants in the population are very high, yet non-
European migrants are under-represented in comparison to European migrants. 
In Germany, the logic reverses. Non-European migrants are better represented 
than European migrants. In France the majority of immigrant deputies are 
originally from within the EU. To be precise European migrants are from 
Belgium, Italy, Germany, Greece, Rumania, and Spain. Non-EU representatives 
count a representative from Armenia, one from Chile, and only one from 
Maghreb, born in Tunisia. This data is quite revealing as it shows the extent to 
which immigrant groups that are quite large in the French population such as 
Magrebians, South-east Asians, and Turks remain underrepresented in French 
politics.  
 
In contrast, a majority of third-country immigrant deputies and only few deputies 
of European origin are in the Bundestag. Similarly to the immigrant groups that 
live in Germany, third-country immigrant deputies are from Iran, India, and 
Turkey. Immigrant deputies from Europe in the Bundestag count a representative 
from Croatia, one from Poland, and one from Spain. Interestingly, the Italian and 
Greek communities as well as Southeast Asian migrants who have significantly big 
communities in Germany are not represented in the Bundestag. 
 
Like in Germany, in the United Kingdom the number of third-country immigrant 
deputies overpasses the number of European immigrant deputies. Among the 
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representatives that are originally from EU countries the House counts deputies 
from Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Rumania, and Estonia. Third-country 
representatives are from Somalia and from the Nations of the Commonwealth, 
including Ghana, India, Jamaica, Pakistan, Rwanda, and South Africa. In the 
United Kingdom we observe the presence of deputies from countries from the 
Eastern Block. Also, it is quite clear that the fact that some third-country migrants 
in the UK enjoy full political rights helps them their political inclusion.  
 
The evidence here presented for the three cases examined, suggests that country-
specific factors play a great role in defining the demographics of national 
parliaments. The alarming under-representation of Maghreb immigrants in 
France can be explained by its colonial past. Evidence shows that Algerian 
migrants to France indicate some hesitation in their identification with France 
(Thibalat 1996). Furthermore the French ideals of assimilation and secularism 
make it particularly difficult for Muslims to achieve equality (Alba 2005: 32). And, 
the French electoral system also closes the doors to visible minorities because the 
two-round majority system tends to favor the nomination and election of white, 
male, and middle-class candidates (Elgie 2005).  
 
In Germany, the electoral system includes proportional representation, 
characterized precisely by what is known as personalized proportional 
representation. Thus, Germany’s mixed electoral system facilitates a “personal 
vote at the grass roots” (Klingemann and Wessels 2001). The number of 
immigrant candidates is in the rise in Germany, and first and second-generation 
Turks constitute a great majority of the immigrant candidates. And, most 
importantly, immigrants’ representation is driven in Germany by the two small 
left Parties, the Greens and Die Linke, and to a lesser extent by the SPD. Yet 
increasing immigrant nomination has been also observed for the FDP. In this 
context, an important finding is that higher numbers of immigrant candidates are 
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nominated in party lists than in single-member electoral constituencies. Therefore 
from this it can be concluded that for smaller parties the mobilization of 
immigrant voters in immigrant constituencies is “becoming and feasible electoral 
strategy” (Claro da Fonseca 2011:122).  
 
Lastly, in the United Kingdom, matters related to race are very much present in 
the political arena than in other democracies. De facto, there is evidence that the 
Labour and Conservative parties committed to increasing ethnic minority 
representation, which has drastically augmented the number of minority 
candidates and elected parliamentarians (Sobolewska 2013). These new political 
opportunity structures at the party level are fostering immigrants’ representation.  
 
Finally, in despite of all the country-level explanations for immigrants’ 
representation presented above, one commonality catches our attention: the 
absence of Southeast Asian immigrants in political leadership. The systematic lack 
of participation of members of this group in national politics (low turnout, under-
representation) suggests that there are group-related factors explaining their self-
isolation. Sociological explanations point at their level of self-sufficiency. Families 
are for many of these cultures, the basic societal unit and the most important 
economic support (Chan et al. 2007). These societal values of independence 
contribute to their isolation. Furthermore, there is evidence that among some of 
these cultures and in particular the Chinese community there is a generalized 
distrust vis-à-vis the authority (Adamson et al. 2009). And, as it has been proved, 
political distrust accounts for low political participation (Shaffer 1981).  
5.4.2 Age, Gender, Education 
Political rulers conform what is called the governing elites of a society (Nadel 
1956). Their preeminence draws from the fact that these elites gather the 
legislative and coercive authority over the most general affairs of the community. 
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These governing elites have some characteristics in common regarding their 
education and social status.  
 
Table 20 shows the summary statistics related to the characteristics of national 
deputies. France is the oldest legislature with an average age of 54.8. United 
Kingdom follows, where deputies have an average age of 51 years old. Finally, the 
German bundestag is the youngest of the three having an average age of 49.2. 
Compared to the overall legislatures, immigrant deputies are 3 years older in 
France (57 years old), 7 years younger in Germany (42 years old) and 3 years 
younger in the United Kingdom (48 years old). The native-immigrant difference 
age of national deputies indicate that in France experienced immigrant deputies 
are preferred, whereas in the United Kingdom, and more especially in Germany, 
younger immigrant political leaders find their path into politics.  
Table 20.Age, Gender and Education67 
 
 France Germany United Kingdom 
 All Imm. All Imm. All Imm. 
Age  54.8  57 49.2  42 51 48 
Female (%) 18.2 27.7 31.6 41.6 19.5  12 
University Degree (%) 80 82.3 83.3 84.3 72 96 
Total 577 18 614 12 646 21 
 
 
Furthermore, in terms of the gender composition of the national legislatures two 
main phenomena are observed. First I have pointed out earlier in this Chapter, 
women are better represented in Germany (proportional system) than in France 
and the United Kingdom. 31.6 percent of the members of the Bundestag are 
                                                
67 Sources: Deputies’ Personal Websites. France: Archives of the 13th Legislature (retrieved May 
2013), Roucan (2011). Les Deputés, Cahiers du Cevipof 55/2011. Germany: Bundestag 
Dokumenten (retrieved May 2013). United Kingdom: Key Issues for the New Parliament, House 
of Commons Library Research (retrieved May 2013). Data on the university education was 
available for only 625 (97%) of the Members of the House (http://www.suttontrust.com/).  
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women, 19.5 percent in the House of Commons, and 18.2 percent in the National 
Assembly. Female immigrant deputies represent 41 percent of the total of 
immigrant deputies in Germany, 27.7 percent in France and 12 percent in the 
United Kingdom.  All in all, immigrant women find better representation in 
Germany and in France than they do in the United Kingdom. The evidence 
indicates that the “double penalty” of sex and ethnicity (Constant et al. 2006) is 
more present in the United Kingdom than it is in the other two European 
democracies.  
 
Finally, to understand immigrants’ representation and the barriers they encounter 
I examine deputies’ level of education. On average, immigrants living in Europe 
have very limited education (OECD 201368), yet a high level of education appears 
as a distinctive trait among immigrant deputies. On average the Bundestag and 
the National Assembly have similar education levels. 83.3 percent of the German 
deputies and 80 percent of the French deputies has a university degree. In the 
United Kingdom University degree among parliamentarians is less frequent and 
only 72 percent of the elected members of parliament have graduated from 
university. Yet interestingly in the three legislatures immigrant deputies have more 
formal education than the legislatures’ average (France 82.3 percent, Germany 
84.3 percent and United Kingdom 96 percent). These differences are very marked 
in the context of the United Kingdom, where all but one immigrant MP has a 
university degree, contrasting to a great extent with the average education of 
white members of parliament.  
 
In summary, the examination of the age, gender and education of national 
legislatures shows that political elites tend to be as under-representative of the 
ethnic structure as they are of the class structure of a given country. Furthermore, 
the comparison of immigrant deputies and native deputies reveals that immigrants 
                                                
68 http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/World-Migration-in-Figures.pdf 
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suffer from “cumulative disadvantage”, which makes their inroads to politics more 
complicated. All in all, initial comparative disadvantages in terms of education, 
class, and available resources are self-reinforcing (Merton 1988:606) therefore 
immigrants need to excel in terms of education, experience, and leadership in 
order to gain access to politics.  
5.4.3 Ties to Immigrant Groups 
Putnam, Feldstein and Cohen (2003) demonstrated the importance of civic culture 
for the working of democracy. Engagement in networks contributes at making 
bonds of trust and understanding, and building community. On other terms, they 
contribute to the creation of social capital, which develop “networks of 
relationships that weave individuals intro groups and communities” (Putnam, 
Feldstein and Cohen 2003:1). In this way, vertical and horizontal relations 
enhance the development of trust, which is indispensable for pursuing collective 
goals.  Furthermore, as Putnam puts it, social networks play a key role in political 
learning (2000:343).   
 
The role that civic networks play in the political participation and trust on 
institutions of immigrant groups has been thoroughly examined, and the studies 
conclude that networks are a very relevant explanation of immigrants’ political 
engagement in their host countries. Fennema and Tillie (1999) examine the 
political participation and political trust of four different ethnic groups residing in 
Amsterdam: Turks, Maroccans, Surnamese, and Antilleans. The authors show 
that there is a correlation between the degree of civic community of the ethnic 
groups studied, and the level of political participation and trust in local political 
institutions. Basically those migrants that were engaged in ethnic networks 
participated more in politics and developed greater trust on the political 
institutions of their country of residency. Similarly, Gidengil and Stolle (2009) 
studied the extent to which immigrant women’s social networks affect their 
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propensity to vote and to participate in unconventional political activities, as well 
as their knowledge of politics and government services and programs in Canada. 
Their findings show that bonding ties (ties with people with similar social 
background) have a positive effect on political incorporation, and that the 
resources that are embedded in their social networks, are crucial for immigrant 
women. Togeby (2004) finds some evidence of the effects that participation on 
ethnic minority associations increased political participation among immigrant 
minorities in Denmark.  
 
These evidence shows that the social interactions that occur within networks can 
also involve active attempts to influence people’s political views, to mobilize them 
to engage in political activities, and building a collective identity. So ethnic social 
networks emerge as powerful tools to foster immigrants’ political participation and 
representation. From this perspective, it is crucial to understand what types of 
relationships do immigrant deputies have to the immigrant communities and 
networks. As mentioned above understanding these linkages are useful because 
political trust of immigrants on immigrant leaders increases when there is some 
type of proximity (Fennema and Tillie 2001:35) and parties recruit legislative 
candidates from ethnic networks (Norris and Lovenduski 1995).  
 
A small number of immigrant deputies have an official and public relationship to 
immigrant networks. In France, only two deputies are related to immigrant 
networks. The deputy Patrick Devedjian of the UMP who is of Armenian origin is 
a member of the Armenian Community and François Asensi, deputy of the 
Communist party born in Spain, is one of the founding members of the Friends of 
the Convicts of the Spanish Republic. In Germany, the immigrant MPs having 
links to ethnic networks are also only two. The deputy Juratovic of the SPD of 
Croatian origin is a member of the peace in former Yugoslavia network, and 
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Hakki Keskin who is of Turkish origin and member of Die Linke is the founding 
member of the Turkish Community in Germany.  
 
In the United Kingdom the number of immigrant deputies having relation with 
ethnic communities is larger than in France and Germany, and count for almost 
the half of the total of immigrant deputies. Diane Abbot of Jamaican origin and 
member of the Labour party is the Founder of the Black Child Initiative. Equally, 
Dawn Butler who is also from the Labour party and of Jamaican origin is a 
member of the Union for Race and Equality. Michael Howard of Rumanian and 
Jewish origin has been engaged with the Jewish Community. Daniel Kawczynski 
born in Poland is vice-chairman of Conservative Friends of Poland. Piara Khabra 
who was of Indian origin is the leader of the Asian Community in West London, 
and the President of the Workers’ Association where he assists Indian migrants 
with settling and finding jobs. Sadiq Khan of Pakistani background has actively 
worked as a lawyer in cases related to minorities’ discrimination in several 
organizations. Shahid Malik of Pakistani origin is Chief executive of the Pakistan 
Muslim Center. Marsha Singh, of Indian origin is a member of Bradford’s Ethnic 
Community. Finally, Keith Vaz of Yemen origin is the Chair of the Labour 
Ethnic Minorty Taskforce. On the side of the Conservatives, Howard who is of 
Rumanian origin is a member of the Jewish community. Equally, Kawczynski 
who is also of Polish origin is a member of the Conservative Friends of Poland 
organization.  
Table 21.Ties to Ethnic Groups 
 
 
Ties No Ties  
France 2 15 
Germany  2 10 
United Kingdom 10 11 
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As can be seen, some immigrants MPs are linked to immigrant networks and 
associations however the great majority is not. Based on this evidence here 
presented the claims over the relationship between ethnic network membership 
and immigrant candidates’ nomination (Trasher et al. 2013, Norris and 
Lovenduski 1995, Fennema and Tillie 2001) cannot be substantiated for the cases 
here studied. Nonetheless, for some of the immigrant deputies, ethnic network 
participation and advocacy appears just in the center of their activities.  
5.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
In chapter 5 I examine the descriptive representation of immigrants in national 
parliaments. First, the study makes use of a novel method to measure descriptive 
representation. Traditionally, representation has been measured by only counting 
the number of elected representatives having specific characteristics. However in 
this study I use the Representation Index developed by Bloemraad (2013) to 
measure immigrants’ representation as a function of the size of the group in the 
population. Thus, in the first part of the analysis I examine six European countries 
and draw the following preliminary conclusions. The evidence suggests that the 
Representation Index is a more precise measurement of immigrants’ 
representation, which highlights the extent to which immigrants is under-
represented in national parliaments. Interestingly, immigrants’ representation is 
less related to the characteristics of electoral systems (disproving hypothesis 6) 
because proportional systems do not necessarily enhance the descriptive 
representation of this group suggesting that cross-country variations are in reality 
related to other factors.  
 
In the second part of the analysis I focus on three cases: France, Germany, and 
the United Kingdom. I carry out in depth analysis of immigrants’ representation. 
The analysis sheds light on two phenomena. On the one hand, the descriptive 
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statistics show that left-parties, and in particular Socialist parties, are more open to 
nominate immigrants for safe seats while in Germany, the Green party also plays 
an important role in the election of immigrant deputies. Furthermore, there are 
immigrant deputies among conservative parties, yet these remain less numerous, 
especially in Germany. On the other hand, it shows that immigrant deputies are 
to a great extent elected in immigrant constituencies. The comparative analysis 
demonstrates that in France party ideology is the main determinant of 
immigrants’ representation, and in the United Kingdom, constituency is more 
influential. These findings provide some support to prove hypotheses 7 (the role of 
party ideology) and 8 (the effects of immigrant constituencies) on immigrants’ 
representation yet more empirical evidence is needed still to make any claim. 
 
Finally, the third part of the study uses biographical data to further explain 
immigrants’ representation. The biographical analysis sheds light on three main 
facts. First, regarding the country of origin of immigrant deputies from European 
migrants are better represented in France than in Germany and the United 
Kingdom. At the same time, Turkish migrants in Germany and Commonwealth 
migrants in the United Kingdom are represented in parliament, whereas Maghreb 
immigrants in France are under-represented. Lastly, Southeast Asian immigrants 
are absent in the three parliaments, which suggests that group-specific features 
also influence immigrants’ representation. Furthermore, among migrants the 
youth is also under-represented, as much as women and the working class. This 
means that to some extent similar mechanisms that apply to the representation 
native population shape the formation of political elites among immigrants. Also, 
the migration background seems to have a penalizing effect for accessing 
parliament, this is suggested by the fact that migrant deputies are on average more 
educated than native members of parliament. Finally, relations to immigrant 
networks and groups don’t seem to be a crucial factor for a political career in the 
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three countries here analyzed; yet they are more important in the United 
Kingdom.  
 
To conclude, the presence of immigrants in national legislatures raises the 
question of whether there is a relationship between descriptive and substantive 
representation. Indeed elected immigrant-origin representatives can work on the 
interests of other migrants, by influencing the public agenda, influencing the 
allocation of resources and voicing immigrants’ concerns (Bird et al 2011, Butler 
and Broockman 2011, Lovenduski and Norris 2003). Therefore I devote Chapter 
6 at examining what role immigrant deputies play in the substantive 
representation of immigrants’ interests and views, against alternative explanations.   
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6. Substantive Representation 
In the previous chapter I have examined immigrants’ descriptive representation in 
national parliaments and the factors that influence the nomination and election of 
immigrant candidates. Yet in the context of multicultural democracies, a crucial 
question is whether descriptive and substantive representation are related: Do 
immigrant deputies represent immigrant voters? Furthermore, immigrants are 
concentrated within the borders of specific electoral constituencies where 
integration and immigration-related concerns are the most present. Then a 
second question is whether geographic concentration facilitates the representation 
of immigrants’ interests and views: Do deputies respond to the immigrant 
constituencies when these are concentrated and more visible?  
 
This Chapter examines immigrants’ substantive representation in national 
legislatures. In this aim, I analyze the written questions (WQs) asked in national 
legislatures in France (2007), Germany (2005) and the United Kingdom (2005), 
based on a dataset I created for this doctoral dissertation. The Chapter is 
structured as follows. It first reviews the literature on substantive representation. 
Subsequently the main hypotheses that are tested in the analysis are presented. In 
the second section the research design is explained including a detailed account of 
the data used, the operationalization of variables, the coding strategy and the 
methods used in the analysis. Then I present the statistical analyses and the main 
findings. Finally, the conclusion draws some possible implications of this study for 
the research on political representation.  
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6.1 Analytical Framework 
Substantive representation refers to the representations of the views and interests 
of citizens in political institutions and policy-making (Pitkin 1967). It grounds on 
the assumption that “a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing 
responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens” (Dahl 1971: 1–
2). In general, substantive representation has focused on the representative-voter 
linkage. Empirically, its measurement has gone along two roads. Numerous 
studies centre on the elite-mass opinion congruence (Miller and Stokes 1963, 
Achen 1978, Powell 1982, Thomassen and Schmitt 1997, Schmitt and 
Thomassen 1999, Marsh and Wessels 1997, Mateo Diaz 2005, Ruedin 2013). 
Positions in the Left-Right ideological dimension are examined for voters and 
parties (or candidates). This tradition focuses on the positions on the left-right 
dimension because this is considered as an “all-embracing” dimension 
(Thomassen and Schmitt, 1997:172), stable on time and the umbrella to other 
conflict dimensions (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990). Representation is measured 
looking at the differences between the positions. Inspired by the concept of spatial 
voting, which is based on the distance between a voter A and a party or candidate 
B, good representation exists when there is a small distance in the position of 
voters and parties or candidates, in contrast when they are far away representation 
is rather poor.  
 
A second stream of research has adopted a behavioral approach and centered on 
representatives’ behavior as the locus of representation. Embodying this tradition 
are studies examining different styles of representation, roll call voting, 
parliamentary speeches and parliamentary questioning. In order to govern, 
deputies have to accommodate to the rules of the legislatures and adopt different 
political roles in the aim of strategically allocating the scarce resources at their 
disposition towards specific goals (Strøm, 1997:155). Deputies can specialize in 
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one policy area, focus on the constituency interests, behave as a party member, or 
hold leadership roles within the parliament (Searing 1994). Deputies’ behavior can 
draw on a variety of motivations including re-nomination, re-election, party 
leadership, or legislative leadership  (Strøm and Nyblade 2007), yet the pursuit of 
reelection has been highlighted as the most prominent one (Mayhew 2004). The 
behavioral approach to representation contends that there is good representation 
when a given topic is very present in the agenda of individual deputies and/or the 
overall legislature.  
 
In the context of multicultural democracies, the analysis of immigrants’ 
representation embodies several challenges. To start with, it is important to make 
explicit what aspects of representation we are exactly examining (Achen 1978). 
The opinions of immigrant voters can correlate strongly with representatives’ 
opinions yet congruence doesn’t guarantee that immigrants’ views and preferences 
are de facto represented in policy making. It is therefore important to examine the 
material form that these opinions take in policy making in national legislatures, 
and for that reason in this Chapter I examine the questions that deputies ask in 
national legislatures, that is following the behavioral approach. 
 
Second, in the last decades political research has shed light on the emergence of 
issue voting (Bartolini and Mair 1990, Mair 1997) which “involves the conscious 
calculation of policy benefits for alternative electoral choices” (Carmines and 
Stimson 1980: 78). Following these assertions, it has been observed that in 
countries with large migratory inflows the issue of immigration has penetrated the 
political arena. Issue ownership theories have claimed that immigration is an issue 
of far-right parties (Green-Pedersen 2007, Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008). 
Yet, in the context of multicultural democracies the issue has gained in complexity 
embracing a variety of policy areas and penetrating the agendas of conservative 
and left parties (Chapter 4, Meguid 2002, Van Spanje 2010) and it has even been 
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politicized in party systems where anti-immigration parties didn’t emerge (Pardos-
Prado et al. 2013, Van Spanje 2010, Alonso and Claro da Fonseca 2012, 
Perrineau 2004). Following these observations it appears as a fertile strategy to 
focus on issue representation (Powell 1982) and examine immigrants’ 
representation by focusing on how well individual representatives represent 
immigrant voters on immigration-related issues, including policy areas related to 
border control, citizenship and integration in the questions they ask in the national 
legislatures.  
 
Third, much of the literature on representation - and in particular research 
dealing with underrepresented social groups such as women and ethnic minorities 
– is centered on the study of legislators and legislatures dismissing how group 
representation makes sense in the light of the demand side of representation, that 
is the respective groups themselves. In the previous Chapter of this dissertation 
(Chapter 5) I pointed out at some of the concerns that researchers are rising over 
this fact, and some of the attempts to correct for this bias in the measurement of 
descriptive representation. For example the Representation Index (Bloemraad 
2013, see also Forest 2012) accounts for the immigrant population in the 
measurement of immigrants’ descriptive representation. Accordingly descriptive 
representation in national legislatures is examined as a function of the size of the 
immigrant population in a given country. In the analysis of immigrants’ 
substantive representation the concept of dyadic representation is a very useful 
tool to account for the immigrant population. Dyadic representation emphasizes 
the connection between representatives and their constituencies (Weissberg 1978), 
and as such it has two very interesting properties for our case. On the one side, the 
concept applies well to single member constituency systems where the connection 
between representatives and voters is particularly strong. As representatives are 
elected in and by the constituencies, they are expected to voice the interests of 
their constituents (Soroka et al. 2009). Given that it is at the local level where 
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immigrants live together with natives and integrate (Penninx et al. 2004, Caponio 
and Borkert 2010), the concept of dyadic representation is useful because it 
structures immigrants’ representation within the framework of the relationship 
between immigrant constituencies and their representatives. Following this 
dimension, the size and concentration of the immigrant population within the 
borders of the electoral district are a crucial factor in measuring descriptive 
representation. On the other side, the concept of dyadic representation is useful 
because it can be used to account for “surrogate representation”. In reality, 
immigrants’ may have their most important interests represented by immigrant 
deputies that were elected in other districts. As Mansbridge (1999) puts it:  
 
“it is in this surrogate process that descriptive 
representation often plays its most useful role, allowing 
representatives who are themselves members of a 
subordinate group to circumvent the strong barriers to 
communication between dominant and subordinate 
groups” (1999:642). 
 
Given these points, the concept of dyadic representation emerges as a heuristic 
method to scrutinize the representational relationship that immigrants and 
representatives have in the context of multicultural democracies.  
 
In this Chapter substantive representation is examined by looking at the questions 
asked by national deputies on issues related to immigration, and as a function of 
the immigrant electorates. Following this approach, three factors are likely to 
influence how well immigrants are represented in the questions tabled in their 
respective legislatures: immigrant constituencies, party ideology, and immigrant 
deputies.   
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Firstly, high priority to constituency concerns can pay off in the form of personal 
vote (Cain et al. 1987; Blais et al. 2003). In fact, empirical evidence shows that 
immigrants’ substantive representation is related to immigrants’ visibility in a 
given constituency; this means that it is dependent on immigrants’ concentration 
(see for example Forest 2012) because the size of immigrant community affects the 
capacities of national deputies to represent the interests of immigrants in national 
legislatures. When minorities are concentrated their views and interests are more 
salient and are more likely to be in the agenda of the elected representatives (Bird 
2011:213). All in all, as it is in immigrant constituencies where much of the 
challenges of immigration and integration take place, therefore deputies elected in 
these constituencies have particular interest in allocating more resources to these 
issues. Furthermore, as  “contact theory” shows, intergroup contact improves 
attitudes towards the minority group, reducing stereotyping and enhancing 
cooperation (Pettigrew 1998), which can lead to greater representation. Therefore 
the first working hypothesis of this Chapter reads as follows:   
 
Hypothesis 9: Immigrant Constituencies 
Deputies elected in more ethnically diverse constituencies 
are more likely to ask immigration-related questions than 
MPs representing more homogeneous constituencies.  
 
 
Yet, the representative-constituent relation as the explanans of substantive 
representation has been contested, particularly in European democracies, with the 
dominance of partisan and individual explanations of representation. The role of 
parties has been shown to provide a superior account of legislative behavior over 
other explanations across European legislatures (see for example Converse and 
Pierce 1986, Farah 1980). Parties offer the possibility of a structured collective 
action, provide with an electoral prospect, resources and influence over policy-
making (Owens 2003). So in this way parties have an ex ante control, leading to 
behavioral cohesion between parties and party members (Strøm and Nyblade 
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2007). Grounding on these observations, the expectations are that parties remain 
distinct and coherent on the ways their party members address the issue of 
immigration because parties align the preferences of its members and subordinate 
them to centralized control (Strøm 2003:67). In this framework it is assumed that 
individual deputies converge with regard to their positions and activities in 
national legislatures with other deputies from the same party. From this viewpoint, 
in accordance to the party preferences deputies of the left tend to be more 
concerned about immigrants’ family reunion, naturalization and integration, 
while conservative deputies oppose all these policies (Kittilson and Tate 2004). 
Following these observations, the party hypothesis reads as follows:   
 
Hypothesis 10: Party Policy Position  
Party policy position is significantly related to 
immigration-related parliamentary questioning. This 
means that deputies affiliated to parties that are more 
favorable to support immigration and integration policies 
ask more immigration questions than deputies that are 
members of parties that oppose them.  
 
 
Finally, “who” the leader is can be of relevance because the leaders’ personal 
views on specific issues might differ from those of the party.  Although policy 
distance between deputies and parties is in general very small, “who” the 
representative is can be relevant for the representation of underrepresented 
interests (Aarts et al. 2011:3, Popkin 1994). Evidence on the relationship between 
deputies’ personal characteristics and their behavior sheds light on the fact that 
gender, sexual orientation, and ethnicity influences what deputies do in national 
parliaments. Women representatives advocate feminist values and express 
stronger concerns about social issues (Norris and Lovenduski 1995:219-224). And 
ethnic minority representatives address more often ethnic-related issues than non-
minority deputies (Bird 2011, 2007, Wüst 2011:262, Saalfeld 2011). As can be 
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seen, evidence points out at dyadic representation occurring between surrogate 
representatives and the members of specific social groups. The concept of 
surrogate representation has emphasized the importance of personal 
characteristics for the representation of immigrants in national legislatures. In 
reality representatives are primed by their personal experiences and therefore 
more inclined to represent issues from which they are somehow related, 
benefitting the representation of views and interests of those citizens with whom 
they share similar characteristics (Mansbridge 1999). Based on this, we examine 
the linkage between descriptive and substantive representation presented in 
Hypothesis 11.  
 
Hypothesis 11: Immigrant Deputies 
Deputies of immigrant origin are more likely to ask 
immigration-related questions than native deputies. 
 
To conclude, based on the analytical framework I have derived the three main 
hypotheses that are examined in this Chapter and that were stated above. In order 
to examine them I have designed a comparative study. The research strategies 
adopted are presented in the next section.  
 
6.2 Research Design and Measurement 
In order to examine immigrants’ substantive representation in national legislatures 
and test the explanatory power of each of the above-mentioned possible 
explanations a series of research design decisions have been made. A detailed 
account of case selection criterion, data, coding and analyses used to examine the 
topic are presented here.  
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6.2.1 Case Selection 
In bicameralist democracies the lower house is the most important one because it 
is elected following the formula one citizen one vote (Lijphart 1999:201) serving 
the purpose of legitimation (Tsibellis and Money 1997:46). In single member 
electoral systems national deputies are elected in their electoral districts, and 
therefore are held accountable to the voters (Soroka et al. 2009). Deputies have 
stronger incentives for constituency-service and the link between voters and their 
representatives is considered to provide citizens with a voice in the affairs of the 
nation (Norris 1997). 
 
Legislative elections in France use the single-member constituency system. At the 
2007 election there were 577 constituencies, 555 of which were situated in the 
metropolitan territory and two in France’s overseas territories. The elections take 
place using the two-ballot majority-plurality system where a candidate is elected 
after winning the majority of the votes in either the first or the second ballot (Elgie 
1997, 2009). Germany in contrast has a mixed electoral system.  Each voter casts 
two votes, one for the first candidate in a single member district, and a second for 
one the sixteen closed party lists in the Land where she resides in. In the 2005 
legislative election 299 deputies were elected in single constituencies and 299 in 
the list seats (Saalfeld 2009: 212). Finally, in the United Kingdom the single 
member plurality electoral system had in the 2005 election 646 seats. Electoral 
candidates with the most votes win irrespective of the percentage of the votes they 
have obtained (Mitchell 2009).  
 
To sum up, given the emphasis that single constituency systems puts in the 
connection between representatives and their constituencies it is a fertile ground to 
test the working hypotheses proposed in this Chapter. 
  212 
6.2.2 Data 
The study makes use of several data sources to investigate immigrants’ descriptive 
representation. First, the written parliamentary questions have been extracted 
from the websites of respective national legislatures69. To examine immigrants’ 
opinions I use the European Social Survey 2010. And to understand how 
constituency interests affect representation I rely on demographic data evidencing 
the ethnic and cultural composition of electoral constituencies. This data has been 
gathered from the National Statistics websites 70. Furthermore I measure party 
policy position using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2010 (CHES) (Hooghe et al. 
2010). Finally, data about the ethnic and cultural background of national deputies 
has been gathered by the project Migrants as Political Actors71, and extracted also 
from parliamentary and personal websites. 
6.2.3 Immigration Issues 
The issue of immigration includes three main policy areas: border control, 
citizenship and integration policies. Border control policies refer to how many 
immigrants are allowed to enter the country, the categories of immigrants that are 
allowed to enter and the procedures that migrants have to follow in order to be 
allowed in the country. Historically immigration policies have been tied to 
economic development and the need of foreign labor force. Nonetheless cultural 
factors have played a predominant role in defining which immigrant groups were 
allowed to enter a country like the White Australia Policy or the Chinese 
                                                
69 France: http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/recherche/questions, 
Germany: http://www.bundestag.de/ (special thanks go to Matthias Haber for facilitating me the 
access to this data).  
United Kingdom: http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-
statements/written-questions-answers/ 
70 France: INSEE 2011, Germany: Statistiches Bundestamt 2010, United Kingdom: Office of 
National Statistics 2011 
71 Coordinated by Andreas Wüst: http://www.migrantactors.net/  
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Exclusion Act in the United States. Yet, following the rise of the terrorist threat 
embodied by the attacks in New York, London and Madrid, border control 
policies became increasingly driven by securitarian concerns. For example, the 
European Neighborhood policy was launched by the European Union in the aim 
of avoiding “new dividing lines across the continent” resulting in more difficult 
migration procedures for certain groups (Zaiotti 2007). Citizenship policies in 
turn, refer to the procedures, costs and requirements for naturalization. Empirical 
evidence suggests that countries are turning towards more liberal citizenship 
policies, facilitating naturalization and allowing double citizenship (Koopmans 
2005). Finally, immigrants’ integration describes the set of policies related to the 
incorporation and participation of immigrants, and the accommodation of their 
cultural differences (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010:4).  
6.2.4 Written Parliamentary Questions  
While there are numerous activities that deputies perform in parliament, I opted 
for analyzing the written parliamentary questions asked by individual deputies to a 
member of the national government and created the Parliamentary Question 
Dataset. Parliamentary questioning appears across parliaments as a mean for 
holding governments accountable (Wiberg 1995) and as such they are a crucial 
part of the system of policy making shedding light on the policies to which MPs 
direct their and voters’ attention (Ferree et al. 2002:14). From the perspective of 
political representation analysis, written parliamentary questions provide with a 
unique opportunity to examine both the behavior of individual parliamentarians 
and the functioning of modern legislatures (Martin 2011). These are a significant 
element of parliamentary debates providing an insight of deputies’ main concerns, 
as they are object to less behavioral constraints from the party leaders than other 
activities such as roll call voting or oral questions. Furthermore, the analysis of 
individual legislators’ behavior offers the possibility to examine the performance of 
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national legislatures - key institutions in the policy-making process – from a 
different perspective.  
 
Single written parliamentary questions contain two very useful pieces of 
information. First, they reveal the policy areas that are of interests to individual 
parliamentarians. In the questions deputies ask it can be observed to which topics 
they feel more concerned about. Second, the content of the question shows the 
representation orientation adopted by individual deputies. By examining the type 
of topics addressed evidence of personal vote cultivation, interest on national or 
local issues,  “good” party members following party leaders, and more 
independent deputies can be disclosed. In other words, written parliamentary 
questions stand as valid and solid measure of legislature activities compared with 
other parliamentary activities (Martin 2011). 
 
Substantive representation in this Chapter is measured counting the number of 
parliamentary questions tabled by individual deputies on issues related to border 
control, citizenship, and integration policies. Certainly, the number of questions 
captures the saliency (importance) of the issue of immigration for a given deputy 
and not the positions expressed (favorable or negative opinions on that issue). 
Confronted with limitations on the existent data where it is not possible to extract 
the positions expressed, saliency is taken as a proxy for issue relevance and 
representation (a similar strategy is applied by Saalfeld 2011, Martin 2011, Bird 
2005, Soroka et al. 2009)72. The central unit of analysis is the individual deputy 
for whom the total number of immigration-related questions is measured. Large 
numbers of immigration-related questions evidence good representation, and on 
the contrary, small numbers signals poor representation (see Thomassen 2012).  
                                                
72 In an ideal case a study of substantive representation would analyze the content of the questions 
asked to determine what positions do deputies represent in these policy areas. However to my 
knowledge there is not data available that would allow us to measure issue positions for every 
single written question.  
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6.2.4.1 Coding  
Written parliamentary questions tabled by individual deputies in the 2007 French 
National Assembly, 2005 German Bundestag and 2005 British House of 
Commons summing up to more than 350,000 questions are analyzed in this 
Chapter 73.  The coding of the questions has followed strict procedures combining 
computer-aided and manual coding methods. The coding scheme applied is 
context sensitive, which means that the objective has been to identify questions 
that target the immigrant population dependent on the country where these have 
been asked. Therefore using existent official documents and considering dominant 
national discursive frameworks words (including truncated words) related to 
border-control, citizenship and integration have been identified in French, 
German and English.  
 
Following an automated process, the data has been coded as (1=related to 
immigration, and 0=not related to immigration). In a second step I have 
examined the data and searched for false negatives and positives, being able to 
expand the keywords related to immigration74. A dummy variable was created 
registering whether the question explicitly referred immigration issues or not (1= 
immigration-related, 0=non immigration-related).  
 
The length of the questions varies across parliaments and deputies. In the French 
parliament questions are long (longer that in other legislatures) and framed in 
ways that make more reference to general over particular issues. The following is 
an example of a more general question about immigration:   
 
                                                
73 The analysis of the French case includes the period between June 2007 and April 2011. Deputies 
from overseas departments and territories have been excluded. The analysis of the British 
Parliament excluded the deputies from Scotland. 
74 The list of keywords is included in the Appendix. 
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France |Mr. B. from the UMP asks the Minister of Immigration, 
Integration, National Identity and Solidarity Development about the 
promotion of the national identity. He asks him to send him a 
summary of the current state of this issue75. 
 
This question asked in the French National Assembly asks to the Minister of 
Immigration about the promotion of the national identity in France. The question 
is a good example of the more indirect style used by French representatives. Also it 
illustrates the tendency in French politics to use politically correct concepts to refer 
to highly sensitive issues (i.e. national identity). 
 
In Germany, the written parliamentary questions are also in general lengthier 
than in the United Kingdom. Moreover, in terms of the topics covered they 
address a wide variety of issues. The following question is an example of the 
questions tabled at the Bundestag:  
 
Germany | Deputy W. asks “When is the federal Government expects 
the completion of the scientific evaluation of about the migrant labor 
market reform2010/Hartz IV, and when will the reports be publishes, 
and if not, why not?”76 
 
This precise question deals with some studies that were conducted in relation to 
reforms that were to be implemented in Germany related to immigrants’ access to 
social benefits.  
 
                                                
75 Mr. B. from the UMP “attire l'attention de M. le ministre de l'immigration, de l'intégration, de 
l'identité nationale et du développement solidaire sur la promotion de l'identité nationale. Il lui 
demande de bien vouloir lui dresser un bilan de l'état de l'existant”    
 
76 Mr. W from the Green party asks “Wann rechnet die Bundesregierung mit der Fertigstellung 
der wissenschaftlichen migrantenspezifischen Evaluation der Arbeitsmarktreform 2010/Hartz IV, 
und werden mögliche Zwischenberichte veröffentlicht, und wenn nein, warum nicht? 
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Finally, generally speaking in the British House of Commons questions are shorter 
and address specific issues in a very direct way. The following is an example of 
this:  
 
United Kingdom | Deputy A. from “Hackney North and Stoke 
Newington asked to the Minister of State, Department for 
Constitutional Affairs, what measures she has taken to increase the 
registration on the electoral register of black and ethnic minorities”. 
 
This parliamentary question addresses the electoral registration of black and 
minority voters. In the United Kingdom, the concept “ethnic minorities” refers to 
the non-white British population, and includes first and second-generation 
migrants and the populations from former colonies and the Commonwealth.  
 
All in all, as I show here the written questions asked evidence the concerns that 
individual deputies have on policies related to border control, citizenship and 
integration and are therefore a good element to analyze. 
6.2.5 Independent Variables 
The purpose of this research is to understand what factors influence immigrants’ 
political representation. Based on the existent literature I have hypothesized that 
immigrant constituencies, party policy position and immigrant deputies play a 
crucial role in immigration-related parliamentary question.  The description and 
measurement of each of these variables is detailed below. 
 
First, the variable constituency composition refers to the ethnic and cultural 
diversity that characterizes an electoral district. The variable measures the share 
of immigrant residents in every constituency, which results from the division of the 
number of immigrants in the constituency by the constituency total population. 
The share of immigrants in a constituency is a surrogate measure for constituency 
interests. Although a more exact measure of constituency policy preferences can 
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be derived from opinion polls, as the data is not available for the constituencies 
analyzed here I make use of this surrogate measure (for similar design see Saalfeld 
2011, Soroka et al. 2009).  
 
Second, the variable party policy position measures as the position of parties on 
integration policies. The Chapel Hill Expert survey (wave 2006) is used (Hooghe 
et al. 2010).  Experts on political parties in the three countries were asked to locate 
parties’ position on a 11 points scale in which 0= multiculturalism and 10 = 
assimilation. The use of expert surveys has two advantages compared to other 
ways of measuring party policy position. First, expert surveys are “set out to 
summarize the judgments of the consensus of experts on the matters at issue (…) 
in a systematic way” (Benoit and Laver 2006:75). And second, the complexity of 
certain issues makes expert surveys the perfect measurement instrument because 
experts are able to process diverse sources of information (Hooghe et al. 2010:3). 
 
Finally, the third independent variable is deputies’ background, a dummy variable 
that identifies the background of individual MPs (1= immigrant-origin and 0 = 
native). First and second-generation migrants have been identified among the 
members of the national legislatures, using deputies and deputies’ parents 
nationality at birth.  
6.2.6 Control Variables 
Together with the three key independent variables presented above, two control 
variables are included in the analysis of immigrants’ substantive representation.  
 
The first control variable is a count variable showing total number of questions, 
which show the total number of questions in all topics asked by an individual 
deputy. The purpose of this variable is to control for the potential effects of  
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“hyper-productive” MPs asking numerous questions in general (Saalfeld 2011: 
282).  
 
The second control variable is a dummy variable that discriminate opposition and 
majority deputies (where 1= opposition and 0= majority). Question time provides 
the opportunity to opposition parties and deputies to hold government 
accountable, to criticize adopted policies, to suggest new policies, and to send 
signal to voters as a potential alternative to the current government (see for 
example Soroka et al. 2009, Franklin and Norton 1993)  
6.2.7 Methods 
Content analysis is a method designed for analyzing written, verbal or visual 
messages  (Cole 1988), that relies on systematic and objective procedures to 
describe and quantify a phenomenon (Neundorf 1980). The method can be used 
with quantitative and qualitative data in a deductive, hypothesis testing, or in an 
inductive fashion. The usual procedure is to follow specified classifications: words 
and phrases that have similar meaning are filtered into fewer inclusive categories 
(Cavanagh 1997). The method of content analysis is particularly useful for 
understanding phenomena that need to be explored in depth like immigrants’ 
substantive representation. A structured categorization matrix containing the 
keywords identified has been applied to the written parliamentary questions of 
each of the legislatures analyzed in the search for patterns of substantive 
representation. 
 
The analysis of representation in this case relies on the manifest reference of 
immigration policy areas in the written questions. In the first part of the analysis 
descriptive statistics are used to show representational similarities and differences 
between deputies representing demographically diverse and more homogeneous 
constituencies, across parties, and between immigrant-origin MPs and natives 
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across parliaments. In the second part, negative binomial regressions are used 
examine to what extent the main independent variables (constituency 
composition, party policy position, and deputy’s background) explain immigrants’ 
substantive representation77.  
6.2.8 Reliability 
Reliability implies that the use of the same research methods should result in the 
same results for the same phenomenon (Miller 2007:92). The type of research that 
deals with some type of content analysis presents challenges related to the inherent 
subjectivity in the interpretation of text that is linked to differences in the 
properties that are attributed to specific concepts. Two major strategies are used 
to increase the reliability of these types of analyses. First, a crucial tool is inter-
coder reliability where the same content is assigned to two or more coders, and 
the reliability is established based on the amount of agreement or correspondence 
between the coders (Neundorf 2002:141). With this strategy, the coding process 
has to achieve acceptable levels of inter-coder agreement to validate the 
measurement. While numerous projects make use of this technique (for example 
the Manifestos Project, Chapter 4) it requires the mobilization of many human 
and monetary resources, which are not always available. Fortunately, 
technological development has facilitated the use computer-assisted content 
analysis. This second option has the advantage that can be easily replicated and 
that a single researcher can cope with huge amounts of data. In sum, the use of 
automatic coding reduces costs and increases reliability (Kind and Lowe 2003). In 
this research I have then opted for the second solution and used computer-assisted 
content analysis to identify the parliamentary questions that deal with 
immigration.  
                                                
77 I have included these variables (only) because similar studies show that these are the most 
important ones (see Bird et al. 2011, Saalfeld 2011).  
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6.2.9 Validity 
A central concern in the social sciences is that many concepts, as the concept of 
political representation, are abstract and cannot be observed directly (Krippendorf 
2004:315). In order to validate the main dependent variable of this research, that 
is immigrants’ substantive representation, I analyze one of the observable 
behaviors that this concept entails: asking questions in parliament on policy areas 
that are of central concerns for immigrant voters (border control, citizenship and 
integration policies). The method of content analysis on which the statistical 
analyses of this Chapter draw allows for making replicable and valid inferences 
from data to their context, in the aim of providing knowledge, new insights, and a 
representation of facts (Krippendorff 2004) for the studied phomenon. Precisely, 
the objective of content analysis is to condense data into concepts and categories, 
which facilitates the description immigrants’ substantive representation. 
Furthermore, the data here analyzed is representative of the questions asked in 
parliaments for the periods analyzed, fulfilling the requirement of “sampling 
validity” (Krippendorff 2004:319). Finally, I have ensured “semantic validity” of 
the data by making sure that the categories of analysis of a text correspond to the 
meanings these texts have within the chosen contexts (Krippendorff 2004:319).  
6.3 Results  
6.3.1 Immigrant Voters: Different Opinions? 
The study of immigrants’ substantive representation in national parliament 
presents several challenges. One of the biggest is related to the question of whether 
immigrants’ hold views and opinions, which are substantively different from the 
opinions of the native population. In Chapter 3 of this dissertation I have showed 
evidence signaling that immigrant voters tend to support to a greater extent 
parties that are in the center left and left of the political spectrum. Controlling for 
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socio-economic factors including gender, education and income we observed that 
migratory background plays a role in the voters’ party choice. The underlying 
assumption is that parties’ position related to immigration and integration policies 
is decisive. Thus, immigrant voters support parties that held more liberal views on 
these issues.  
 
The study of immigrants’ substantive representation is in line with the assumption 
that immigrant and native voters have different views on immigration. In order to 
explore this argument I examine the opinions of immigrant and native voters 
about the impact of immigration on the national economy78. Figure 23 shows the 
distribution of opinions on immigration between immigrant and native voters in 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Differences are calculated looking at 
the distribution of immigrant and native voters. Negative scores signal the 
distribution of native voters, and positive values show opinions held by immigrant 
voters (it expressed the differences in shares of both groups).  
 
Figure 23 shows a very clear pattern across the three countries. Native voters tend 
to think that immigration is bad for the country’s economy while immigrant voters 
tend to think that immigration is good for the national economy. However, 
opinion differences between immigrant and national voters are not equally intense 
in the three countries. In Germany, the groups are more similar than in France 
and the United Kingdom. One third of the German voters think that immigration 
is bad for the economy, 27 percent think is neither good nor bad, and 39 percent 
think that it good. Among the immigrant voters 25 percent think that immigration 
is bad, 26 have a moderate view and 45 percent consider that immigration is food 
for economic development. In France opinions about immigration are more 
                                                
78 I have also examined the opinions of immigrants and native voters on other issues captured by 
the ESS 2010 including: (1) satisfaction with the state of the economy, (2) agreement with 
reduction of difference in income levels, (3) levels of satisfaction with the national government, and 
views on the state of  (4) health services and (5) of education in the country. No major differences in 
opinions between immigrant and native voters are reported in these five policy areas.  
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polarized across groups. More than 40 percent of French voters think that 
immigration is bad for the economy against 24 percent of immigrant voters. 28 
percent of French respondents have a moderate view on the issue, while 30 
percent of immigrant voters do so. And, 30 percent of French and 46 percent of 
immigrant voters consider that immigration is good for the economy. Overall 
immigrants have more positive views on immigration than native French, and 
these differences are significant. Finally, in the United Kingdom inter-group 
differences are even more salient than in France. While 46 percent of the British 
population thinks that immigration is bad ford the economy, only 20 percent of 
immigrant respondents think so. Around 30 percent of the respondents of both 
groups think that immigration is not good nor bad for the economy, and one third 
of the British respondents think that immigration is good against more than a half 
of the immigrant respondents (30 and 56 percent respectively).  
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Figure 23.Is Immigration Good or Bad for the Country? 
(Distribution Difference in Percentage of Immigrant and 
Native Voters)  
 
 
Source: ESS 2010 
 
As can be seen, immigrant voters have different concerns on immigration issues 
compared to national voters. Therefore, in the following sections I examine how 
individual legislators and national legislatures respond to views and opinions of the 
immigrant population.  
6.3.2 National Legislatures  
One of the central concerns of content analysis is to make sense of the data that is 
being analyzed to learn ‘what is going on’ and to obtain an understanding of the 
whole (Tesch 1990).  Differences and similarities in the use of written 
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parliamentary questions are observed between the British House of Commons and 
the French National Assembly (see Table 22). Asking written questions is very 
common in the House of Commons, where the total number of questions is a bit 
more than 250,000. At the French Assembly, deputies ask also numerous 
questions as well. For the parliamentary period analyzed in this study the total 
number of questions summed more than 95,00079. Finally, in Germany the total 
number of questions is around 12,000. Regarding the questions on immigration, 
the numbers are very small in comparison with the total number of questions. In 
France, 1,468 questions deal with issues that are immigration specific, 
representing 1.5 percent of the total number of questions. In Germany, 186 
questions asked by members of the Bundestag were on immigration issues 
representing two percent of the total questions asked. And, in the United 
Kingdom 5,965 questions tabled referred to issues associated with immigration, 
which represents 2.3 percent of the total number of questions.  
                                                
79 In this research only the questions asked at the French National Assembly between the June 
2007 and April 2011 have been analyzed.  
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Table 22.Number and Percentage of  
Questions per Legislature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen, the attention devoted to immigration issues in parliamentary 
questioning is overall very low. Yet as shown above the issue is more salient in the 
House of Commons, followed by the Bundestag, and finally the French National 
Assembly.  
6.3.3 Constituencies  
As I have presented earlier, France, Germany and the United Kingdom have 
overall similar shares of immigrants living in their countries however the their 
geographic distribution varies across the countries, resulting in some 
constituencies being constituted of immigrants where in others native French, 
German or British are the great majority. To be precise, in France the mean share 
of immigrants per constituency is 5.4 percent, with a standard deviation of 4.5 and 
a range of 27.5. In Germany, the mean share of immigrants per constituency is 
8.5 percent, with a standard deviation of 5.33 and a range of 26.6 percent. And in 
the United Kingdom, even greater differences are observed in terms of the socio-
demographic compositions of the constituencies. The mean share of immigrants is 
8.3 percent per constituency, with a standard deviation of 11.9 and a range of 
65.8 percent. This means that in the United Kingdom the population is 
geographically very unevenly distributed.  
 Total 
Number  
of  WQs 
Number   
Immigration  
of WQs 
France 
 
95860 1486  
(1.5%) 
Germany 12604 256   
(2%) 
United Kingdom  259799 5965  
(2.3%) 
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The question of how well immigrants are represented by the elected deputies 
based on their geographic concentration is examined in Table 23. The table 
presents the average number of questions asked by the elected deputies elected in 
constituencies with low, middle-low, middle-high and high shares of immigrants. 
The data shows that in France the average number of questions increases when 
the share of immigrants in the constituencies. In constituencies with very low 
shares of immigrants deputies asked an average of 1.8 questions, in constituencies 
with mid-low shares an average of 2.1 questions, in districts with mid-high shares 
an average of 2.5 questions and finally in constituencies with high shares of 
immigrants an average of 4.2 questions. This evidence signals that in France the 
representation of immigration issues in the National Assembly increases when the 
immigrant population is larger and more concentrated. This relationship between 
immigration-related parliamentary questioning and the size of the immigrant 
population is however not present at the German Bundestag, and to a lesser 
extent in the United Kingdom.    
 
In Germany, the shares of immigrants in the constituency and the number of 
immigration questions asked by the deputies elected in the single-member districts 
have apparently not relationship. A larger number of questions (average 0.5) have 
been asked by deputies elected in constituencies with lower shares of immigrants. 
Deputies elected in constituencies with mid-low shares of immigrants didn’t ask 
any question on immigration. And deputies representing districts with mid-high 
and high shares of immigrants asked on average 0.1 questions on this topic. 
Second, as it is observed the overall number of questions asked by these deputies is 
very low. This evidence suggests that in the German case the electoral system is in 
reality a crucial factor influencing immigrants’ representation. In fact of the total 
number of immigration questions tabled, 18 percent (48 questions) were asked by 
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deputies elected by the single-member district system and 82 percent by the 
deputies elected under proportional representation.    
 
Finally, in the United Kingdom and more similar to France, the number of 
questions tends to increase together with the share of immigrants residing in the 
electoral constituency. Deputies elected in constituencies with low shares of 
immigrants tabled an average of 5.7 questions on the issue. Interestingly deputies 
that represent constituencies with mid-low shares of immigrants asked more than 
the double number of questions than the deputies of the first group (13.6 on 
average) and also more than the deputies elected in constituencies with more 
migrants. To be precise, British deputies elected in districts with mid-high shares 
of immigrants asked an average of 10.4 questions on immigration each, and 
deputies elected in constituencies with high shares of immigrants a mean number 
of 12.9 questions. Considering all this evidence, we observe progressive attention 
to immigration issues when the immigrant population increases yet the issue is 
more salient in constituencies with smaller, yet still visible, number of immigrants.  
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Table 23.Mean Number of Immigration Questions asked 
and Share of Immigrants in the Constituencies (quartiles) 
 
 % Immigrants in Constituency 
 Low Mid-Low Mid- High High 
France 1.8 2.1 2.6 4.2 
Germany80 0.5 0 0.1 0.1 
United Kingdom 5.7 13.6 10.4 12.9 
 
 
Grounding on this empirical evidence, we can conclude that size of the immigrant 
population is to a great extent related to the attention that elected deputies give to 
the issue (at least in France and the United Kingdom). Yet, we need to further 
explore this relationship to understand the dynamics of immigrants’ substantive 
representation.  
6.3.4 Political Parties  
The elected political parties in the general elections of France 2007, Germany 
2005 and United Kingdom 2005 held different positions related to immigration. 
As it can be observed in Figure 24 I have extracted the positions of elected parties 
on whether they rather support multicultural policies or assimilation of 
immigrants. Looking at the location of parties we detect different landscapes for 
the representation of immigrants across the national parliaments.  
 
In France, the average of position of elected parties is 6.2 with a standard 
deviation of 1.8 (unweighted measures) which signals that parties are in general 
more favorable of the assimilation of immigrants to the French culture. This 
                                                
80 This table only includes the 299 deputies elected in single-member districts who asked a total of 
48 questions related to immigration (18% of the total).  
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observation is in line with the fact that France has in Europe the longest tradition 
of assimilation (Brubaker 2001: 535). The governing majority party UMP has one 
of the strongest positions on assimilation in the National Assembly scoring 7.5 
(unweighted measure). Among the elected parties, only the Mouvement pour la 
France (MPF) holds a view that is more supportive of assimilation. Also close to 
the UMP but with a more moderate position is the centrist party coalition UDF-
Modem, which scores 6.7 in the given scale. Interestingly, both the Socialist and 
the Communist parties score 5.8, meaning that they have more moderate views 
on assimilation closely followed by the Left Radical Party (PRG). Finally the 
Green party (Verts) remains an exception in the French legislature being the only 
party that openly supports multicultural policies (score = 3.2).  
 
The German Bundestag combines, loyal its ideals of diversity, a rich array of 
views on the question of the integration of immigrants. On average parties score 
5.2 on the multiculturalism-assimilation scale, with a standard deviation of 2.9. 
These measures elucidate the existence of different views, and a more polarized 
parliament on this policy area. To start with, the governing coalition formed by 
the Christian Democrats, the CSU and the SPD has a variety of positions related 
to multiculturalism. The Bavarian party CSU scored 9 points on the scale, 
followed from not far by the CDU (score = 8.1). The Social Democrats score 4.6 
points being not very far from the FDP, which scores 5 points in the scale. The 
German left wing parties are clearly more favorable to multiculturalism than to 
assimilation. Yet the Linke and especially the Greens (Grünen) are strong 
supporters of multiculturalism scoring 3.5 and 1.3 respectively.  
 
Lastly, the House of Commons hosts on average more moderate views on the 
issue (mean 5.8, sd.2.1) yet among the cases here studied is also the parliament 
hosting the most radical party elected, the UKIP which scores 9.3 in favor of 
assimilation. The Conservatives are also favorable to assimilation and to a similar 
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extent than the UMP in France, scoring 7.5 in the scale. And the majority party, 
the Labour has also more conservative views on the issue (even more than the 
Socialist party in France, and the Social Democrats in Germany) and scores 6.4 in 
favor of assimilation. The remaining parties in the House are either moderate 
supporters of multiculturalism, like the Scottish National Party (5) and the Liberal 
Democratic Party (4.9) or more enthusiastic supporters like the Party of Wales 
(PLAID, 4) and the Greens (3.4).  
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Figure 24.Multiculturalism Policy Position of Elected Parties per Country 
 
   Source: CHES 2006 and 2010.  
   Legend: Governing parties represented by white triangles. France: mean 6.2, sd. 1.8 |Germany: mean 5.2, sd. 2.9 | United Kingdom: mean 5.8, sd. 2.1 
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Summing up, the three national legislatures examined in this thesis have different 
landscapes in relation to the positions on immigration of the elected Governments 
and parties. In this very rich context, a crucial question is how parties’ position on 
the issue of immigration related to the questions asked by individual members of 
parliament.  
 
Table 24 shows the number of immigration questions asked broken down by 
party81. In France, the Socialist party asked the largest number of questions on the 
issue of immigration in the whole French legislature, tabling 679 questions. They 
are closely followed by the UMP as the members of this party tabled 642 questions 
on immigration. The Left deputies asked 137 questions, and finally the deputies in 
the center asked only 28 questions in relation to immigration. In relative terms 
however, 3 percent of the questions asked by members of the Left party making it 
the party that gives proportionally more attention to the issue, which is also 
observed on the fact that on average Left deputies asked 6 questions on the issue. 
2 percent of the questions asked by the deputies of the socialist party were related 
to immigration, which means that per deputy there is an average of 3.5 questions 
on the topic. Finally in the case of the UMP and the Center immigration questions 
represent only 1 percent of the total, of which on average 2 questions on 
immigration for the deputies of the former, and 1.1 for the elected representatives 
of the latter.  
 
In Germany, the deputies of the Green party asked a total of 53 questions on 
immigration, which represents 2 percent of the total number of questions tabled 
during the legislative term, and an average of 1 percent of questions per deputy. 
The Linke has tabled the larges number of questions on immigration: a total of 95 
questions, which represents the 3 percent of the questions its member asked. 
                                                
81 For the analysis of France parliamentary groups have been used instead of parties because this is 
the only partisan data available for the French deputies. 
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Therefore on average the members of the Linke tabled 1.8 immigration questions. 
Surprisingly the Social Democrats tabled the smallest number of immigration 
questions, only 18. Still given that they tabled a small number of questions in 
general this represents 2 percent of the total number of questions they asked 
deriving on an average of 0.1 percent of immigration questions per deputy. Based 
on this evidence parliamentary questions does not seem to be a tool that the Social 
Democrats exploit fully, but this can be explained by the fact that they are part of 
the “grand coalition”. Finally the members of the FDP tabled 40 questions on 
immigration, which is 1 percent of the total number of questions and which 
locates them as the second party with the largest number of immigration questions 
per deputy (average of 0.7) in the Bundestag. Finally, the CDU/CSU which 
represents the largest party group in the Bundestag tabled a total of 50 questions, 
which represents 2 percent of the total questions asked like in the case of the 
Greens and the Social Democrats, yet in terms of the average number of 
immigration questions per deputy they are very low and perform only a bit better 
than the SPD (0.1 questions per deputy).  
 
The House of Commons has compared to the Assembly and the Bundestag a 
different approach to immigration questions. First of all, the total number of 
questions in the House are considerably higher that in the other two legislatures. 
Also, the number of immigration questions is higher both in absolute and relative 
terms. The members of the Liberal Democrat party asked 1,068 questions on the 
issue of immigration. 2 percent of the total number of questions the Liberal 
deputies asked was on this topic, representing the highest average of questions per 
deputy 20.5 of the whole parties here examined. Labour deputies represent the 
governing party. They tabled in total 1,794 questions related to immigration issues 
which represent 3 percent of the total questions they asked (and the highest 
percentage in the House) yet on average Labour deputies asked only 5.8 
questions, that is the smallest number in the House. This evidence signals that in 
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relative terms immigration issues are important for the party yet as it is the 
incumbent party the overall number of questions is smaller than for the opposition 
parties. Finally, the conservatives tabled the larges number of immigration 
questions (n=3,103), which represents as for the liberals 2 percent of the total 
questions they asked and an average of 15.9 questions per deputy of that party.  
 
To conclude, the descriptive statistics are quite revelatory. In France left deputies 
give proportionally more attention to immigration questions than center and right 
deputies, which sheds light on the existence of a Left-Right divide. In Germany 
this division also exists, yet the role of representation belongs more to the Linke 
and Green parties, as the Social Democrats are the ones giving less attention to 
the issue. Lastly, in the United Kingdom all parties are very active at asking 
questions on immigration.  
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Table 24.Number and Share of Immigration Questions by Party  
 
Country Party 
No. 
Questions 
Immigration 
Questions  % 
No.  
 MPS 
Average 
Deputy 
France Left 4587 137 3% 23 6.0 
 PS  29976 679 2% 192 3.5 
 Center 4441 28 1% 25 1.1 
 UMP 56856 642 1% 315 2.0 
Germany Grune 2781 53 2% 51 1.0 
 Linke  2889 95 3% 54 1.8 
 SPD 769 18 2% 222 0.1 
 FDP 4038 40 1% 61 0.7 
 CDU/CSU 2127 50 2% 226 0.2 
United Kingdom  LibDem 48718 1068 2% 52 20.5 
 Lab 65569 1794 3% 312 5.8 
 Cons 145512 3103 2% 195 15.9 
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Parliamentary questions are a mean for holding governments accountable 
(Wiberg 1995). Therefore in this context an important question is whether the fact 
of being in government or in the opposition has a major effect on how many 
questions deputies ask on immigration. Table 25 presents the questions asked by 
majority and opposition members. The behavior of both majority and opposition 
members of parliaments reveal similarities and differences across parliaments. 
Following the logic of government control, deputies from governing parties ask 
fewer questions on immigration than opposition parties.  In France deputies of the 
UMP asked 642 questions and deputies from the opposition 844. In Germany 
deputies from the grand coalition asked in total 68 immigration questions whereas 
the deputies of the opposition asked a total of 188 questions. Finally, in the United 
Kingdom the Labour deputies who are members of the majority party asked in 
total 1,794 questions while the opposition deputies asked 4,171 questions.  In 
relative terms however there are in France deputies of the opposition asked larger 
shares of immigration questions than majority deputies (2.1 and 1 percent), yet in 
Germany and the United Kingdom the logic reverses. 1.9 percent of the questions 
asked by the opposition and 2.3 percent of the questions asked by the members of 
the majority raised concerns about immigration in the Bundestag. While in the 
House of Commons, 2.1 of the questions tabled by the members of the opposition 
were concerned about immigration matters while 3 percent of the questions of the 
majority were on these questions.  
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Table 25.Number and Share of Immigration Questions by 
Majority and Opposition Deputies  
 
 Governing  
Party(ies) 
Opposition  
Parties 
France 642 
(1%) 
844 
 (2.1%) 
Germany  68 
(2.3%) 
188 
(1.9%) 
United Kingdom 1,794 
(3%) 
4,171 
(2.1%) 
 
 
To conclude, differences between left, center and right wing parties in terms of the 
number and percentages of questions on immigration they ask are observed across 
national legislatures. However, what appears as a common trait is a correlation 
between parties’ position on multicultural policies and the relevance of the issue 
for its members. Overall, the more the party favors multiculturalism (left parties in 
France, the Greens and the Linke in Germany and the Liberal Democrats in the 
United Kingdom) the more its members ask questions related to immigration. 
Finally, the role of control that parliamentary questions can play is observed in the 
three parliaments. Opposition deputies ask in absolute terms more questions on 
immigration than deputies of governing parties. Yet in relative terms immigration 
has been of a greater concern for the opposition only in France. And one possible 
explanation for this is the side in which the major center-left is located: the 
Socialists are in France in the opposition, yet the Social Democrats in France and 
the Labour party in the United Kingdom are governing parties. Thus all these 
findings lead us to seek for further examination of what other factors influence the 
treatment of immigration issues.  
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6.3.5 Immigrant Deputies 
A major question in the study of immigrants’ representation is about the 
relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. The rationale is 
that deputies’ personal experiences of migration, integration, xenophobia leads 
them to have a greater concern about the situations experienced by immigrant 
residents in the country. Figure 25 shows the average number of immigration 
questions asked by both immigrant and native deputies in every national 
legislature. At a first glance we observe a similar trend across national legislatures: 
the average number of questions on immigration asked by immigrant deputies is 
higher than the average number of immigration questions asked by national 
deputies. In France, immigrant representatives ask on average 3.6 questions on 
immigration, while French deputies ask only 2.6. In Germany elected immigrants 
to the Bundestag asked an average of 2.3 immigration questions, while German 
deputies asked an average of only 0.2 questions on the issue. Finally, in the United 
Kingdom immigrant deputies also outperform British deputies in terms of the 
number of immigration questions they ask (19.4 and 10.3 respectively).  
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Figure 25.Average Number of Questions Asked by 
Immigrant and Native Deputies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Generally speaking these findings point in the direction of a close relationship 
between the descriptive and substantive representation of immigrants in European 
democracies.  
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6.3.6 Constituencies, Parties or Immigrant Deputies  
So far I have examined the extent to which the share of immigrants in the 
electoral constituencies, political parties and immigrant affect individually 
immigrants’ descriptive representation. Looking at the above presented evidence 
we observe that immigration-related parliamentary questioning is related to larger 
immigrant populations (except in Germany), to members of parties that favor 
multicultural policies and to members of the legislature that have an immigrant 
background.   
 
A question that emerges in this context is whether these three factors are equally 
important, and whether similarities are observed across countries. Therefore I 
proceed to analyze the extent to which these factors influence immigrants’ 
representation in national legislatures. Table 26 presents the results of a binomial 
regression examining the number of questions tabled by the members of the 
French National Assembly and the British House of Commons82. The main 
independent variables included are the share of immigrants in the constituency, 
the position of the deputy’s party on multicultural policies, and a dummy variable 
indicating whether the deputy has a migratory background (1=yes, 0=no).  
Additionally, whether MPs are in the opposition or not and the total number of 
questions they ask are also relevant, so I have included these control variables. 
The dependent variable is the number of immigration questions, which is an over-
dispersed count variable because the conditional variance exceeds the conditional 
mean. Therefore, a series of negative binomial regressions were fitted to the 
country cases, regressing the number of immigration-related questions asked by 
individual MPs in the national legislatures on the independent and control 
                                                
82 Germany has been excluded from this analysis due to the very small number of questions tabled 
in the Bundestag.  
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variables specified above. Two separate models have been run for France and the 
United Kingdom to account for cross-country variations.  
 
The results presented in Table 26 show further specify immigrants’ representation 
in national legislatures. The first analysis examines the effects of the independent 
variables on immigration-related parliamentary questions in the French National 
Assembly. The share of immigrants in the constituency has a positive and highly 
significant effect (p<.001) on immigration-related parliamentary questioning, 
party policy position has a positive yet not significant effect on the number of 
questions tabled and the impact of the dummy variable background is in the 
expected direction because immigrant deputies also ask more questions that 
national deputies, yet this relationship is not significant. In terms of the effects of 
the control variables we observe that opposition party membership and the total 
number of questions asked (all topics combined) have a significant effect on the 
number of immigration questions  (p<.001).  
 
The second analysis examines immigration-related parliamentary questioning in 
the British House of Commons. The evidence shows that the share of immigrant-
origin residents in the constituencies influences the number of immigration 
questions asked in the House, and the effect of socio-demographic composition on 
the number of immigration questions deputies ask is significant (p<.001). The 
position of parties on the issue is unlike in France negative, yet like in France it is 
not significant. This means that the number of questions tabled by a deputy 
increases when its party moves towards more assimilation policies. Regarding the 
dummy variable background, a change from cero to one, meaning that the 
members of the House has a migratory background, has an effect on the number 
of immigration questions, yet again the effect is not significant. Finally the fact of 
being a member of an opposition party and the total number of questions asked 
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during the legislative period have a significant effect on the total number of 
immigration questions.  
 
Table 26.Negative Binomial Regression for the Number of 
Immigration Questions83 
 
Number of Questions 
Independent Variables France United Kingdom 
Constituency (% Immigrants)  .084 (.01)*** 
 
.031 (.0066)*** 
Party policy position -.013 (.08) .100 (.0907) 
Immigrant Deputy (dummy)  .551 (.27) .309 (.3620) 
Member of the Opposition (dummy)  .635 (.200)*** .814 (.1515)*** 
Total No WQs   .003 (.000)*** .002 (.0002)*** 
Constant -.806 (.677) -.342(.6075) 
N 555 559 
 
Cells contain coefficients from a negative binomial regression model with standard errors in parentheses 
*p≤.05, ** p≤.01, ***p≤.001 
 
In essence the analyses reveal that deputies represent immigrants when these are 
numerous and concentrated, confirming the expectations presented earlier in this 
Chapter (H9) that deputies elected in ethnically diverse constituencies represent to 
a larger extent immigrants in national legislatures than deputies elected in “white” 
constituencies. Besides, the analyses do not support the expectations that parties’ 
position on immigration will influence the questions on immigration that deputies 
ask. Indeed two important facts have to be highlighted on this regard. The first 
one is that the effects of partisanship on immigration-related parliamentary 
questioning are very low. The second one is that when including all the relevant 
variables party policy position shows across legislatures opposing effects. While in 
France, deputies from parties that are closer to multiculturalism (that is closer to 0) 
tend to ask more questions on immigration, in the United Kingdom is the 
opposite: more questions are asked by members of parties that oppose 
                                                
83 The French overseas departments and territories and the Scottish constituencies have been 
excluded from the analyses. France includes questions asked between June 2007 and March 2011.  
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multiculturalism (closer to 10). As a result, we are not able to provide evidence for 
Hypothesis 10, which suggested a correlation between party policy position and 
the number of immigration questions. Finally, the analyses do not provide enough 
empirical foundations to establish a relationship between descriptive 
representations (Hypothesis 11). To put it in another way, while accounting by the 
effects of other factors on substantive representation, the evidence presented here 
doesn’t support the assumption that immigrant deputies are more likely than 
native deputies to represent the immigrant electorate. All things considered, we 
also show that deputies in the opposition and active deputies (on all topics 
confounded) do a great job in putting the issue of immigration on the political 
debate by asking numerous questions about immigration, citizenship and 
immigrants’ integration.  So to answer the main question of this section we can 
conclude that it is the presence of immigrants in the electoral constituencies, 
which has the largest effect on their representation in national legislatures.  
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6.4 Conclusion and Discussion 
Chapter 6 investigates the substantive representation of immigrants in national 
legislatures. Grounding on existent literature this study investigates in particular 
how the socio-demographic composition of the electoral constituencies in which 
deputies were elected, the policy position of the parties that deputies represent, 
and migratory background influence the extent to which immigration issues were 
among the concerns of national deputies.  
 
The analysis of substantive representation relies on the examination of the written 
parliamentary questions tabled by individual deputies in their respective 
legislatures. Parliamentary question are a very useful tool to examine deputies’ 
individual policy preferences and concerns. In the context of this study substantive 
representation is measured in terms of the number of times a deputy ask a 
question that is related to immigration, citizenship or integration. And I assume 
that representation increases when more questions are asked. In this study I 
examine French National Assembly elected in 2007, the German Bundestag 
elected in 2005 and the British House of Commons elected in 20005. The 
selection of cases is based on a number of common criteria that the cases share, 
and has been performed to facilitate our understanding of commonalities as well 
of differences across European democracies.   
 
The analyses of parliamentary questions reveal that across parliaments the share 
of immigrants residing in an electoral constituency (which is a surrogate measure 
of constituency interests) significantly affects the number of immigration-related 
parliamentary questions asked by the deputies elected in these constituencies 
providing with evidence to support H9. In this framework, deputies’ 
responsiveness to their constituencies makes sense as they are elected in and by the 
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constituencies (single-member constituency system) and high priority to 
constituency concerns can have a return in personal votes (Cain et al. 1987; Blais 
et al. 2003). Besides, traditionally, the role of parties has been shown to explain to 
a great extent legislative representation across European legislatures (Owens 2003, 
Strøm and Nyblade 2007). Nonetheless in the context of immigrants’ 
representation parties are less influential than it is assumed which presents a 
disagreement with the expectations formulated in H10. Lastly, immigrant deputies 
are active in asking immigration questions and they do so to a greater extent than 
native deputies. However when other factors are considered (like the constituency 
in which she was elected, the party she is member of etc.) the effects of having a 
personal history of migration has a smaller effect on the extent to which 
immigration issues are a concern for these deputies, challenging the expectations 
of H11. Finally, factors such as being a deputy of an opposition party and being 
active on other topics also increases the extent to which a deputy will voice 
questions that are of concerns for the immigrant populations living in these 
countries.  
 
To conclude the findings presented in this Chapter are in line with Saalfeld (2011) 
and Soroka et al. (2009) as they indicate the existence of dyadic relationship 
between immigrant voters and their representatives, and raises questions about 
the relationships between (1) party policy position and deputies’ issue 
representation and (2) the descriptive and substantive representation of 
immigrants in national legislatures, which need future examination.   
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7. Conclusion and Discussion  
This doctoral dissertation is an empirical study of the political incorporation, 
participation and representation of immigrants in European democracies. While 
international migration is gaining in scope and complexity, not only in Europe but 
worldwide, I hoped to shed more light on the underlying processes and 
implications of this phenomenon for electoral democracies. In order to do so, I 
examined the process of immigrants’ political incorporation. Following Easton 
(1957) I examined the input of immigrants’ interests and demands, the support 
they receive from the immigrant and national electorates and political parties, and 
their impact on political representation.  
 
This last section highlights the main findings of this study. It discusses in particular 
the observed effects immigration and ethnic diversity has on turnout, voting, 
parties and representation. Finally it summarizes the main contributions of this 
dissertation and reviews the limitations of the studies presented here and how 
these topics can be addressed in the future.  
7.1 Main Findings  
Chapter 2 “Setting the Context: Multicultural Democracies”: European 
countries are experiencing mass immigration to unknown levels and migratory 
inflows are becoming the main source of demographic change in these societies. 
Population predictions forecast that in the next decades first and second 
generation migrants will count for one third of the total European population. 
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Immigrants are in their majority workers and face several challenges including 
greater levels of unemployment, deskilling and discrimination. These socio-
demographic transformations have considerable implications for electoral 
democracies. One of the most important ones is that immigrants tend to 
concentrate in specific cities and areas, which in combination to the liberalization 
of citizenship policies and the extension of voting rights contribute to formation of 
an immigrant electorate. As a result in some electoral constituencies the fortune of 
electoral candidates and political parties depends to a great extent on the support 
of immigrant voters. In essence, in the same way that immigration is transforming 
the landscape of European societies it is the drive of major transformation at the 
heart of electoral democracies. 
 
Chapter 3 “The Immigrant Voter”: The comparative study of the voting 
behavior of immigrant voters sheds light on the fact that in general immigrants 
register lower turnout than native voters. The fact that similar participation 
patterns are observed across groups and contexts suggests that many immigrants 
feel alienated from the democratic system where they live. Electoral studies 
explain this by the fact that most migrants are workers and workers tend to 
participate less than other social classes. Yet, immigration-centered approaches 
also point out that immigrants are also less integrated because they usually go 
through a couple of years in which they are not allowed to vote, they have limited 
political knowledge and feel they have little or not impact on the political system. 
Besides, immigrant groups show different voting preferences. At first glance 
immigrant voters seem to be strong supporters of left and center left parties yet the 
evidence doesn’t support the ethnic cleavage hypothesis. Instead, the findings 
suggest the existence of interaction between ethnic groups specificities and party 
systems.  
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Chapter 4 “Issue Evolution and Political Parties”: The examination of 
the evolution multiculturalism across parties and party systems shows that the 
saliency of the issue is related to international migration. As a result when 
immigration increased the issue became more and more salient. One of the key 
findings of this empirical study is that against what is commonly believed the 
saliency of the issue is not exclusively the result of an anti-immigration agenda. 
Instead, till the 1990s the politicization of the issue across European democracies 
resulted mainly from positive mentions of multiculturalism, even among 
nationalist parties. Yet in the last decades parties have turned against 
multiculturalism. And several situations including terrorism, civil unrest, and 
political conflicts are associated with this twist in the politics of immigration. 
Finally the cross-country analysis shows that in most party systems the issue is 
gaining in saliency yet it is only in countries where anti-immigration parties are 
present that parties are more polarized on the issue and opposition to 
multiculturalism is stronger.  
 
Chapter 5 “Descriptive Representation”: As for the study of descriptive 
representation the findings show that the characteristics of electoral systems 
influence to a certain extent the representation of immigrants in national 
legislatures. In fact, while proportional systems tend to facilitate the descriptive 
representation of under-represented groups in the case of immigrants it is not 
exactly the case. Instead, the evidence suggests that the presence of immigrant 
representatives results from the combination of factors: the capacity of immigrants 
to pursue a political career, the openness of political parties in the candidate 
nomination process, and the ability of immigrant candidates to mobilize the 
(immigrant) electorate in the constituency where they run. First, parties of the left, 
in particular Socialists and Greens, and are more likely to nominate immigrant 
candidates than center and right wing parties. Second, immigrants tend to be 
nominated and elected in constituencies with higher concentrations of immigrant 
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voters. Third, the pool of candidates among the immigrant populations is not very 
big partially as a result of the additional cultural and socio-economic barriers to 
integration that immigrants face. In consequence, those immigrant candidates that 
make it into national legislatures excel their national counterparts in areas like 
education and experience. Finally, the role that these factors for immigrants’ 
representation depends to a great extent on the context. In France and Germany 
political parties appear as the main driving forces behind the election of 
immigrant candidates. While in the United Kingdom immigrant constituencies 
are the keys in the election of immigrant deputies.   
 
Chapter 6 “Substantive Representation”: The question of whether 
descriptive representation enhances substantive representation is a great concern 
in political research. Therefore in the last empirical study of this dissertation I 
have examined immigration-related parliamentary questions in the legislatures of 
France, Germany and United Kingdom. The empirical evidence sheds light on 
interesting facts. First of all, the focus on the issue of immigration is a fertile 
ground to examine how well immigrants are represented in policy making. 
Although both immigrant and native voters hold similar opinions across most 
policy areas because they are related to other socio-demographic variables like 
gender, education or income; ethnic background defines citizens’ opinions on 
immigration policies. In general terms, immigrants are more positive about 
immigration while natives are more negative about it. The representation of 
immigration concerns in national parliaments is the result of the interplay of key 
political actors. Deputies elected in immigrant constituencies, those that are 
members of parties having more favorable views towards multiculturalism, and 
deputies having a migratory background ask on average more questions about 
immigration than other elected representatives in national legislatures. 
Nonetheless, the empirical evidence in France and the United Kingdom shows 
that immigrants’ substantive representation depends to a vast extent on whether 
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immigrants are concentrated and visible within the electoral constituencies. As a 
matter of fact immigrants’ substantive representation increases considerably when 
immigrants represent big shares of the electorate because deputies are more 
responsive to them.  
 
To conclude, the findings presented in this dissertation have potentially important 
implications for the study of electoral democracies in the age of migration since 
they suggest that migratory inflows and immigrant voters might matter more than 
previously thought.  
7.2 Limitations 
The findings presented in this dissertation should be considered with care. As I 
have highlighted all through the numerous clarifications and comments in this 
manuscript the questions examined here presented several challenges. To start 
with, the study of immigrants and immigrations in Europe poses the difficult task 
of identifying those individuals. First and second generation migrants are counted 
differently in population statistics, they register lower responses rates and are 
under-represented in most representative surveys, they change names, not to 
mention some of the issues related to their legal status, which make them invisible 
or appear underrepresented in some statistics. Therefore to a great extent 
immigrants are marginalized and difficult-to-reach populations. As a result of 
these facts, all the empirical analyses I have presented should be handled with 
care. Although I have always tried to use the best available data sometimes due to 
the lack of the adequate data many of the measurements are based on proxies or 
may have biases. 
 
In its vast majority, studies on political behavior are based on representative 
samples of the population examined. However, as this data is not available for all 
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the countries examined here - at least to my knowledge - many of the findings are 
based on very small number of observations. Being aware of the implications of 
breaking so many rules at once I have opted however to proceed with the study in 
the aim of providing with some hints that advance our understanding about the 
immigrant electorate. Therefore, these findings are not to be considered as 
conclusive but rather as some evidence that requires further examination. 
 
Equally important it is to be aware that the examination of immigrants’ 
descriptive and substantive representation in national legislatures has been 
conditional to my capabilities to gather data on the origin of the elected deputies. 
Therefore, although I have deployed many efforts to this endeavor, and I have 
made use of data collected by other teams, it is plausible that we are in the 
presence of false negatives; this means that I have treated some deputies of 
immigrant origin as native. Gathering personal data on citizenship and the place 
of birth and citizenship of the parents has proven to be a very difficult task.  
 
Finally, I have tried to maintain as much as possible the comparative scope of this 
study and therefore did my best to include in every study as many cases as I could. 
Yet many parts of the empirical studies rely on few cases and/or cover a very 
limited time span, therefore the generalization of the findings should be limited to 
the cases here presented. 
7.3 Future Research 
While the study of multicultural democracies, immigrant voters, multiculturalism 
and party systems, and descriptive and substantive representation presented in this 
dissertation has made some substantial findings, these pave the way for the 
directions of future research. All the way through the whole study I have provided 
with evidence that shows that immigrants and immigrations are fueling socio-
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political changes in European democracies, and made the point that these 
phenomena require further and deeper examination. In the following, I will 
summarize and discuss some of the aspects that demand further investigation.  
 
The Immigrant Electorate: The study of the political participation and party 
choice of immigrant voters found evidence that the country of origin and the 
characteristics of immigrant group may have and impact on electoral behavior. 
This finding is in line with the conclusions reached by other authors who have in 
single-case studies shown the importance of group-specific effects (Heath et al. 
2011, Brouard and Tiberj 2005). Therefore, future research should consider the 
impact of the country (or region) of origin on immigrants’ political behavior. This 
approach could facilitate the comparison of immigrant groups within a given 
context and shed light on how these relate to the institutions and political actors of 
the hosting country highlighting the inter-group commonalities and differences. In 
addition, similar groups should be observed across countries to understand how 
group-specific characteristics (like the Southeast Asians that register across 
countries lower turnout) travel across contexts. And vice-versa, it would be 
possible to better observe how specific features of given democracies foster or 
hamper the political integration, participation and representation of immigrant 
groups. There are studies demonstrating inter-group and contextual differences 
(for example Bloemraad 2006). Thus further examining the role of these factors in 
European democracies may be of great scientific value.  
 
Political Parties: With regard to the examination of political parties and party 
families, the findings have shown that negative framings of multiculturalism are 
rather a new phenomenon. Taking this into account it is important to further 
understand the mechanisms behind the major change observed on the positions of 
parties and party systems on this policy domain. Future research should unpack 
this policy domain into immigration, citizenship and integration in order to be 
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able to elucidate the underlying dynamics of party policy positioning. In fact, 
when the issue of immigration is unpacked into different policy areas it is possible 
to better understand the real implications of the positions adopted. For example, 
right parties can favor immigration to fulfill the needs of the labor market, just as 
the UMP in France promoted selective high-skilled migration. Equally, left parties 
can promote the integration of immigrants but advocating the regulation of the 
number of newcomers (see for example Money 1999, Banting et al. 2006:57). 
Therefore political research has potentially a lot to gain from the separated 
analysis of political parties’ positions on these policy domains.  
 
Descriptive Representation: In the study of immigrants’ descriptive 
representation an interesting observation is the fact that electoral systems are less 
related to how well immigrants are represented in national legislatures than 
expected. While the literature suggests women are better represented in 
proportional systems than in majoritarian systems, immigrants are not. This 
finding challenges many assumptions in the field, and therefore needs closer 
examination. Besides, upcoming research should seek to better incorporate the 
variable immigrant constituency in the examination of representation. This is in 
line with the claims of some researchers that the immigrant populations should be 
accounted for (Bloemraad 2013, Forest 2012) which are based on the observation 
that the size and concentration of the immigrant population are an important 
factor explaining representation (Bird 2005). Therefore a more elaborated 
measurement of descriptive representations in single member constituencies 
should include the size of the immigrant population into the equation.   
 
Substantive Representation: Finally, the findings derived from the 
examination of substantive representation reveal that parties have little or no 
effect on immigration-related parliamentary questioning. This finding can be 
partially explained by the nature of written parliamentary questioning which is an 
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instrument that gives a lot of freedom to individual deputies. Therefore future 
research should examine immigrants’ representation by looking at other 
parliamentary activities such as roll call voting and speeches. Only a truly 
multidimensional approach to representation can reveal the extent to which 
immigrants are represented in the national legislatures of multicultural 
democracies.  
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9. Appendix 
Table 27.Glossary: Parliamentary Questions Coding 
 
Root Concepts (EN) 
Asyl Asylum, Asylum seeker, Asylum seekers, Asylum policies 
Deportation Deportation 
Detention Detention center, Detention camp 
Discrimination Discrimination 
Ethnic Ethnic minorities, Ethnic background, Ethnicity 
Exclusion Exclusion, Social exclusion 
Family Family-based immigration program 
Foreigner Foreigner, Foreigners 
Illegal Illegal Immigrant 
Immigr Immigrant, Immigrants, Immigration 
Integration Integration, Integration policies 
Irregular Irregular migrant, Irregular migrants, Irregular Migration 
Migr Migrant, Migrant, Migratory Flow, Migratory Background, 
Migration Policies 
Multicult Multicultural, Multiculturalism 
Permit Residency permit, Working permit 
Refugee Refugee, Refugees 
Residency Residency permit 
Romani People Romani People  
Undocumented Undocumented Migrants  
Visa Visa 
Xenoph Xenophobic, Xenophobia 
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